VZCZCXRO7015
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4765/01 3640135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8822
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004765 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DIWANYAH: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS 
FORWARD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Diwaniyah is a province with a number of 
problems.  Security is weak and the reconstruction process is 
virtually halted.  Restarting the reconstruction process 
could provide an alternative to young men with a desire for 
employment, but that is only part of the solution.  Free and 
fair provincial elections, a consistent relationship with the 
Embassy, and a sense of security could also help. This is one 
of a series of analyses by Provincial Reconstruction Teams on 
the governates of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
---------------- 
Political Issues 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Diwanyah province has become something of a neutral 
battlefield for Shia militias.  The violence and illegal 
activities that Al Sarkhi, Jaysh Al Mahdi (JAM) and Badr 
Corps will not conduct in Najaf is being played out in 
Diwaniyah.  Assassinations, including that of the former 
governor Jamal Al Zamili have become more frequent.  Open 
battles in the street between rival militias and the IP have 
become somewhat common. 
 
¶3.  (S) As a backdrop to the aforementioned violence, 
Governor Khalil Hamza has provided tepid leadership in the 
area of security and reconstruction.  Hamza has become a 
mouthpiece and apologist for OMS/JAM.  While he himself is 
SCIRI, he does not have enough political clout to either 
stand up to JAM or ally himself with an alternative such as 
Badr.  Hamza has attempted to create &no-go8 zones for 
coalition forces (CF).  These areas are often located near or 
in Sadrist strongholds.  This has been a clear attempt to 
appease JAM, but has created more violence as the militia 
becomes more emboldened.  The recent violent activity in 
Diwanyah has been one of the strongest indicators of Muqtada 
Al Sadr,s (MAS) loss of control over some JAM groups.  As 
violence flairs in the province MAS has been forced to put 
aside his political ambitions and act as the leader of a 
militia organization.  In Diwanyah JAM plans and carries out 
attacks without central tasking.  For the time being MAS has 
been able to corral the JAM splinter groups in the province, 
but the weakness of the governor combined with Sadr,s 
political distractions have created fertile ground for 
violence. 
 
¶4.  (S) The strongest political player in the province is the 
PC Chairman Sheikh Hussein Al Kalidi.  As a bloc SCIRI holds 
20 of the 41 PC seats in the province.  This allows SCIRI to 
drive the reconstruction effort and steer funding towards its 
interests.  This will likely be used to their advantage as 
provincial elections approach.  The greater factor in how 
provincial elections will turn out is the spending of civil 
organizations associated with OMS and SCIRI.  A great deal of 
money is being spent on social services and providing 
&security8 for important voting blocs.  One estimate saw 
OMS receive 500,000 USD to be used to assist the poor and 
displaced persons.  While this occurs, SCIRI/Badr also have 
their own civil society organizations, but have become quite 
adept at utilizing their political power to keep their 
political enemies off balance (See security). 
 
¶5.  (S) The outcome of Provincial elections, if they occur in 
2007, will be very difficult to predict.  They are likely to 
spur violence between the rival militias.  It appears however 
that the electorate will be looking for an alternative. 
There is too much unemployment and violence.  Any alternative 
will have to be able to withstand withering attacks both 
rhetorical and violent by the Islamists.  Saad Al Abdili is 
head of the IECI and seems conscientious and capable.  He 
will work with CF and the other organizations to give the 
elections a fighting chance at being free and fair.  He will 
need assistance. 
 
--------------- 
Economic Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) The Diwanyah economy is based on heavy industry such 
as textiles and rubber.  Though those sectors have declined 
drastically.  This began prior to 2003 and has continued to 
date.  Construction and construction materials has been a 
stalwart of the economy in Diwanyah.  Reconstruction has been 
going well in surrounding provinces and construction 
 
BAGHDAD 00004765  002 OF 003 
 
 
materials have been in demand.  In Diwanyah province, 
violence, and a Governor and PC that have frequently been at 
odds have stalled reconstruction. 
 
¶7.  (C) At present unemployment throughout the province 
excluding government employees hovers above 60%.  The major 
employer of pre-retirement men is in the security sector. 
Many retired citizens have been forced to at least seek work 
to augment what they receive from a broken pension system. 
 
¶8.  (C) While the IDP crisis in Diwanyah has been less severe 
than in Karbala and Najaf there has still been a strain on 
social services. 
 
--------------- 
Security Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) The Province has seen a spike in violence in the last 
six months.  JAM and Badr Corps relatively evenly divide the 
IP.  There are schemes that have JAM paying 300 USD per 
position in the IP and Badr Corps carving out quotas for 
themselves.  It makes for an ineffective force. 
 
¶10.  (S) Due to SCIRI,s political dominance in the province 
they utilize legitimate routes for illegitimate intimidation 
and elimination of political rivals.  Often bringing spurious 
charges in front of a judge to have enemies arrested.  The IP 
chief Abdul Khalia Badri has proven ineffective and somewhat 
uninterested in quelling violence.  Leaving that task to the 
Iraqi Army. 
 
--------------------- 
Key Political Figures 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Khaleel Ibrahim Hamza: Governor of Diwanyah.  Hamza 
is a key player for his inability as much as anything else. 
He is incapable of standing up to JAM.  He is affable and 
seemingly cooperative when speaking with CF, but has gone out 
of his way to not stand up to militias in his province.   It 
is unlikely he could survive (politically) provincial 
elections. 
 
¶12.  (S) Hussein Al Khalidi:  PC Chairman.  Al Khalidi is a 
member of SCIRI and the strongest legitimate political figure 
in the province.  He has more power than Hamza and tends to 
ignore the governor on key issues.  If SCIRI were able to 
maintain their dominance in future elections, he is Hamza,s 
likely successor. 
 
¶13.  (S) Hayder Ali:  Lead OMS PC member.  Ali,s political 
power is minimal, but his unfailing support and cover for JAM 
in the province makes him vital.  Any real political effort 
to slow JAM activity would be opposed by Ali.  He is also the 
leader of the chorus for calling for CF withdrawal from all 
facets of life in Diwanyah.  He claims CF are running their 
own death squads. 
 
¶14.  (S) Saad Al Abdili:  Head of IECI-Diwanyah.  Al Abdili 
is included here for his potential impact on provincial 
elections.  He is an honest broker whose success will 
directly affect the way ahead in the province.  He has fresh 
ideas regarding polling on Election Day and campaigning prior 
to the day.  He will be in constant contact with the REO and 
CF. 
 
---------------------- 
Possible Steps Forward 
---------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S-NF) Diwanyah is a province with a number of problems. 
 Security is weak and the reconstruction process is virtually 
halted.  The first step in turning the province around may be 
through reinforcing the U.S. presence by putting the PRT or a 
USG representative at FOB Echo.  At some point in the future 
a decision will be made regarding Provincial Iraqi Control. 
One way for helping ensure that an informed decision is made 
is by placing members of a reconstruction/diplomatic team in 
the province. 
 
¶16.  (S) To quell violence there will need to be a new 
governor and a rather heavy hand by the Iraqi Army. 
Restarting the reconstruction process will provide an 
alternative to young men with a desire for employment, but 
that is only part of the solution.  Free and fair elections, 
 
BAGHDAD 00004765  003 OF 003 
 
 
a consistent relationship with the Embassy and a sense of 
security will all play a role. 
SCOBEY