VZCZCXRO6936
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4759/01 3632149
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 292149Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8807
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004759 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ANBAR PROVINCE -- THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, STEPS 
FORWARD 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist.  Reasons. 1 
.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1 (S)  Summary:  Anbar public opinion is antagonistic toward 
the Shia-led national government, with mixed attitudes toward 
Coalition Forces.  Given that few of the province's Sunni 
majority residents voted in the last Provincial Elections, 
the Provincial Council (PC) is not viewed representative or 
democratic. Al-Qaeda Iraq steadily increased attacks 
throughout 2006, supported by a cadre of foreign fighters. 
Possible contributors to security and stability include the 
continued mobilization of tribal leaders, further development 
of the police, provincial elections, and improved relations 
between the provincial and central government. This is the 
first in a series of cables from Provisional Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) and Regional Embassy Offices (REOs) in every 
Province, with input from Embassy Baghdad, outlining key 
issues, noting key political leaders, and proposing steps 
that could help restore security and foster reconciliation 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) The Anbar Provincial Council fled to the relative 
safety of Baghdad last April amid insurgent threats in 
Ramadi.  The Council holds meetings and conducts business in 
Baghdad, but it is effectively in exile.  Council members say 
that security conditions in Ramadi are still too volatile to 
contemplate the Council,s early return to the province. 
The Council was elected in the January 2005 poll.  Anbaris 
boycotted; only 3,700 votes were cast province-wide in a 
population of 1.2 million residents.  The Sunni 
fundamentalist Iraqi Islamic Party won sufficient votes to 
form the Provincial Council.  Thus the Council,s claim to 
legitimacy rests on the weak foundation of a slender turn-out 
in a boycotted poll.  Elsewhere in the province, some 
municipal councils have dispersed because of insurgent 
pressure.  Those that continue to meet are little more than 
legacies of the CPA days.  Fearful of insurgent attacks, few 
civil servants appear at their offices at the government 
center in Ramadi. 
 
¶3. (C) Public opinion in Anbar is antagonistic toward the 
Shia-led Maliki government.  Anbaris generally do not have 
positive feelings about the Center,s fitful efforts towards 
national reconciliation.  Attitudes towards the Coalition 
range from antagonism to grudging acquiescence.  Ties between 
the central government and the Anbar provincial government 
began to improve in late 2006 with the PM's appointment of a 
sub-minister Cabinet official to represent Anbari interests, 
but they are still deeply troubled. 
 
¶4. (C) There is no clear leader in the province either among 
secular political figures, or among Sunni clerics and tribal 
leaders.  No one tribal sheikh is recognized as the 
undisputed leader.  Key tribal figures have fled abroad. 
 
--------------- 
Economic Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has disrupted the normal 
patterns of economic life through its campaign of violence 
and intimidation. AQI is also deeply involved in economic 
crimes, such as hijacking, highway extortion, black 
marketing, and control of gasoline stations.  The 
organization is largely self-financed by these methods. 
There has been a flight of Anbar middle class, professionals, 
and senior clerics and sheikhs to areas of Iraq in which they 
feel more secure or to neighboring countries.   Markets are 
rudimentary.  There is no credit-based economy.  The banking 
system is dysfunctional.  Agriculture is on the subsistence 
level.  There are indications of oil and gas deposits in the 
western part of the province, but they unexplored. 
Unemployment is between 40% and 60%, and at least eight 
state-owned companies are idle or operating below capacity 
due to unusable or outdated equipment, and the lack of a 
reliable supply of electricity. 
¶6. (C) There is no telephone service in Anbar.  Insurgents 
have destroyed cell-phone towers, ground cables, and switch 
centers.  However, a public-private venture is scheduled to 
begin the roll-out of a wireless local loop cell-phone 
service in the first quarter of 2007.  The province has not 
received consistent GOI resources for war-damage compensation 
and for post-battle reconstruction. 
 
--------------- 
 
BAGHDAD 00004759  002 OF 004 
 
 
Security Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (S-NF) AQI, the dominant insurgent group, has eliminated 
or co-opted competition from Baathist insurgents, who are no 
longer a significant factor.  Ansar Al-Sunna is also active. 
AQI,s objective is to debilitate the Iraqi police (IP), keep 
pressure on the CF, and intimidate the local population. 
Attacks steadily increased throughout 2006, rising to about 
430 incidents recorded weekly by mid-December from 230 weekly 
incidents a year ago.  Two-thirds of the incidents took place 
in Ramadi. Recidivism is a continuing problem.  Security 
detainees are typically not prosecuted because Anbar does not 
have a criminal justice system.  There are an estimated 300 
to 500 foreign fighters in the province, who enter primarily 
from Syria. 
 
¶8. (C) Insurgents were able to intimidate Anbar,s population 
with relative ease early in 2006, but AQI was on the 
defensive by year's end, as the IA,s two divisions in the 
province continued to expand operations.   There appears to 
be little desire by Anbari youth to join the army, which they 
view as a Shia organization.  Police recruitment, however, is 
up.  Some 8,400 policemen are on the province,s rolls today, 
compared to 1,000 policemen twelve months ago, and virtually 
none twenty-four months ago. 
 
¶9. (S-NF) The most significant security development on the 
battlefield in 2006 was the emergence of a group of 
anti-insurgent tribal leaders in the Ramadi area, led by 
Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha.  The movement comprises some 25 
tribes and is making a bid to spread its influence both east 
and west through the Euphrates Valley.  It claims to have 
killed 70-80 insurgents since September, while sustaining 35 
&martyrs8 in its own ranks. 
 
--------------------- 
Key Political Figures 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (C-NF) Governor Ma,moun Sami Rashid al-Alwani is the the 
longest-serving post-Saddam al-Anbar governor, assuming his 
post in June 2005.  He has been the target of numerous 
insurgent assassination attempts.  He is affiliated with the 
Iraqi Islamic Party, but claims to be an independent.  He has 
sometimes at odds with Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha and the 
Sahawa-al-Anbar (SAA) anti-insurgency group of sheiks. In 
PRT's view, he appears honest and diligent, making frequent 
visits to Baghdad to knock on GOI doors to advance his 
provinces interests. 
 
¶11. (C) Dr. Abdulsalam A. Mohamed has been Chairman of the 
Anbar Provincial Council since April 2006.  Supportive of the 
Coalition, he seeks USAID assistance to develop the skills of 
the province,s civil servants.  He convokes meetings of the 
Provincial Council in Baghdad and handles such sessions with 
skill. Suspicious of Sheikh Sattar and the SAA, he believes 
that Sattar ultimately seeks to undermine the Council,s 
legal authority.  He is also suspicious that PM Maliki is 
strongly influenced by Iran. 
 
¶12. (C) Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Rishawi is leader of Sahawa 
al-Anbar (SAA), a group of Ramadi-based anti-insurgent 
sheikhs.  His relationship with Gov. Ma,amoun has been 
strained, although he has access to PM Maliki, President 
Talabani, and the Defense and Interior Ministers.  He has led 
the SAA in actively fighting AQI, and expanded SAA,s 
influence to other parts of the province.  He has also 
actively recruited Anbaris to join the police.  He was 
appointed al-Anbar Director of Counter-terrorism by the GOI, 
effectively superseding the interim provincial police chief, 
who is a fellow SAA member.  He has publicly clashed with 
senior Sunni cleric, sheikh Harith al-Dari.  He has a 
sometimes rocky relationship with Anbari sheikhs resident in 
Jordan.  He reportedly amassed wealth by smuggling. 
 
¶13. (S)Sheikh Hamid Farhan Heis al-Dhiyabi ) President of 
Sahawa al-Anbar and was the group,s initial candidate for 
deputy provincial governor(reportedly a lawyer(probably  as 
important as Sheikh Sattar in the SAA leadership(his Dhiyabi 
tribe is supportive of CF and Iraqi forces(in the past 
reportedly affiliated with Faisal al-Gaoud,s Iraqi 
Solidarity Council and Ahmed Chalabi,s Iraqi National 
Congress. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00004759  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶14. (S) Sheikh Hikmat Muhammad Samir al-Muhammadi ) 
Paramount sheikh of the Muhammadi tribe, which is one of the 
larger tribes in the Fallujah-Saqlawiyah area(reportedly one 
of the three most influential figures in the Fallujah 
area(currently believed to be out of the country. 
 
¶15. (S) Sheikh Ghazi Sami Abbas al-Issawi ) Wealthy 
businessman(resident in Amman(  member of the Amman-based 
Al-Anbar Central Council(head of one or several Albu Issa 
sub-tribes in the Amiriyah area. 
 
¶16. (S) Sheikh Tariq Khalaf Abdullah al-Halboosi ) President 
of the Amman-based al-Anbar Central Council(wealthy 
businessman(supports Governor Ma,amoun and the provincial 
government(deeply involved in Iraqi and regional hydrocarbon 
industries. 
 
¶17. (S) Sheik Khamis Hasnawi Aifan al-Issawi ) Paramount 
sheikh of the Albu Issa tribe(has been a proponent of 
cooperation with the Coalition(a critic of the 
insurgency(was the target of an unsuccessful SVBIED attack 
in June 2005(.has expressed support for Sheikh Sattar,s SAA. 
 
¶18. (S) Sheikh Majid Abdul Razzaq Ali Sulayman al-Assafi ) 
De facto leader of the Dulaymi Confederation(active in the 
provincial government until early 2004(his public support 
for CF caused him to be targeted for assassination(has fled 
to Jordan(has aspirations to be governor of Anbar(dislikes 
Gov. Ma,amoun. 
 
¶19. (S) Sheikh Amer Abdul Jabaar Ali Sulayman ) Half-brother 
of Sheikh Majid(in early 2004 he was the chairman of the 
Provincial Council(pro-MNF, but distrusts 
democracy(supports the SAA. 
 
¶20. (S) Sheikh Sabah Sattam Sharji al-Mahalawi ) Paramount 
sheikh of the Albu Mahal in the al-Qa,im area(lives in 
Amman(has expressed support for the SAA. 
 
¶21. (S) Sheikh Bezia Najriss al-Gaoud ) Patriarch of the 
wealthy al-Gaoud family (Hamid, Jalal, the deceased 
Talal)(lives in Amman(a significant figure in the Albu Nimr 
tribe(cooperative with the Coalition since 2003. 
 
¶22. (S) Sheikh Ali Hatim Ali Sulayman al-Assafi ) The 
ranking Dulaymi sheikh living in Iraq(politically 
active(appears to be socially conscious and seemingly 
secular(has been involved with SAA from its founding in 
September. 
 
¶23. (S) Sheikh Mutab Mahrut al-Hadhal al-Anizi (and his 
brother Lawrence) ) The elderly leader of the Anzah 
tribe(purportedly related to the Saudi royal family(wealthy 
landowner(known as the sheikh of sheikhs(his tribe 
reportedly contains Sunni and Shi,a(has expressed support 
for the SAA. 
 
¶24. (S) Farhan Tekan Farhan al-Ubaydi ) Mayor of Al-Qaim 
since late 2005(former Saddam-era general(opposed to the 
insurgency(allegedly targeted by AQI(well regarded for his 
leadership qualities. 
 
¶25. (S-NF) A key opposition figure is Sheikh Mudhir Abdul 
Kareeim Thiab al-Kharbit.  Hereditary sheikh of the Khalifa 
tribe and a former leader of the Dulaymi confederation, he is 
a former supporter of Saddam.  Resident in Syria, Jordan, and 
France, he has supported insurgent causes. 
 
------------------------------- 
Comment: Possible Steps Forward 
------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (C-NF) Coalition forces should continue to prepare the 
way for the deployment of the IP and IA in Anbar.  Ramadi is 
an example.  MNF-West forces launched major operations in 
that city in June; they are still underway.  MNF-West has 
established a series of inter-locking combat outposts (COPs), 
forward positions set up in urban areas to deny space to the 
insurgents.  The COPs are being set up sequentially; a new 
one is established as MNF-West forces push into different 
neighborhoods, and as ISF forces become available to follow 
up.  From these positions, MNF-West maintains &overwatch8 
activities and actively patrols key areas.  Depending on 
conditions, security responsibilities are transitioned to the 
IA and later to the IP.  In some instances, the IA co-locates 
 
BAGHDAD 00004759  004 OF 004 
 
 
with CF on the same COP, or they set up their own outposts 
nearby.  The operation proceeds in stages:  isolate the area 
of interest; clear; retain; and transition to the ISF.  The 
process as a whole is a visible sign to the local population 
that the Coalition and ISF are there to stay and are 
determined to eliminate the insurgents. 
 
¶27. (C-NF) There are practical results to these security 
operations -- the mobilization of tribal leaders in Ramadi to 
fight AQI and the increase in applicants to join the police 
force did not happen merely because of local initiative. 
They happened as a result of CF and ISF security operations. 
The tribes of Ramadi would not today be making a common front 
against AQI and the youth of the area would not be applying 
as police recruits if they doubted the CF,s staying power.  . 
 
¶28. (C-NF) Assuming that the AQI threat will be neutralized, 
the next challenge on the horizon would be to set the stage 
for constructive relations between the Central Government and 
Anbar.  Baghdad and Ramadi must find a way to resolve their 
mutual mistrust, and   MNF-West and the PRT have roles to 
play in this regard.    Another element missing in our 
counter-insurgency strategy is provincial and municipal 
elections.  Anbaris recognize that they made a mistake 
boycotting the January 2005 poll.  Today the PC hangs by a 
fragile thread of &legitimacy8 and the municipal councils 
are self-perpetuating legacies from the CPA days.  Local 
elections would call AQI,s bluff.  Elections may also help 
us on the battlefield.  Evidence suggests that contested 
areas with functioning local governments tend to be more 
stable than those without them.  But ultimately, local 
elections would allow the Anbaris themselves to search for 
their own political accommodations and have a voice in the 
future couse of their province. 
SCOBEY