VZCZCXRO0302
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #1120/01 3321510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281510Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5463
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 001120 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: US-EU EFFORT BRINGS PARTIES TOGETHER 
FOR SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. SKOPJE 880 
     ¶B. SKOPJE 983 
     ¶C. SKOPJE 1017 
     ¶D. SKOPJE 1037 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (C) After weeks of U.S. and EU coaxing, the leaders of the 
four main parties in Macedonia met on November 27 for their 
first substantive talks on legislative and policy priorities 
since the new government took office in late August.  The 
party leaders outlined some of their key priorities and 
agreed to meet again in early December to discuss a process 
for moving forward on Macedonia's NATO and EU membership 
reform agenda.  The talks represent a small step forward 
toward more consensus-building engagement among the parties, 
especially between the government and opposition DUI. The 
chances for success in future discussions will be enhanced if 
DUI can be convinced in the meantime to accept its role as a 
constructive opposition party, and the government is 
persuaded to give DUI the political space it needs and 
deserves (as the biggest eAlbanian party) to influence 
positively Macedonia's reform agenda. 
 
GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION FINALLY AGREE TO TALKS ON NATO AND EU 
INTEGRATION 
 
¶2. (SBU) After weeks of U.S. and EU coaxing, leaders of 
Macedonia's four main parties finally met November 27 in 
Skopje for their first substantive talks on legislative and 
policy priorities since the VMRO-DPMNE-led inter-ethnic 
coalition government was sworn-in on August 26.  PM Gruevski 
and MOI Jankulovska headed the VMRO-DPMNE team, followed by 
eAlbanian governing coalition partner DPA's President Xhaferi 
and VP Thaci.  The opposition side was represented by 
eAlbanian opposition DUI's Ali Ahmeti and VP Arifi. 
Newly-elected leader of the opposition SDSM Sekerinska and VP 
Makraduli also participated. The Ambassador moderated the 2.5 
hour meeting, for which we prepared the agenda; EUSR Fouere 
was co-moderator. 
 
TIME TO OVERCOME PARTY DIFFERENCES TO FOCUS ON NATO AND EU 
REFORMS 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador outlined the goals of the meeting and 
welcomed the participation of the key party leaders.  She 
congratulated the parties for constructive compromises the 
previous week that had avoided creating inter-ethnic tensions 
over the unveiling of a statue of the 15th century Albanian 
hero Skenderbeg in a predominantly eAlbanian suburb of 
Skopje.  PM Gruevski stressed that it was "time to overcome 
party differences" and to work on implementing NATO and EU 
reforms.  He asked the opposition to work with the GOM to 
pass and implement key legislative priorities, including 
draft laws on a public prosecutor, and on religious 
communities. 
 
BADINTER VOTING KEY FOR DUI 
 
¶4. (C) DUI's Ahmeti underscored that constructive dialogue 
was the only way to advance Macedonia's EU and NATO 
aspirations; lack thereof would only "deepen the political 
crisis" in the country.  He called on the government to 
respect Badinter (qualified majority) voting on Framework 
Agreement-related laws, and recited a list of legislative and 
policy priorities for DUI, including a language law and law 
on the status of former NLA (insurgent group) members.  He 
also challenged the composition of the parliamentary 
committee charged with determining whether laws require a 
Badinter vote and called for it to be disbanded.  If the 
parties did not resolve that issue, DUI would not support 
constructive action on other legislative priorities. 
 
SDSM: RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH COULD WORK 
 
¶5. (C) SDSM underscored the importance of using the talks to 
achieve concrete results, and to build confidence and trust 
among the four parties.  Sekerinska said she believed there 
was political will to achieve results. In the spirit of 
constructive opposition, she said SDSM would support the 
 
SKOPJE 00001120  002 OF 003 
 
 
government's reform efforts that focused on FWA 
implementation, combating corruption, and improved political 
relations. 
 
¶6. (C) Sekerinska warned the government, however, against 
trying to build an artificial legislative minority by 
"shopping" for smaller parties that currently were a part of 
the opposition.  She also cautioned against manipulating the 
draft parliamentary rulebook to limit the opposition's 
ability to participate in plenary debates.  It would be easy 
for the opposition to oppose draft legislation if the 
government did not allow adequate debate time. 
 
DPA: THE BLAME FALLS SQUARELY ON DUI 
 
¶7. (C) Placing the blame squarely on DUI for the lack of 
legislative and policy progress in the government's first 100 
days, DPA leader Xhaferi said DUI had treated the lack of 
constructive dialogue until now "as an abstract issue."  The 
current crisis had sprung, he said, from DUI's resentment 
over its exclusion from the government.  Calling the Badinter 
principle a "pillar of DPA policy," Xhaferi urged consensual 
democracy as the way to move ahead on Macedonia's reform 
agenda. 
 
¶8. (C) DPA VP Thaci defined Badinter, according to strict 
intepretation of the FWA, as requiring a vote of a majority 
of non-Macedonian MPs.  He stressed that a valid Badinter 
vote did not require a majority of eAlbanian MPs, if other 
minority MPs (Turks, Serbs, Vlachs) were sufficient to form a 
majority with other eAlbanian MPs in the Parliament. 
(Comment: Although Thaci's interpretation is correct if one 
adheres only to the letter of the FWA, it clearly is at odds 
with the spirit of that agreement.  The FWA was developed to 
ensure that eAlbanians and/and other ethnic minority groups 
would have a decisive voice in matters affecting them.  End 
Comment.) 
 
NEXT STEPS -- A PROCESS FOR MOVING FORWARD ON LEGISLATIVE AND 
POLICY PRIORITIES 
 
¶9. (SBU) Summarizing the meeting, the Ambassador called for a 
second meeting in early December with a clear agenda compiled 
by the four parties.  The parties would discuss directly how 
to move forward on that agenda, with a view to formalizing a 
process for consultation and consensus-building.  The agenda 
would consist of two or three priority issues, with a 
follow-on meeting later in the month or the month following 
to discuss additional items.  The participants agreed. 
 
¶10. (C) PM Gruevski asked if the parties would consider 
meeting without US and EU participation.  DUI's Ahmeti 
objected, stressing that there were no prospects for success 
without International Community (IC) engagement. The 
Ambassador suggested, as a compromise, meeting once more with 
IC participation, and then deciding whether to continue 
subsequent meetings in that format.  Participants agreed. 
They also approved a joint press statement, drafted by the 
U.S. and EU, that outlined in general terms the purpose of 
the meeting. 
 
GENESIS OF DIALOGUE -- ON THE PATH TO CONSENSUS 
 
¶11. (SBU) We have been pressing the government and opposition 
to show greater flexibility in opening and maintaining 
channels of dialogue, with the goal of achieving consensus on 
the reform agenda required for Macedonia's NATO and EU 
aspirations, since the government took office in late August. 
 The Ambassador raised with PM Gruevski and FM Milososki in 
early September the need for redoubled efforts to engage in 
constructive dialogue with DUI (ref A).  Both assured her 
they would "work to build bridges" with the opposition. 
Those initial efforts led to a U.S.-brokered private meeting 
October 5 between Gruevski and Ahmeti on the draft law on 
police (ref B), their first-ever face-to-face meeting, in 
which they gauged each other's intentions and agreed to 
continue efforts to build dialogue. 
 
¶12. (C) We followed the Gruevski-Ahmeti encounter a few days 
afterwards with an informal lunch with the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI 
VPs to press for further leadership talks, a message 
reinforced in mid-October by EUR/SCE Director Hoh (ref C) and 
 
SKOPJE 00001120  003 OF 003 
 
 
by DAS DiCarlo during her late October visit (ref D.)  When 
several attempts, including one co-sponsored by the local 
NATO and EU missions, failed to bring the political 
leadership together for constructive talks in a public forum, 
it became evident that a successful dialogue would require 
U.S. and EU initiative to bring them together in a private 
meeting. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶13. (C) The November 27 meeting marks a small but significant 
step forward in moving the parties toward more 
consensus-building engagement.  After the failed public 
attempts of the parties to come together to demonstrate, 
albeit superficially, that there was a political will for 
dialogue, it took the US and EU coaxing, together with 
careful spadework to ensure the event would not become a 
glaring media event, to get the leaders to engage in 
substantive discussions. 
 
¶14. (C) The tone of the discussion was civil.  No heated 
exchanges took place and both Ahmeti and Xhaferi were 
uncharacteristically silent through much of the meeting. 
After the meeting ended, Ahmeti and Thaci, sworn enemies in 
the public eye, engaged in a 30-minute private discussion in 
a corner of the room.  If the two main ethnic Albanian 
parties can continue talking constructively, 50 percent of 
the battle will have been won.  The other 50 percent will 
consist of getting DUI to accept its role as constructive 
opposition, and in getting Gruevski to recognize that he must 
rein in DPA's efforts to cripple DUI as a political force, 
and must give DUI political space in which to have its 
concerns heard, if he hopes to advance Macedonia's NATO and 
EU reform agenda. 
MILOVANOVIC