VZCZCXRO5563
OO RUEHAG RUEHKW RUEHROV
DE RUEHTH #3254/01 3621344
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281344Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7735
INFO RUCNMUC/EU CANDIDATE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0561
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4521
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0186
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0230
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 2734
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 3772
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 1496
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0576
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STAFF STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 003254 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC OTRA PTER GR
SUBJECT: ATHENS RSI DECEMBER 2006 READOUT 
 
REF: A. ISTANBUL 1201 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 90114 
 
Classified By: CHARGES D'AFFAIRES THOMAS COUNTRYMAN.  REASONS 1.4 (B) A 
ND (D). 
 
 ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On December 11, Embassy Athens hosted 
Chiefs of Mission and others from posts in Amman, Ankara, 
Beirut, Cairo, Nicosia, Rome (MFO), Sofia, and Tel Aviv, as 
well as participants from S/CT, INL, NEA, DOJ, OSD, CENTCOM, 
EUCOM, and the NCTC, for an Eastern Mediterranean conference 
of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy Initiative (RSI). 
Participants described terrorist threats within their host 
countries, linkages to trans-national terrorism (principally 
al-Qaida, but also the PKK and Hizballah), and possible 
regional policy responses.  Given the complex nature of the 
threats, participants foresaw effective responses in policies 
combining diplomatic efforts and assistance to host 
governments, intelligence collection and information sharing, 
economic measures, military power, as well as public 
diplomacy, particularly through the internet, which was seen 
as the medium of choice for terrorists.  The work of the 
conference focused on five key areas of concern: 
 
-- the persistent terrorist threat in Sinai; 
 
-- the threat to European border security posed by returning 
jihadists; 
 
-- the PKK,s role in destabilizing Turkey, Iraq, and Western 
Europe; 
 
-- Lebanon as the front line in the struggle between 
democracy and Iranian theological revolution; 
 
-- challenges and best practices for our public diplomacy in 
countering terrorist propaganda. 
 
The incoming Eastern Med regional CT coordinator was able to 
participate in the conference, which will help this officer 
get off to a strong start when she arrives in Istanbul in 
mid-2007.  Regional participants welcomed the opportunity to 
work cooperatively and looked forward to meeting again )- a 
point they underscored with Washington participants.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
AN EVOLVING THREAT ) AND DYNAMIC RESPONSE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) The December 11 Athens conference was the second 
Eastern Mediterranean RSI meeting; the first was held in 
Istanbul in June 2006 (ref a).  COMs and other participants 
viewed the RSI format as a valuable one, in this case 
especially because it brought together participants from two 
different regional bureaus and the MFO.  Flows of terrorist 
personnel, goods, finances, and ideas are dynamic, involving 
potential threats to the United States and Europe, which, 
participants underscored, demand agile, field-driven policy 
responses.  Participants focused on a number of issues first 
raised at the June RSI conference, as well as newly emerging 
potential threats, such as those in the Sinai. 
 
THE SINAI TIME BOMB 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Participants viewed the Sinai as the site of 
persistent terrorist activity.  Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad, an 
indigenous Islamist bedouin terror group, has carried out 
three major terrorist bombings in Sinai resort communities 
since 2004.  In addition, it has -- so far unsuccessfully -- 
targeted the Multi-national Force and Observers (MFO) with 
one IED and two suicide bombings.  Ambassador Larocco, MFO 
Director General, described the Sinai as a &time bomb8 with 
consequences for Israel, Gaza, and Jordan, as well as Egypt. 
Weapons trafficking, a profitable element in the broader 
smuggling apparatus between Sinai and Gaza, attracts a high 
volume of weapons and explosives to the area.  According to 
Larocco, because this includes Strela missiles, MFO 
helicopters no longer fly in the vicinity of the Gaza border. 
 
ATHENS 00003254  002 OF 004 
 
 
 The introduction of the Egyptian border force in September 
2005 -- concurrent with the withdrawal of Israeli troops from 
Gaza -- has failed to curb the weapons smuggling.  The 
Egyptians insist that more troops are needed but have not 
received permission under the Camp David Accords for 
additional troops.  Although there is no treaty limit on the 
number of police forces in the area, all agree that police on 
the ground have not been effective. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The USG has engaged with the Egyptians on technical 
assistance at the border to address smuggling, but there 
appears to be no simple technological fix, especially in 
light of treaty limitations.  Egyptian, Israeli, and 
Palestinian border authorities have met on a regular basis, 
but meetings were disrupted by violence in Gaza last summer. 
The parties are now working to re-start these consultations. 
The Egyptians are also hampered by their own bureaucratic 
infighting over Sinai, which has impeded economic and 
political development in the region. 
 
Participants identified five discreet avenues of activity as 
potentially fruitful: 
 
-- increasing Egyptian intelligence collection and capacity; 
-- improving border controls; 
-- strengthening legal/legislative measures; 
-- addressing deeper economic and social conditions; 
-- continued diplomacy, focusing on cross-border 
consultations. 
 
Participants also agreed that the USG should share best 
practices developed elsewhere with Egypt and Israel )- 
perhaps by funding a conference to share information on 
technical means to disrupt terrorist activity, such as 
terrorist financing. 
 
 
RETURNING JIHADISTS: THE NEXT BIG THING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Participants agreed that as the situation in Iraq 
and/or Afghanistan changed, many jihadists were likely to 
leave those theaters and attempt to transit to Western 
Europe, creating a new CT problem.  Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Cyprus were identified as likely transit nations in the 
eastern Mediterranean, while European and American 
border-control tools to deal with the problem were described 
as uneven and disjointed, allowing little bilateral or 
international cooperation.  Examples of the latter were the 
absence of a common European database of useful information 
beyond the embryonic Schengen &Information System.8 
Moreover, American databases held by the CIA, FBI, DHS, 
State, etc. were stovepiped.  The obstacles to overcoming 
these problems were both procedural and technical. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Using a discussion paper developed by Ambassador 
Ries and country team on ways to counter the threat posed by 
returning jihadists, participants identified two specific 
areas to begin work.  First, the U.S. needed to make 
decisions on what watchlist information )- especially 
biometric -- it could share with European border-control 
agencies and how to do so.  Second, a first step to 
cooperation with the Europeans would be a conference 
involving experts below the political level but senior enough 
to make decisions/commitments.  After considerable discussion 
of possible venues, it was decided that S/CT would coordinate 
with EUR/ACE and DOJ to organize a conference involving 
participants, host countries and perhaps others and 
Interpol.  The question of whether the conference would be 
small and regionally focused or larger and more theoretically 
oriented was left open, though the majority of participants 
leaned toward a smaller conference focused on technical 
standards of data sharing, with a larger conference as a next 
step.  The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Center 
in Bucharest was discussed as a model for developing this 
type of cooperation. 
 
PKK: NUMBER TWO AFTER AL-QAIDA 
------------------------------ 
 
ATHENS 00003254  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶7. (S/NF) 2006 saw a major increase in terrorist violence by 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).  The Germans have 
described the PKK as the second most significant contemporary 
terrorist threat after al-Qaida and the number-one 
organized-crime threat in Europe (though the French and Swiss 
have downplayed or avoided the issue).  The PKK also 
represents a major political threat insofar as perceived 
U.S./Iraqi inaction against the PKK safehaven in Northern 
Iraq could provoke Turkish intervention.  The U.S. has been 
working on several fronts against the PKK, but much remains 
to be done.  Moreover, action against the PKK by the 
Europeans would create a good optic with the Turks as 
Turkey,s EU accession slows.  The Principals Committee 
recently raised the PKK from a Tier 3 to a Tier 2 terrorist 
threat, which will allow for the commitment of greater 
collection resources to track PKK activity.  There is active 
interagency collaboration in Washington to shut down PKK 
camps and review options against PKK leaders in Iraq. 
Participants suggested a number of possible steps for the 
U.S. and Europeans: follow-on consultations in Europe by S/CT 
Deputy Urbancic, which might include southeastern Europe and 
the eastern Mediterranean; increased counter-terrorist 
training programs with the Turks; increased intelligence 
sharing, including by other RSI countries; increased 
overflights of PKK bases in Iraq (this reportedly has a 
strong psychological impact on the PKK )- the Turks also 
have expressed interest in commercial purchase of 
surveillance blimps); strengthening of obstacles to PKK 
financial flows; political pressure on Kurdish leader Barzani 
to shut PKK bases/centers; a DOJ push on the European 
prosecutors, liaison group EuroJust to focus on PKK; and a 
diplomatic push on the Germans during their EU presidency to 
promote anti-PKK efforts. 
 
LEBANON: FRONT LINE OF U.S./IRAN CONFLICT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) Lebanon was described as a new surrogate conflict: 
while the U.S. sought to promote democracy and stability, 
Iran sought to export theological revolution through 
Hizballah.  Hizballah received tremendous financial, 
material, and spiritual backing from Iran and, while the 
terrorist group suffered significant infrastructure damage 
from the attack by Israel last summer, it emerged 
organizationally unscathed, if not stronger, and was likely 
to rebuild itself in 6-8 months.  Syria was also seeking 
avenues to increase its influence in Lebanon.  The U.S. had 
begun to describe Hizballah as a global terrorist threat. 
Participants focused on several areas of activity, 
emphasizing the need to continue our efforts in all:  working 
towards establishing a common political vision for the 
country; pre-emptive PD action to head off Hizballah 
propaganda undermining the democratic process; build-up of 
the Lebanese government,s ability to police through 
equipment and training grants (in 19 recent bombing cases, no 
one has been arrested, undermining police legitimacy); 
increase of costs to Iran and Syria for intervention and 
support of Hizballah; and more work with Europeans to 
increase awareness of the Hizballah threat. 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNTERING TERRORIST PROPAGANDA 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (S/NF) While all conference participants agreed on the 
importance of a strong PD push against the terrorist message, 
there was general frustration at the success of our efforts 
so far, including the inability of the Department to secure 
desired funding for relevant PD efforts.  Participants thus 
focused primarily on developing new, indirect methods to get 
our message across.  For example, an increase in the number 
of foreign students in American schools and of American 
students in foreign schools was seen as paying large 
long-term dividends.  Embassy Athens shared the experience of 
its program on countering anti-Americanism in working with 
private foundations to support lecture visits by major 
American figures outside the world of foreign policy. 
Athens, experience with its brand new youth website 
&www.Mosaiko.gr8 was also cited as a model for other 
 
ATHENS 00003254  004 OF 004 
 
 
embassies.  EUCOM discussed its experience with its 
&www.setimes.com8 website and the Marshall Center,s 
extensive expertise, including a program on Countering 
Ideological Support for Terrorism.  These and a number of 
other EUCOM tools are at the USG,s disposal in the public 
diplomacy realm.  Participants agreed that television and 
radio appearances )- particularly when done in host-country 
languages )- were much more effective than conferences of 
diplomats, politicians, and scholars.  Finally, participants 
agreed that progress on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, in 
addition to bringing greater stability to the region, would 
also have immense PD impact. 
 
LOOKING AHEAD 
------------- 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Regional ambassadors will decide on the timing and 
venue for the next meeting and asked S/CT, DOD, and other 
Washington participants to underscore the important synergy 
such meetings bring to regional cooperation efforts. 
Ambassador Crumpton previewed the four new full-time regional 
RSI coordinator positions that have been created (with six 
others in the works) and noted that the Eastern Mediterranean 
center would be located in Congen Istanbul.  He also 
emphasized Washington,s support for flexible, dynamic 
regional networks and initiatives to counter terrorists.  The 
conference agreed that RSI has proved effective not only in 
promoting counter-terrorism initiatives but also for 
promoting inter-embassy, inter-agency, and inter-regional 
cooperation. 
 
¶11. (C) Conference participants cleared this message. 
COUNTRYMAN