VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3767/01 3051108
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011108Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1081
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1449
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7587
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1541

S E C R E T SEOUL 003767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO EAP F/O, T AND ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016 
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK OFFERS TO EXPAND PSI PARTICIPATION, WITHOUT 
ENDORSING PSI 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW.  REASON: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (S) On November 1, Park Sun-won, Secretary to the 
President for National Security Strategy, outlined for the 
DCM a new ROK proposal for its participation in PSI.  He said 
the South Korean Government would soon announce three 
responses to the October 9 North Korean nuclear weapons test: 
 1) Measures the ROK government will take consistent with 
UNSCR 1718; 2) Unilateral ROKG punitive measures; and 3) 
Expanded ROK participation in PSI.  Park did not elaborate on 
the first two, but said that after three weeks of heated 
political debate, the ROK proposed to increase ROK 
participation in PSI.  The key line of its announcement would 
read:  "The Korean government will continue to expand its 
scope of participation in PSI through information exchange, 
asset contribution, and participation in related meetings." 
Park made it clear his proposal was designed to increase ROK 
participation in PSI without provoking a military clash with 
the North or arousing a domestic outcry.  Because of those 
concerns, Park said the ROKG had decided it would not endorse 
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, but indicated 
the ROK was willing to work closely with the United States 
and others to share intelligence, more closely monitor its 
own ports, and support the interdiction of any North Korean 
vessels transporting WMD, provided the interdiction took 
place outside of Korean territorial waters. 
 
¶2.  (S) In a follow-on conversation with the Ambassador, 
National Security Advisor Song Min-soon underscored that 
endorsing the PSI principles was a bridge too far at this 
point since it was equated to ROK involvement in maritime 
interdiction in the public debate.  But the ROK would fully 
participate in all PSI activities, Song added.  The 
Ambassador pushed back, saying "full participation" in PSI 
was only for countries that endorsed the principles, and 
urged Song to keep working the issue. 
 
ROKG Preparing Response to DPRK Nuclear Test 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) On November 1, 2006, the DCM and POL-MIL Chief met 
with Secretary to the President for National Security 
Strategy Dr. Park Sun-won (at Park's request) to receive a 
preview of the South Korean Government's soon-to-be announced 
policy on participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI).  Park began by expressing appreciation for 
the U.S. Government's decision to go forward with the October 
31 meeting in Beijing among EAP Assistant Secretary Hill, his 
North Korean counterpart Kim Gye-gwan, and Chinese VFM Wu 
Dawei. 
 
¶4.  (S) Dr. Park stated that the South Korean Government 
would soon announce the measures it will take in response to 
the North Korean nuclear weapons test of October 9.  There 
would be three parts to that announcement, he said: 
 
-- Measures the ROK government will take consistent with 
UNSCR 1718; 
-- Unilateral punitive measures the ROK government will take; 
and 
-- Expanded ROK participation in PSI. 
 
Park did not elaborate on what the first two announcements 
would entail, but instead turned his attention to explaining 
the new ROK proposal on PSI. 
 
Heated Political Debate 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Dr. Park noted that intense inter-agency discussions 
had been taking place during the past three weeks within the 
ROKG over whether, and how, to increase South Korea's support 
for, and participation in, PSI.  He said that ruling Uri 
Party leaders had intervened in that discussion in ways that 
were "not helpful, but were necessary" for the government to 
gain their understanding.  There were "many voices" on the 
issue; some believed full participation in PSI was the best 
option, others were more cautious, but even they viewed PSI 
as a legitimate activity and believed the ROK had to play a 
more important role in the nonproliferation efforts of the 
international community, Park explained.  He went on to 
describe various reasons why the ROK was taking a cautious 
approach toward PSI.  North-South relations were tricky and 
the Korean Peninsula was a volatile place, with the potential 
for military clashes along the DMZ, Military Demarcation 
 
Line, as well as within disputed maritime boundaries, Park 
elaborated.  He cited North-South clashes at sea in 1999 and 
2002 as examples.  Please understand, Park pleaded, that 
South Korea was not capitulating to the North, but had to 
consider carefully what the DPRK's reaction might be to any 
actions they took, adding that South Korea is still 
technically in a state of war with the North. 
 
Expanded Support For PSI 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S) Dr. Park told the DCM he had prepared an announcement 
of increased ROK participation in PSI, stressing that it was 
only a preliminary draft, but that he had discussed its 
content with National Security Advisor, and Foreign 
Minister-designate, Song Min-soon.  He said he was unable to 
hand over the one page draft, but then read it to the DCM. 
It began by emphasizing the ROK's commitment to halt the 
proliferation of WMD, and went on to say the ROKG was 
actively taking part in various multilateral nonproliferation 
regimes, including NPT, MTCR, and Wassenaar.  The ROK 
likewise supported PSI's objectives and had taken part as an 
observer in PSI exercises, Park continued. (NOTE: Most 
recently, the ROK sent a three-person observer team to the 
October 29-31 LEADING EDGE exercise in the Persian Gulf.  END 
NOTE).  As a result, the ROK believed it was already 
"participating" in PSI, Park asserted. 
 
¶7.  (S) Continuing, Dr. Park said that President Roh put the 
highest value on stopping "vertical proliferation" through 
denuclearization of the DPRK via the Six-Party Talks, as well 
as supporting the global effort to prevent "horizontal 
proliferation" of WMD through the use of PSI.  Therefore, 
Park read, "The Korean government will continue to expand its 
scope of participation in PSI through information exchange, 
asset contribution, and participation in related meetings." 
He added that "Furthermore, the ROKG is already conducting 
thorough inspections to restrict the flow of terror-related 
weapons into and out of its ports, and will continue to 
strengthen such efforts." 
 
¶8.  (S) Making it clear his proposal was an attempt to 
increase ROK participation in PSI without causing a military 
clash with the North, or domestic criticism, Park explained 
that he had carefully examined how to "compromise between 
South Korea's firm commitment to halt proliferation of WMD 
and the particularity of the Korean Peninsula and its divided 
nation." 
 
But Will Not Endorse Statement of Interdiction Principles 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶9.  (S) Pressed by the DCM on whether or not the ROK would 
also endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, 
Park clearly indicated that would not be an element of the 
ROK announcement.  "Endorse" was a very strong term in the 
Korean language," he claimed, because it implied a new legal 
obligation.  The DCM replied that PSI participants were free 
to act within the confines of their own national legal 
authorities and international commitments.  Park appeared 
aware of this point, but indicated that endorsement of PSI 
would be seen as going too far in the eyes of key political 
players, and his leaders wanted to quell the domestic debate. 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Pressed further on how the ROK would respond to 
various proliferation scenarios, Park said that if credible 
intelligence were received that WMD was being shipped to or 
from North Korea, the ROKG would share that information with 
the United States and would want us to interdict the suspect 
vessel, provided it was done outside Korean territorial 
waters.  What if the ship was passing within your territorial 
waters?, the DCM asked.  "Then we would ask you to wait a few 
hours" (until the DPRK ship reached the high seas), Park 
replied. 
 
¶11.  (S) The DCM thanked Dr. Park for sharing his proposal 
with the USG.  He welcomed ROK willingness to increase the 
level of its support for, and involvement in, PSI.  He 
cautioned, however, that Washington would likely be 
disappointed to hear the ROK remained unwilling to endorse 
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.  He stressed 
that PSI remained an important international effort involving 
77 countries around the world; that PSI made no demands on 
the ROK inconsistent with its national authorities and 
international commitments; and that by failing to endorse PSI 
fully, the ROKG was missing an opportunity to send a signal 
to North Korea that it would not tolerate proliferation of 
 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 
¶12.  (S) Evidencing the continuing interagency debate within 
the South Korean government, Dr. Park asked us not to share 
the content of his draft announcement with the ROK Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
 
¶13.  (S) COMMENT:  It is clear the ROK had made an effort to 
respond to the Secretary's request to join PSI delivered 
during her October visit to Seoul.  Given the domestic 
political situation, however, the Roh Administration does not 
want to go any further than this, at least for now.  Of 
course Roh's own views have impeded a better understanding of 
PSI within Korean society.  This is a disappointing outcome, 
particularly in light of the effort we made in meeting with 
the DPRK in Beijing on October 31.  Embassy recommends we 
reply to the ROK with dissatisfaction and continue to press 
the Blue House to fully endorse PSI.  END COMMENT. 
VERSHBOW