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Leza L Olson  11/01/2006 02:25:29 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Leza L Olson

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
S E C R E T    NOFORN     TEL AVIV 04349

SIPDIS
CXTelA:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   IPSC PD RSO CONS IMO RES ECON DCM DAO AMB AID
            ADM

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
DRAFTED: POL:MCKEAYS
CLEARED: A/DCM:HFINN, POL/C:MJSIEVERS, DAO:PJD, POL/RES:JF, CG:JW, US

VZCZCTVI956
PP RUEHC RUEHJM
DE RUEHTV #4349/01 3051206
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011206Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7334
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 4902

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2031 
TAGS: PINR PBTS PGOV PREL GZ IS
SUBJECT: (S/NF) PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI SECURITY 
COOPERATION (C-NE6-01638) 
 
REF: STATE 169657 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones.  Reason:  1.4 (b) (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) In response to reftel, embassy submits the 
following answers to questions posed in reftel.  These 
answers were formulated with contributions from SIHO, DAO Tel 
Aviv, ConGen Jerusalem, and the U.S. Security Coordinator's 
office. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) The answers below correspond to the questions posed 
in reftel. 
 
¶A. (S/NF) There is limited cooperation between Israeli and 
Palestinian security services.  This is mainly as a result of 
long-standing tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. 
None of the District Coordinating Offices (DCOs) or District 
Coordinating Liaisons (DCLs) appear to be jointly manned. 
The Israeli security services have different levels of 
contact with the District Coordinating Offices (DCOs) 
depending on the issue, but the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
circumvent the DCOs and communicate directly with the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank.  Representatives from 
the Israeli Security Agency (ISA, also known as the Shin Bet 
or Shabak) meet routinely with representatives from the 
Mukabarat (the Palestinian intelligence service) and the 
Preventive Security Organization (PSO) on specific 
security-related issues.  There are indications that threat 
information is shared, including information on imminent 
suicide attacks, and information on Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ) and Hamas affiliates.  How the Palestinians respond 
varies according to the crisis of the moment.  In general, 
Israeli security officers display favorable attitudes towards 
senior Palestinian security officials like Rashid Abu Shabak 
(the Director General for Internal Security, and the previous 
chief of the Gaza PSO) and Tawfik Trawi (the acting commander 
of the Mukabarat's General Intelligence Organization).  The 
ISA also views West Bank PSO commander Ziad Hib-al-Rih as 
cooperative.  The IDF tends to have a lower opinion of 
Palestinian security organs across the board.  Israeli 
security officials complain about the extent to which their 
Palestinian counterparts act against terror suspects in 
response to tips and information.  The Israelis seek greater 
action on the part of the Palestinian security services to 
apprehend suspected terrorists based on intelligence provided 
to them.  The Palestinian security services seek greater 
intelligence sharing from their Israeli counterparts, and for 
their part complain that the Israelis do not provide enough 
specific information to act upon. 
 
1) (S/NF) There is limited cooperation between the Israeli 
and Palestinian security services.  Occasionally, Shin Bet 
liaises on a behind-the-scenes basis with the Preventive 
Security Organization, which falls under the authority of 
Director General for Internal Security Rashid Abu Shabak. 
Shin Bet also informally liaises with the Mukabarat, which is 
directly under Palestinian President Abbas.  The Israelis 
cooperate with and directly assist the Presidential Guard in 
motorcade operations, based on Israel's interest in 
safeguarding PA President Abbas.  Post does not believe that 
there are contacts between the Palestinian civil police and 
the Israeli National Police (INP), but the INP is visible in 
parts of the West Bank. 
 
2) (S/NF) Liaison and functional representatives from both 
sides continue to have contact with their counterparts. 
 
3) (S/NF) During meetings, which are sensitive and closely 
held, representatives from both sides discuss specific 
security information.  The Palestinians pose various requests 
to the Israelis and vice versa.  (NOTE:  More detailed 
information about these requests can be found in reports in 
intel channels.  END NOTE.) 
 
4) (S/NF) Israeli and Palestinian counterparts may meet 
several times per month or on a case-by-case basis.  Meetings 
occur both at the senior and mid-level ranks. 
 
5) (S/NF) Meetings usually take place in Jericho or 
Jerusalem.  The Israelis help their counterparts get past 
checkpoints when necessary.  Several senior Palestinians have 
VIP status, but find it less problematic when they coordinate 
with the Israelis. 
 
6) (S/NF) There are few coordinated operations against a 
limited number of targets.  Expectations and underlying 
mistrust on both sides render cooperation difficult.  The 
Israelis are cautious when dealing with the Palestinians, and 
for their part, the Palestinians are careful not to be seen 
as collaborating with Israel.  The second Intifada, the 
long-standing war on terror, and Hamas's January 2006 
election victory all contribute to continued distrust and 
skepticism, yet at the same time, the Hamas victory has 
aligned to a greater degree the interests and objectives of 
the Israelis and Fatah-affiliated security services against 
Hamas. 
 
7) (S/NF) Israeli and Palestinian security agency 
representatives who have contact with one another have 
developed a degree of respect on a personal level.  After the 
January 2006 elections in which Hamas gained political clout, 
the frame of reference for the Israelis seemed to change as 
they began to look at the Fatah-loyal Palestinians as allies 
against Hamas.  This has not, however, translated into any 
change in perception by Israeli security officials towards 
their Palestinian counterparts.  If the Shin Bet were to rank 
order the Palestinian security services, it would place the 
Mukabarat at the top of the list, followed by the PSO, the 
Presidential Guard, the Palestinian police, and the National 
Security Force (NSF).  The Israelis are concerned that 
Palestinian security services may be penetrated to some 
extent by Hamas, which might compromise any further 
development in cooperation. 
 
8) (S/NF) Hamas's January 2006 election victory spurred a 
different frame of reference for the Israelis.  Israel's 
official policy now is to not meet with PA officials, aside 
from the President and his representatives.  Post's overall 
assessment is that cooperation is currently limited and will 
not expand to its full potential until greater progress is 
achieved in the peace process at the political level.  Israel 
is inclined to help the U.S. Security Coordinator assist the 
Presidential Guard to a certain extent, so that it can 
protect President Abbas. 
 
9) (S/NF) There is no longer any formal mechanism for 
contacts or coordination between the IDF and Palestinian DCO. 
 Experiences from recent hostage situations and evacuations 
from Gaza indicate that there is minimal contact between the 
IDF and the Palestinians, and that any such contacts are 
informal or personal.  They are generally limited to 
resolving specific issues. 
 
10) (S/NF) Post is unaware of any regular dealings between 
MATAK and the Palestinian security services. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) In addition to the information that DAO Tel Aviv 
has contributed in the above assessment, DAO Tel Aviv 
believes -- based on its close relationship with the IDF and 
military intelligence sources -- that the Israeli military 
does not cooperate with the Palestinian security services, or 
utilize the DCOs or DCLs in the execution of its duties in 
the West Bank.  DAO Tel Aviv's assessment is that the Israeli 
military has a very low regard for the Palestinian security 
services, and that cooperation between IDF representatives 
and Palestinian security officials is unlikely to develop 
absent significant progress in the peace process. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
JONES