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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 001034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KREC ER
SUBJECT: PFDJ POLITICAL CHIEF ON DARFUR, SOMALIA AND THE 
STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS 
 
 
Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Ambassador met with People's Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) Political Director Yemane 
Ghebreab on December 12.  On Sudan, the Government of the 
State of Eritrea (GSE) remains hopeful - unrealistically so 
it appears for now ) that it may still play a role in 
helping to mediate between Khartoum and Darfurian rebels. 
Regarding Somalia, Ghebreab was sharply critical of USG 
policy while the Ambassador reminded him that the GSE had no 
credibility criticizing foreign intervention, such as the 
proposed AU force, so long as the GSE continues to send 
weapons and military trainers into Somalia to support the 
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC).  The Ambassador also 
emphasized to Ghebreab the negative consequences for 
bilateral relations if the GSE continues to refuse visas for 
official TDYers and otherwise to impede the functions of U.S. 
Embassy operations.  End Summary. 
 
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Darfur 
------ 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador inquired about the status of the proposal 
for an Eritrean-mediated conference between the DPA 
non-signatories and the Government of National Unity (GNU). 
Ghebreab said "they were still working on it."  Ghebreab 
noted that the GSE still was seeking a role for Chad in the 
process as well but that the last meeting in Tripoli, at 
which Chad had been present as well, tensions had clearly 
remained high between Chad and Sudan.  Getting the GNU to 
accept a Chadian role was clearly going to be difficult, he 
opined.  When asked about the multitude of initiatives for 
working with the DPA non-signatories, Ghebreab noted that no 
one had been "keen" on Libya's leadership and, in the end, 
the GNU had reaffirmed its interest in the Eritreans 
mediating.  The Ambassador asked Ghebreab his view of 
Egypt,s role, to which Ghebreab replied that Egypt wants to 
help but doesn't see itself as playing a leading role. 
Ghebreab expressed his view that AU/UN-led negotiations 
showed little promise.  According to Ghebreab, Bashir has 
said that such negotiations were a non-starter, in part 
because he believes that the DPA non-signatories are not 
prepared to take the idea seriously. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador commented that the U.S. was deeply 
concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in 
Darfur and the need for movement on the proposal for an AU/UN 
hybrid force.  He voiced his concern about reports that the 
Sudanese President was unlikely to follow through on 
commitments made in Abuja and Ghebreab agreed that it appears 
unlikely that President Bashir will accept a hybrid force. 
The Ambassador said the USG has concerns about Eritrea's own 
position on Darfur; he noted that the GSE too has opposed 
efforts to put a UN force into Darfur and previously sought 
to minimize the seriousness of the humanitarian crisis there. 
 He told Ghebreab that the GSE's actions in the face of the 
severe human rights problems in Darfur very much affect the 
credibility of the GSE's proposed mediation role.  In the 
face of increasing violence there, this is even more of a 
concern.  Without specifically addressing Eritrea,s stance, 
Ghebreab did note that in recent conversations with National 
Congress Party and Darfur non-signatory interlocutors, he had 
encouraged them to honor the Cessation of Hostilities 
agreement, but neither side seemed interested.  So long as 
both sides continue to believe in the superiority of their 
forces, or are convinced they need to make military gains to 
bolster their negotiating posture, they will continue to 
pursue a militarily edge, he posited. 
 
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Somalia 
------- 
 
¶4. (C) On Somalia, Ghebreab commented (predictably) that UNSC 
Resolution 1725 was bad policy and would not serve the 
interests of Somalia, the region, or the U.S.  The Somalis 
should be left alone to settle their internal disputes 
without foreign interference.  The Ambassador challenged 
 
ASMARA 00001034  002 OF 003 
 
 
Ghebreab on the credibility of the GSE's public statements 
denouncing foreign intervention in Somalia, given that 
Eritrea is providing weapons and personnel support to the 
CIC.  Without denying Eritrean support to the Courts, 
Ghebreab characterized Somalia as a "lopsided problem" with 
the greatest issue being Ethiopia's misplaced policies and 
occupation of Somali territory.  "If you don,t want Eritrea 
to do anything in Somalia, you have to push out Ethiopia," he 
said. 
 
¶5. (C) Ghebreab said the GSE's objective was the 
reconstitution of Somalia, and if there were no external 
support propping up the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), then the TFG would not exist.  If the U.S. wishes to 
play a role in reconstituting Somalia (and he pointedly noted 
that he doesn't believe the U.S. wants this), then we should 
not have supported the warlords who have been destabilizing 
the country.  The CIC has brought a semblance of peace and 
order to Somalia and without foreign intervention would 
likely be able to extend this to the rest of the country, he 
concluded.  The Ambassador countered that what "progress" the 
CIC had made in Somalia was hardly peaceful but by means of 
force of arms.  Moreover, their "progress" which came with 
the support of external actors such as Eritrea, might have 
allowed the CIC to impose its will on the population but this 
was no guarantee that the Courts enjoyed the widespread 
popular support Ghebreab asserted.  Recognizing that the U.S. 
and GSE had very different assessments of the best way 
forward in Somalia, the Ambassador closed by offering 
Ghebreab his view that the GSE's benign characterization of 
CIC intentions would likely prove to be mistaken. 
 
------------------------------ 
Bilateral Operational Problems 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to the bilateral relationship, the Ambassador 
acknowledged that while this issue did not fall directly in 
Ghebreab's official area of responsibility, as Political 
Chief of the PFDJ, he wanted to alert him to a looming 
problem affecting the Embassy,s ability to operate.  (Note: 
Ghebreab is, in fact, one of the key policy advisors to 
President Isaias on issues related to the relationship with 
the USG.)  The Ambassador outlined the range of operating 
problems created by the GSE's continuing denial of visas for 
TDY support staff, mentioning as examples refusals for our 
regional medical personnel, OBO building contractors, and 
technical staff for repair and maintenance of our buildings 
and systems.  The situation has reached the point, he said, 
where the Embassy's operational integrity is being eroded by 
the GSE.  As a result, the post is reviewing whether we can 
continue to operate in-country at current staffing levels or 
whether we will need to modify our operations and reduce our 
presence and services.  As an example, the Ambassador 
mentioned the current suspension of NIV services due to the 
GSE's refusal to issue visas for our TDY consular officers. 
The GSE to date, he continued, has provided no reasons for 
the denial of these visas, shown no consistency in its 
visa-issuing procedures and offered no assistance toward 
rectifying the problem. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador recalled a similar conversation with 
Ghebreab a year ago, when he had warned of the consequences 
if the GSE maintained travel restrictions on diplomatic 
personnel in Asmara.  The GSE had in fact intensified the 
restrictions and the result was the unfavorable outcome of 
reciprocal travel restrictions on Eritrean diplomats in the 
U.S.  The Ambassador noted he did not want to see the visa 
issue follow a similar path -- but made it clear that the USG 
could not continue to accept the status quo.  The Ambassador 
asked whether the GSE was pursuing a deliberate course of 
trying to push out the U.S. Embassy by making it impossible 
to operate in-country, because that was the conclusion most 
likely to be drawn from the GSE's actions.  If this was not 
the case, the GSE's choices were nonetheless moving us in 
that direction.  Ghebreab commented that while he was not 
fully aware of day-to-day operational issues between the 
diplomatic community and the GSE, he did not believe the GSE 
was pursuing a deliberate policy of harassment.  On a 
 
ASMARA 00001034  003 OF 003 
 
 
personal level, he added, he believed that the U.S. and 
Eritrea needed to re-engage in a productive relationship on 
both an operational and policy level. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ghebreab, like many of the government officials, has 
been traveling in recent weeks.  While the meeting was 
intended largely to "catch-up" with Ghebreab on a range of 
issues, the Ambassador also wished to use the opportunity to 
clearly relay the message of the seriousness of GSE actions 
in continuing to refuse our official visa requests and the 
potential consequences.  This message has been reiterated in 
different venues for many weeks with our MFA contacts - with 
little forward progress.  While Ghebreab seemed surprised at 
the extent of the problem, whether the message will get back 
to those responsible for resolving the visa imbroglio is 
unknown.  Post will continue to emphatically deliver this 
message through the limited governmental channels open to us. 
 We think that Ghebreab likely does believe it is important 
to Eritrea to re-engage with the USG but note the care he 
took to express the thought in terms of his personal opinion 
rather than as  representing the GSE's views.  We fear that 
no matter how much Ghebreab and others like him might worry 
that the GSE is going too far in pushing the USG away, 
President Isaias and others in the government are unlikely to 
shift course any time soon. 
DELISI