VZCZCXRO5959
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #7044/01 3170917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130917Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5247
INFO RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 5554
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0302
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0284
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0388
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0305
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0289
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 007044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM 
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS ON CROSS-STRAITS RELATIONS 
 
REF: SHANGHAI 7043 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mary Tarnowka, Section Chief, Political/Economic 
Section, U.S. Consulate Shanghai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary: Several prominent Shanghai-based cross-Straits 
scholars told visiting EAP Political Officers during meetings on 
November 1-3 that domestic political turmoil in Taiwan would 
continue and would prevent any breakthroughs on cross-Straits 
issues for the foreseeable future.  The scholars expected 
President Chen Shui-Bian to use constitutional reform to push 
independence and provoke the mainland.  They expected Beijing to 
react strongly only if the constitutional reform process touched 
on territorial issues, but acknowledged that Beijing would view 
with suspicion any proposal initiated by the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP).  Scholars expressed skepticism about Ma 
Ying-jeou's chances for the 2008 Presidential election, with 
some noting that even if Ma did win the Presidency, it would be 
difficult for him to overcome DPP opposition and improve 
cross-Straits relations.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
DPP Constitutional Reforms 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) During a November 1 meeting with visiting EAP Political 
Officers Chernawsky and Longenecker, Shanghai Institute for East 
Asian Studies (SIEAS) Director Zhang Nianchi predicted that 
Taiwan domestic politics would continue to be polarized in the 
next two years.  He said that neither the DPP nor the KMT were 
united and that party infighting had led to a more combative and 
unpredictable political environment.  The DPP was pushing issues 
such as constitutional reform and UN membership to provoke a 
reaction from Beijing and gain more support from voters.  Zhang 
anticipated the DPP would press for referenda on these topics 
and thought the high Taiwan public support for returning to the 
UN would make this a particular flash point for Beijing. 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) Vice President Huang 
Renwei, during his meeting with EAP Political Officers on 
November 2, shared similar views.  Huang said President Chen 
Shui-bian had realized after the demonstrations against him that 
his time was extremely limited.  He needed to find a way to 
catch up and was using the "extreme" independence issue to 
appeal to deep Green voters and reorganize his power base.  Only 
by provoking a crisis, could President Chen regain political 
support.  Huang expected President Chen would continue to push 
independence and trigger a crisis with the mainland in the next 
two years. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  Shanghai's Taiwan scholars were concerned about DPP 
efforts to reform the constitution and believed that these 
efforts were aimed not at improving the government but 
establishing independence.  SIEAS Zhang said he had reviewed 
many of the reform proposals.  While some were innocuous, others 
touched on sensitive issues.  Furthermore, the process of 
constitutional reform itself was dangerous.  Zhang said 130 of 
the 175 articles of the constitution were under consideration 
for revision.  If the Taiwan government revised 130 articles, it 
would be difficult to claim that the revised constitution was 
the same as the old constitution.  In addition, the existing 
constitution represented Chinese people on the mainland and 
Taiwan.  With such revisions approved only by the population of 
Taiwan, one could not say such a revised constitution 
represented all of China.  Finally, Taiwan could argue that only 
an independent country could change its constitution and by 
changing its constitution it was de facto independent.  Both 
Zhang and Huang were worried that Chen would be able to force 
changes by using a "two step forward, one step back" method. 
The DPP could propose a compromise which would appear acceptable 
when contrasted with President Chen's radical proposals, but 
which would still include major steps toward Taiwan 
independence.  Huang noted that while a moderate proposal might 
be more acceptable, any proposal that touched on territorial 
issues, no matter how moderate, was still dangerous. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  Taiwan Research Center Executive Vice President Yan 
Anlin, in a discussion on November 1, was also wary of the DPP. 
He said the DPP leaders were experts at "word games" and worried 
 
SHANGHAI 00007044  002 OF 003 
 
 
that the DPP would be able to trick the United States into 
accepting dangerous constitutional reforms.  For example, when 
President Chen Shui-bian froze the National Unification Council 
(NUC) and National Unification Guidelines (NUG), he used a 
Chinese word that meant both "to freeze" and "to cancel."  To 
Chinese people, President Chen had cancelled the NUG, while to 
Americans he had just frozen the process.  Yan said the DPP was 
attempting to do the same thing with the constitution.  He heard 
that it would change the preamble and replace any reference to 
the Republic of China with "wo guo" (our country).  While to 
Americans, this might seem harmless, to Chinese people this was 
a clear indication that Taiwan was different from the mainland. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  Zhang, Huang, and Yan all suggested that China would 
accept constitutional reforms if it these reforms did not touch 
on territorial or independence issues.  SIEAS Zhang added that 
KMT support for any constitutional changes was necessary for 
passage.  Zhang noted that the KMT also supported constitutional 
reform but said that KMT goals were different from the DPP, and 
were focused on good governance and supporting unification.  A 
KMT proposal would generally be viewed with an open mind, 
whereas any proposal from the DPP would be treated with 
suspicion. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
KMT Internal Politics, Ma's Troubles 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Like Beijing scholars, Shanghai scholars were concerned 
about KMT Chairman Ma's declining popularity and unsure Ma would 
be able to win the Presidency in 2008.  Zhang said Ma had failed 
to come up with a "new direction" for Taiwan to distinguish his 
party from the DPP.  He had also lost support because of his 
handling of the anti-Chen Shui-bian protests.  Zhang predicted 
that Ma would not be able to resolve his differences with 
Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng and People First Party 
(PFP) Chairman James Soong and unite the Pan-Blue camp.  SIIS 
Department of American Studies Director Chen Dongxiao provided a 
similar view during a meeting on November 1.  According to Chen, 
Ma's leadership was eroded by his hesitation and capriciousness. 
 His lack of resolution had led to suspicions within the 
Pan-Blue faction and prevented Ma from uniting the camp.  Chen 
saw Soong as still an important challenge to Ma's leadership. 
According to Huang, Ma was a good man, but did not have the 
ability to lead in a crisis situation. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Zhang said that even if Ma won the election, he would 
face many difficulties and be largely ineffective. According to 
Zhang, because Taiwan domestic politics had become extremely 
polarized, the opposition party often had a lot of power.  If Ma 
became president, he would not be able to make any compromises 
or begin negotiations on cross-Straits issues because of DPP 
opposition.  Huang had a similar view and added that while Ma 
might be able to resolve the three links problem, he would not 
be able to make any progress on significant political issues. 
Huang also said that if DPP Premier Su Tseng-chang became 
President, he would only be able to resolve some of the three 
links issues, but similarly would not be able to make any 
significant political progress. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
Arms Procurement Bill Politics 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Shanghai scholars noted AIT Director Young's comments 
urging Taiwan pass the arms procurement bill.  Zhang said that 
these comments were understandable since the United States was 
in the middle of an election season, but warned that such 
 
SHANGHAI 00007044  003 OF 003 
 
 
comments had a negative effect on cross-Straits relations. 
Huang asked whether Director Young's comments were aimed at 
testing Ma's leadership and probed whether the United States had 
lost its trust in Ma. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
Beijing's Position Towards Taiwan 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  Huang said that Beijing would continue its policy of 
non-interference in Taiwan domestic politics.  Beijing had 
learned its lesson that threatening Taiwan was 
counterproductive.  Huang was worried, however, that if Beijing 
maintained its silence and did not react, this could lead Chen 
Shui-bian to become even more aggressive and radical. 
Nonetheless, he stressed that Beijing was not interested in 
military confrontation.  Zhang said Beijing did not have a 
timeline for reunification.  It understood that unification 
would take a long time and needed to be mutually agreed to by 
both sides.  Zhang also argued that the United States and China 
should discuss what should count as pro-independence steps 
within Taiwan's constitutional reform process and what should be 
considered as the "status quo." 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) EAP Political Officers cleared this report. 
JARRETT