VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0815/01 3071511
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031511Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5725
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000815 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2021 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK/IRAN: JAPAN NIXES BOG DPRK RESOLUTION; 
LIKE-MINDED AGREES ON WAY-FORWARD TO BLOCK SUPPORT FOR ARAK 
REACTOR PROJECT 
 
REF: A. UNVIE 777 
     ¶B. UNVIE 804 
 
Classified By: DCM George A. Glass for reasons 1.4 (h) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) Like-minded countries, meeting at the US mission 
November 2, agreed with Japan's view that, in light of the 
October 31 announcement on Six-Party talks, the Board should 
pursue a Chairman's Summary, but not a resolution unless the 
DPRK reneges on this agreement.  Country statements at the 
Board should be very strong and clear to enable a stronger 
Chairman's summary.  On Iran, all parties agreed that it 
would be inappropriate for the Board to approve technical 
cooperation (TC) for the heavy water reactor at Arak. 
Agreement was reached on questions to put to the Secretariat, 
common talking points to be used with the Board Chair, and a 
division of responsibilities in approaching key NAM 
countries.  Agreement was reached to consider deferring all 
new TC cooperation with Iran until the Secretariat certifies 
that this assistance would not enable Iran's enrichment, 
reprocessing, or heavy water reactor projects.  The 
"like-minded" agreed to reconvene November 10.  End Summary. 
 
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No DPRK Resolution, For Now 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) Ambassador Schulte met with Germany, France, UK, 
Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Argentina, ROK, and 
Japan on November 2 to discuss DPRK and Iran issues in the 
run-up to the November Board.  Ambassador Schulte raised the 
issue of preliminary thinking on how to respond to the 
October 9 nuclear test by the DPRK at the November BOG.  At 
the previous like-minded meeting (ref A) the group noted a 
number of options that could be pursued: a resolution, a 
Chairman's Statement, or a Chairman's Summary.  The Canadian 
chair of the "Core Group" agreed at that meeting to take the 
lead in reviewing elements that could be included in a 
resolution or Chairman's Statement and provided a readout of 
the Core Group's initial efforts.  She started by taking note 
of the October 31 announcement that the DPRK has agreed to 
return to the Six-Party Talks without condition as possibly 
as soon as November or December, adding that with these new 
developments she was looking to the group to decide whether a 
resolution was an appropriate response or not.  She reported 
that the Core Group had only discussed essential elements of 
a resolution if a decision were made to proceed.   She said 
that those elements included a condemnation of the October 
test, strong support for UNSCR 1718, acknowledgment of the 
essential verification role of the IAEA, as noted in the 
resolution.  She added that it welcomed the recent 
developments on the announced intention to resume Six-Party 
Talks.  She emphasized that the resolution needed to be as 
strong as UNSCR 1781, so as to not undermine it. 
 
¶3. (S) The Japanese Ambassador, noting he had new 
instructions from Tokyo following the October 31 announcement 
of the resumption of the Six-Party talks, said Japan prefers 
a Chairman's Summary and is opposed to a resolution; however, 
the issue could be revisited if North Korea "withdrew" its 
intention to resume the talks.  The ROK ambassador said that 
at this point his government is flexible.  He noted that 
UNSCR 1718 was a strong resolution and members were now 
working to implement it.  He emphasized that BOG member 
statements should be strong and in no way weaken 1718. 
Australia noted the potential "awkwardness" in holding 
consultations in Vienna on a resolution during the APEC 
Ministerial Conference in Hanoi.  Norway questioned what the 
objective of a resolution would be, cautioning that if it 
went too far it might jeopardize the Six-Party Talks. 
Ambassador Schulte summed up by noting that no country had 
spoken in favor of a resolution.  He echoed the ROK 
sentiments that if there is n resolution, then members' 
statements at the BOG needed to be strong, and in sync. 
Former BOG Chairman Amano, noting that nuanced statements are 
difficult to capure in the Chair's Summary, advocated that 
the messages be strong, clear and simple. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Agreement to Withhold TC on Arak And To Pressure the DG 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶4. (S) Japan, reiterating points in ref A, recommended a 
strategy that would emphasize the need for a consensus Board 
view on Iran's requests for technical assistance (TC), while 
stressing to the NAM that such consensus would not be 
possible if the heavy water reactor at Arak is included. 
Reinforcing the idea that the entire proposed TC program is 
at stake might then galvanize the NAM to pressure Iran to 
retract its Arak-related TC proposal.  Japan prefers to cast 
this in terms of previous Board resolutions, i.e., it would 
not be appropriate for the Board to approve this TC proposal 
since previous resolutions have called on Iran to 
"reconsider" construction of Arak.  Japan also recommended 
that like-minded delegations lobby the Chair to head off this 
project, as the Chair would relay these concerns both to the 
Director General and to NAM members.  Japan also handed out a 
draft set of talking points on the need and reasoning for 
withholding TC cooperation on Arak. 
 
¶5. (S) Australia, referring to a list of TC-related proposals 
for Iran, suggested that we may want to try to have all of 
them deferred until the Secretariat can certify that none of 
them would enable enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy 
water-related projects.  France agreed that all of the 
proposals should be closely scrutinized.  Canada, seeming to 
agree, also noted that it is not clear who makes the 
determination that projects are indeed intended for "safety" 
purposes.  The UK said that it might make sense to stop Arak, 
while deferring cooperation on the other projects pending a 
report from the Secretariat.  The UK added that the UNSCR 
would need to be specific on these issues, or else the 
Secretariat would defer to the Board to make those 
 
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determinations.  Finland, noting that consults with the EU 
will begin this week, cautioned that withholding TC on 
projects beyond Arak might complicate things.  Norway said 
that we will need to have strong arguments to counter Iranian 
claims that Arak will only produce medical isotopes. 
Ambassador Schulte noted that UNVIE is moving forward with 
DOE briefings on this topic. 
 
¶6. (S) Ambassador Schulte provided a five-point summary of 
the discussion:  1) starting at the November 2 TC technical 
briefing by the Secretariat to member states, members need to 
ask the Secretariat questions about the criteria it uses to 
scrutinize TC proposals and whether any of Iran's TC projects 
would have enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water reactor 
applications (France, Australia, Canada, Japan and German 
agreed to ask questions); 2) the group should review Japan's 
talking points and get back to them with feedback so they can 
be finalized prior to consultations with the Chair the week 
of November 6; 3) The groups should consider whether we want 
to focus only on removing Arak from TC consideration, and/or 
putting the other Iran project proposals on hold pending the 
Secretariat's review; 4) the group needs to start lobbying 
 
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the NAM to counter Iran's expected propaganda about Arak's 
use to produce medical isotopes (the US, UK, Canada, Japan, 
and Germany agreed to approach key NAM countries); and 5) the 
Group will need to wait and see how the expected UNSCR on 
Iran will affect us.  Australia suggested that we should 
review what happened historically with countries like DPRK, 
Israel, India, and Pakistan in terms of TC issues. 
Ambassador Schulte agreed that the US mission could undertake 
this task. 
SCHULTE