VZCZCXRO4931
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #1406/01 3131548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091548Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8241
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0047
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0689
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0080
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0197

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 001406 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/NCE FOR ERIC FICHTE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNAUS EUN YI SR BK CG IS LE
IR, RS, UZ, CU, KPAL, EZ 
SUBJECT: CZECHS ON NOVEMBER 13-14 GAERC 
 
REF: A. STATE 183545 
 
     ¶B. STATE 664065 
     ¶C. PRAGUE 1387 
     ¶D. PRAGUE 1386 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. At the November 13 GAERC the Czechs expect 
the focus to be on the Middle East (Iran, Israel/Palestine, 
Lebanon), Russia, and the Balkans. Czech policy closely 
mirrors U.S. policy in these regions/countries. Specifically, 
the Czechs support: (1) a strong UNSC resolution with 
sanctions for Iran, (2) continuing sanctions for Uzbekistan, 
(3) close cooperation with Russia (while remaining firm on 
Russian human rights violations), (4) a stronger EU common 
position on Cuba, (5) no or minimal delay in final status for 
Kosovo, (6) full compliance with ICTY for Serbia, and free or 
low cost visas for Serbian youth. Also, the EU plans to 
discuss ways to provide increased civilian assistance in 
Afghanistan, and issue conclusions calling for an end to 
Israeli overflights in Lebanon. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Poloff met November 9 with Czech MFA's CFSP 
Department officials Veronika Musilova and Magda Janesova to 
discuss the November 13 GAERC and deliver ref A talking 
points. 
 
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Balkans 
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¶3. (C) The Czech position on the Balkans remains unchanged. 
On Kosovo, Czechs agree that delay of the status process 
makes little sense. However, if a very short delay becomes 
necessary because of the December Serbian elections, the 
Czechs suggest a delay until February, when Slovakia is 
presiding over the UNSC, rather than January, when Russia is 
presiding. The Czechs would be interested in leadership 
positions in the new civilian mission in Kosovo (and are 
pleased that Antonin Zlinsky from the Czech Ministry of 
Defense is serving this mission as the security and logistics 
officer), or a position as political advisor to the commander 
of the KFOR mission. 
 
¶4. (C) On Serbia, the EU will discuss what can be offered to 
Serbia at the upcoming GAERC. The desire is to offer Serbia 
support without appearing to offer "compensation" for the 
possible loss of Kosovo. Czechs continue to call for full 
ICTY compliance, and encourage Serbia's Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations. The Czechs believe visas to Europe should be 
free or low cost, especially for young Serbs (90% of whom 
have never left Serbia).  The EU will announce a visa 
facilitation mandate for Serbia at the GAERC, which will 
allow negotiations on visas to begin. 
 
¶5. (C) On Bosnia, the Czechs are pleased with the election 
results. They are encouraging the Bosnians to take the needed 
reforms seriously, especially police reform. Stabilization 
and Association Agreement talks cannot proceed without 
significant progress on these reforms. 
 
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Russia 
------ 
 
¶6. (C) Czechs agree the U.S. and EU should continue to 
cooperate with Russia on international issues. Clearly, 
Russia is an important partner. However, the U.S. and the EU 
must remain firm on Russia's human rights violations and 
anti-democratic trends. Regarding Russia's announced plan to 
double the cost of gas for Georgia, MFA Director of Eastern 
European Department Tomas Szunyog told poloff in a separate 
meeting on November 3 that the Czechs believe Russia acted 
improperly. Szunyog explained that the Czechs do not oppose 
market prices for Russian gas; however, the correct market 
price (which may not be the price paid by wealthy Western 
European countries) and the timing of the increase should be 
fairly negotiated between the countries without political 
pressure, and the increase to the negotiated rate should be 
implemented over a period of time, not in January 2007. 
 
-------------------------- 
Israeli-Palestinian Issues 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Czechs urge the Israelis and the Palestinians to 
 
PRAGUE 00001406  002 OF 003 
 
 
exercise restraint. They hope Palestinian President Abbas 
will succeed in establishing a unity government that will 
accept the Quartet principles. The Czechs agree that movement 
and access remains an important issue, and support the Karni 
plan. Janesova called the humanitarian situation in Palestine 
"alarming," and said the Czechs would like Israel to consent 
to the opening at Karni to ease the suffering. 
 
¶8. (C) In a separate meeting on November 8, Acting Director 
of the Middle East and Africa Department Pavel Rezac 
expressed concern that the current funding mechanism for 
humanitarian aid in Palestine does not appear to function as 
intended. Without providing further information Rezac said he 
believed the funds are being disbursed primarily to 
supporters of Hamas. 
 
------- 
Lebanon 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Czechs share the U.S. view that there is an 
Hizballah/Syrian effort to bring Prime Minister Siniora down 
or force him into a new cabinet where his opponents will have 
a "blocking one-third" (Ref B). In a separate meeting on 
November 8, Czech Ambassador to Lebanon Jan Cisek predicted 
that if "consultations" proposed by Parliament Speaker Nabih 
Berri failed to achieve a compromise acceptable to Hizballah 
and Syrian actors, Hizballah could call people into the 
streets as early as November 18. 
 
¶10. (C/NF) The EU is concerned about continuing Israeli 
overflights, which it believes undermines the sovereign 
authority of, and public support for, the Siniora government. 
The Czechs share EU concerns, but were concerned that the 
original draft conclusions on the overflights were 
unbalanced. The Czechs asked for the term "provocative" to be 
removed, and asked for a statement about the reason for the 
overflights to be included in the final text. 
 
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Iran 
---- 
 
¶11. (C) The Czechs continue to support a strong UNSC 
resolution to impose sanctions on Iran. However, the Czechs 
are open to renewed negotiations with Iran if it ceases 
enrichment. The foreign ministers will discuss Iran's nuclear 
activities at the GAERC Foreign Ministers' lunch, and plan to 
explore ways to support Iranian civil society at the next 
GAERC in December. 
 
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Congo 
----- 
 
¶12. (U) The Czechs welcomed the peaceful elections and call 
on both candidates to respect the election results. 
 
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Uzbekistan 
---------- 
 
¶13. (C) The Czechs support continuing sanctions on 
Uzbekistan. However, some EU member states support weakening 
existing sanctions. 
 
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Cuba 
---- 
 
¶14. (C) The Czechs continue to look for ways to raise support 
within the EU for a Cuba common position with teeth. (Note: 
The Czech NGO International Committee for Democracy in Cuba 
(ICDC) will host a conference on Cuba in Berlin during the 
German presidency in support of this objective. End note.) 
The Czechs will continue to urge the EU to call on the regime 
to release political prisoners, respect fundamental human 
rights, and permit free and fair multi-party elections. 
 
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Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶15. (C) The EU will explore ways to increase civilian 
missions in Afghanistan to help stabilize the country. The 
Czechs, who will open an Embassy in Kabul in January, 
 
PRAGUE 00001406  003 OF 003 
 
 
strongly support this initiative. The Czechs plan to send 
police trainers to serve with a German team already working 
in-country. Post intends to seek further information on this 
initiative. 
GRABER