VZCZCXRO8544
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #1090/01 3181645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141645Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5424
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 001090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR MK
SUBJECT: (CORRECTED COPY) MACEDONIA: SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ELECT 
NEW PARTY PRESIDENT 
 
REF: SKOPJE 980 
 
Classified By: Poloff Katrina Mosser for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (C) During a November 5 party congress that lasted into 
the early hours of the following day, Social Democratic Union 
of Macedonia (SDSM) delegates elected by a landslide former 
Deputy Prime Minister Radmila Sekerinska as the new party 
president.  The delegates chose as the party's secretary 
general a close associate of President Crvenkovski, himself a 
former head of the SDSM.  The SDSM central board later tapped 
a member Crvenkovski's staff as one of the SDSM's three vice 
presidents.  The leadership change demonstrates Crvenkovski's 
continued influence in the SDSM, and the fall from grace of 
his former creation then rival, ex-Prime Minister Vlado 
Buckovski.  As Sekerinska consolidates her leadership 
position she can be expected to work to distance herself from 
Crvenkovski, whose past influence in the SDSM has been blamed 
by some Social Democrat insiders for the party's failure to 
undergo needed reforms.  That could bode well, initially, for 
the government's relations with SDSM.  End Summary. 
 
SOLE CANDIDATE 
 
¶2. (SBU) The SDSM, the largest opposition party in Macedonia, 
elected former Deputy Prime Minister Radmila Sekerinska as 
the new party president during a November 5 party congress 
that lasted into the early hours of the following day.  SDSM 
held the extraordinary congress nearly a month after the 
former party president and ex-Prime Minister, Vlado 
Buckovski, lost a vote of confidence at the Social Democrats' 
October 7 convention (reftel).  Sekerinska, who long had been 
considered the heir apparent and who enjoyed the strong 
support of President Crvenkovski (himself a former SDSM 
president), won easily, receiving 456 votes of the 516 
ballots cast.  The SDSM congress was largely uneventful, as 
Sekerinska was the sole candidate for the president's seat 
and the bulk of intra-party debates had been aired and 
resolved during the October convention. Sekerinska is the 
first woman to hold the office of SDSM president. 
 
CRVENKOVKSKI'S CIRCLE OF INFLUENCE 
 
¶3. (SBU) In addition to a new SDSM president, the party 
elected a new secretary general and 70 members to the SDSM 
central board.  The new secretary general, Goran Mincev, is a 
relative unknown who previously served in an obscure 
government position and who is widely considered to be 
"Crvenkovski's man."   Mincev ran against Ljubco Jordanovski, 
who until recently served as Macedonia's Ambassador to the 
U.S. and is a former president of the parliament. The 
election of Mincev over Jordanovski, who is close to 
Buckovski, signals a complete break from Buckovski's SDSM and 
a further strengthening of the ties between the new SDSM 
leadership and President Crvenkovski. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The newly elected SDSM central board held its first 
meeting on November 7 and elected three new party vice 
presidents and the 15 members of the party presidency.  The 
new vice presidents include Jani Makraduli, a former SDSM 
party whip in the parliament who is closely aligned with 
Sekerinska (he was her witness at her recent marriage); Igor 
Ivanovski, an MP and close confidante of Crvenkovski; and 
Zoran Zaev, the mayor of the southeast Macedonian city of 
Strumica and the only member of the new leadership linked to 
Buckovski. 
 
THE FUTURE OF SDSM -- ESCAPING CRVENKOVSKI'S SHADOW 
 
¶5. (C) The change in party leadership not only reflects the 
delegates' general dissatisfaction with what they considered 
to have been the failed policies and poor poll ratings of 
former SDSM president Buckovski, but also signals 
Crvenkovski's attempt to tighten the party reins.  Although 
Sekerinska's rise to power in the party owes much to 
Crvenkovski's support, that does not necessarily mean she 
will repay the favor with blind loyalty to him and his 
circle.  Sekerinska is likely to work to escape Crvenkovski's 
shadow in order to strengthen her own control over the rank 
 
SKOPJE 00001090  002 OF 002 
 
 
and file and implement the party reforms she has advocated. 
She will have to proceed with caution, however, to avoid 
provoking counter-reactions from Crvenkovski loyalists such 
as Mincev and Ivanovski. 
 
RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT -- AN UNORTHODOX ALLY? 
 
¶6. (C) Sekerinska can probably count on initial cooperation 
from the government if she chooses to work toward legislative 
victories to consolidate her position.  PM Gruevski was among 
the first of Macedonia's political leaders to congratulate 
Sekerinska after her victory and he met with her midweek to 
discuss how to work constructively together and how to 
conduct a more civilized public debate over policy 
differences.  Gruevski likely would jump at the chance to 
widen any gap between Sekerinska and Crvenkovski, given his 
long-standing disdain for the President and refusal to 
recognize Crvenkovski's election as legitimate.  Sekerinska 
may therefore find a more flexible, compromise-ready 
government ally will give her the leverage she needs to 
increase the distance between her and Crvenkovski. 
 
BUCKOVSKI'S FALL FROM GRACE AND A POSSIBLE OLIVE BRANCH 
 
¶7. (C) The political rift between Buckovski and Crvenkovski 
grew to an open feud over the past year as the latter sought 
to undermine the ex-Prime Minister in order to strengthen his 
own position in the party (reftel).  With Buckovski no longer 
a member of the party's key decision-making bodies, it is 
possible that, once the SDSM constitution is modified to 
permit formal faction, he will form an internal party faction 
to contest Crvenkovski's influence.  It is unlikely, however, 
that he will risk leaving SDSM in the short-term, since he is 
not sure how many party supporters would jump ship with him. 
In statements to the press, he has made it clear that for now 
he intends to work within SDSM for reforms that would loosen 
the party's current rigid, centralized structure. 
Additionally, the election of Buckovski's party ally Zaev as 
an SDSM vice president could be an olive branch to the former 
Prime Minister's supporters and could provide an opening for 
a Buckovski-Sekerinska entente to counter Crvenkovski. 
MILOVANOVIC