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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 008811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
TEL AVIV - PLEASE PASS TO APHSCT DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2016 
TAGS: ASEC EPET PTER ENERG SA
SUBJECT: UNPRECEDENTED MEETING BETWEEN USG AND SAG ON 
PETROLEUM INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES OBERWETTER FOR 
REASONS 12958 1.4 B, D, AND E 
 
--------- 
Summary 
--------- 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  In light of recent threats to petroleum 
infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, on 31 October Vice Admiral 
Walsh, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Commander, 
U.S. Fifth Fleet, and Dhahran Consul General Kincannon met 
Saudi Arabian representatives from the  Royal Saudi Naval 
Forces (RSNF), Ministry of Interior (the Mabahith, Coast 
Guard, and the Facilities Security Forces) and Saudi Aramco 
for the first time at the King Abudulazziz Naval Base, in 
Jubail City.  Vice Admiral (VADM) Walsh offered U.S. military 
support in thwarting potential attacks on critical Saudi 
infrastructure, and his staff briefed the Saudi Arabian 
representatives on Fifth Fleet capabilities.  Rear Admiral 
(RADM) Fahad Ahmed Al Kayyal, Commander of the Eastern Fleet, 
led the Saudi delegation, welcomed assistance, and 
highlighted the need for technical information sharing. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Saudi Participation Included Key Agencies, Including 
Newly-Established Facility Security Force (FSF) 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  In addition to RADM Al Kayyal, most major Saudi 
Arabian security agencies were present at the meeting, 
including the Ministry of Interior,s newly-established 
Facility Security Force (FSF) formed to protect critical 
petroleum infrastructure.  Key Saudi Arabian meeting 
participants included: 
 
--  HRH Commander Sultan bin Khalid Al Faisal Al Saud, RSNF 
Special Forces, Commander Task Force 88; 
--  Brigadier General Khalid Ali Al Humidan, Mabahith, 
"International Relations and Cooperation;" 
--  Brigadier General Dr. Saad bin Khalid Al Jabri, Special 
Advisor to the Assistant Minister of the Interior for 
Security Affairs; 
--  Brigadier General Abdul Rahman Ibrahim Ibrahim, 
Commander of the Border Forces (including the Coast Guard) 
in the Eastern Province; 
--  Major General Saad bin Mohammed Al Majid, Commander, 
FSF; 
--  General Abdullah Bin Y. al-Zahrani, Coast Guard 
Commander, Jubail; 
--  Mr. Samir Raslan, Saudi Aramco, General Manager 
Industrial Security Operations; 
--  Major General Ahmed bin Mohammad Al Rubayan, Eastern 
Area Commander; and 
--  Captain Mohammed al Amri, RSN Eastern Fleet Operations 
Officer. 
 
U.S. Mission participants included Dhahran Consul General 
Kincannon, Acting Defense Attache Hobbes, and Energy Attache 
Ross. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
VADM Walsh Upbeat on Cooperation to Protect 
Critical Petroleum Infrastructure 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  VADM Walsh stressed the U.S. Navy's willingness 
to be of assistance in protecting critical Saudi petroleum 
maritime infrastructure, and underscored his openness to 
hearing all feedback on the usefulness of NAVCENT and 
Coalition operations and the manner in which they are 
conducted.  His staff delivered a briefing on the Fifth 
Fleet,s maritime and aerial reconnaissance capabilities for 
the Saudi interlocutors.  VADM Walsh,s staff offered 
consequence management assistance in the event of a major oil 
spill.  Saudi Aramco,s Samir Raslan noted Aramco was 
generally well-prepared for even a major oil spill, but 
welcomed assistance as needed. 
 
RIYADH 00008811  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
RADM Al Kayyal Stresses Need for Technical 
Information Sharing and Coordination 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  RADM Al Kayyal thanked VADM Walsh and NAVCENT for 
offering support and cooperation.  Brigadier General Al 
Humidan noted on-going threats to Saudi Arabian petroleum 
infrastructure from Saudi Arabian extremists and Iraqi 
national Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, whom he characterized as "the 
Al Qaida leader for Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula." 
RADM Al Kayyal noted the importance of information sharing 
and coordination, and  specifically requested technical 
information exchange focused on threat tactics.  He suggested 
a data link via the Eastern Fleet as a mechanism for doing 
so.  He remarked positively on a previously-planned office 
call for 1 November in Bahrain at the NAVCENT Headquarters. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RADM Al Kayyal Laments Difficulty of 
Ascertaining Small Vessels' Intent 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  RADM Al Kayyal stressed the difficulties 
confronting the RSNF in policing an Arabian 
Gulf populated with many thousands of small fishing boats. 
He regretted the difficulty of ascertaining the intent of 
small vessels when they approach critical petroleum 
installations, noting fishermen in the region predominantly 
use small dhows and skiffs.  He lamented problems with 
evaluating the credibility of intelligence derived from the 
Internet, such as recent threats against Ras Tanura petroleum 
complex.  He highlighted Ras Tanura,s vulnerabilities, 
stating the Sea Islands, North Pier, and South Pier are this 
vast complex,s most critical infrastructure.  He remarked 
coordinates from the latest threat intelligence could 
indicate Al Qaida was using satellite imagery, not only 
Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment on the ground. 
RADM Al Kayyal underscored that terrorist groups only needed 
to cause minor damage to a crude oil facility to shake up 
international oil markets through media publicity. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Mabahith: We Need Original Text 
for Intelligence Sharing 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Brigadier General Al Humidan remarked on the need 
for the U.S. to share intelligence in original Arabic, rather 
than in translated form.  He indicated the USG passed the SAG 
intelligence about an impending attack on the Iraqi al Basra 
Oil Terminal in translated form in 2004.  He noted a critical 
word was mis-translated, leading the RSNF to look out for 
attacks on oil tankers, rather than for vessels launched by a 
specific tribal group in Yemen.  In April 2004, U.S. Navy 
action thwarted a large attack on the oil terminal.  However, 
3 U.S. servicemen were killed when they approached and 
intercepted a traditional dhow, which then exploded.  The 
speaker indicated that the mis-translation would have been 
obvious to a native Arabic speaker who had seen the original 
text, implying the RSNF would have been in a position to 
better understand and possibly prevent the attack. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Saudi Aramco Weighs In: Production Facilities not a 
Critical Risk; Seaside Facilities Difficult to Protect 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Saudi Aramco,s Samir Raslan downplayed the firm,s 
vulnerabilities to terrorism against its production 
infrastructure.  He stated the company operates 3500 oil 
fields, and Aramco can turn off pumping from any field from a 
central control center if needed. (Note: Raslan likely meant 
oil wells; Aramco operates approximately 80 oil fields, but 
more than a thousand wells.  While Raslan is generally 
correct that Saudi Aramco,s production facilities are likely 
 
RIYADH 00008811  003 OF 003 
 
 
some of the least vulnerable parts of its infrastructure, his 
spin on Aramco,s large number of fields is a bit 
over-optimistic.  While Saudi Aramco has many oil fields, 
production is heavily centralized in a small number.  The 
Ghawar and Safaniya fields account for total production about 
6 million barrels per day (mbpd) of the 9.1 mbpd Saudi Arabia 
typically produces.  End note.)  He noted Saudi Aramco 
considers Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, and the gas facilities as 
likely major targets.  He remarked on the difficulty of 
protecting seaside facilities, as it was very easy to use a 
small dhow to carry out an attack.  He noted Aramco had 
designated restricted zones around its seafront facilities 
marked by buoys, and used helicopters ferrying crews and 
catering to conduct routine aerial surveillance. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Aramco Complaint: Mistakes Cost Us Money 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Saudi Aramco,s Samir Raslan stressed the need for 
strong coordination when U.S forces are operating near Saudi 
Aramco facilities.  He recounted one incident (Note: we 
believe this is an older incident) in which the U.S. Navy 
mistakenly boarded a Saudi vessel, setting off rumors in the 
"oil patch" of renewed hostilities in the Arabian Gulf.  He 
complained such incidents damage Saudi Aramco financially, 
stating the incident cost the company $50 million USD, but 
did not specify the nature of the costs.  VADM Walsh 
acknowledged the incident, and RADM Al Kayyal noted the U.S. 
Navy had apologized for it.  VADM Walsh agreed with Raslan on 
the need for strong coordination. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Commander Notes Concern with Possible 
Attacks on Oil and Gas Tankers 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S)  HRH Commander Sultan provided his ground-level 
assessment of working day to day to protect Saudi Aramco 
facilities.  He stated security patrols on most Saudi Aramco 
facilities are routinely monitored, presumably by those with 
intentions to attack the facilities.  He believes most Saudi 
Aramco facilities present a sufficiently hard target to 
dissuade terrorists from attacking by sea.  He instead argued 
tankers at major terminals were significantly more at threat 
than fixed facilities.  He noted tankers often moor several 
miles away from major terminals, especially if they are too 
large for the berthing facilities.  He noted these tankers 
enjoyed relatively little security while taking on their 
cargo, and it is relatively easy to penetrate the hull of an 
empty ship.  He also expressed his concern with an attack on 
a gas tanker.  (Note: Whether liquid petroleum gas (LPG) or 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), he could not say.  End note.) 
He indicated the Saudi military had carried out simulations 
showing that, in the case of an attack on a gas vessel in Ras 
Tanura Channel, people as far away as Riyadh would die from 
secondary explosions. 
 
--------- 
Comment 
--------- 
 
¶10.  (S)  This meeting was a first in bringing the U.S. Navy 
together at a senior level with appropriate Saudi Arabian 
interlocutors at senior levels from across the RSNF  and 
security agencies.  VADM Walsh and RADM al Kayyal set a 
friendly tone for open cooperation and communication.  VADM 
Walsh,s visit to Jubail was followed by RADM al Kayyal,s 
office call to NAVCENT,s Bahrain headquarters on the 
following day.  We anticipate the meeting will prove to have 
appropriately set the stage to move forward with action items 
and a significant U.S. contribution to safeguarding critical 
Saudi Arabian petroleum infrastructure in the coming months. 
 
 
OBERWETTER