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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 002289 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ASEC HA
SUBJECT: PREVAL II: THE HONEYMOON'S OVER 
 
REF: A. (A) PAP 2273 
     ¶B. (B) PAP 2219 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson, reason 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. There is increasing talk among Haitians these 
days about malaise and government inertia. President Preval, 
now seven months into his term, i seen as isolated and 
distracted. Reports of dissntion within his inner circle, a 
poor legislativ record to date, and a failed disarmament 
policyhave helped contribute to the impression of a 
government adrift. The GOH has yet to decisively take control 
of the security situation and a recent uptick in kidnappings 
has Port-au-Prince on edge.  Public unease has manifested 
itself in a series of small demonstrations, increasingly 
critical press, and much discussion around the dinner table, 
but does not appear to threaten Preval's hold on power. For 
now, the President's immediate challenge is whether he can or 
will play against type and make some real progress on the 
ground. Preval often talks about a small window of 
opportunity for his presidency's success - he needs to take 
advantage of it now.   End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) As they prepare to go to the polls Sunday for local 
elections, Haitians are talking more openly of government 
inertia and inaction. President Preval, now seven months into 
his term, is seen as isolated and distracted. Widely rumored 
to be in love with his events scheduler, the President has 
become the butt of local jokes. His relationship with Prime 
Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis has always been tempestuous, 
though they have weathered their problems in the past.  For 
his part, the PM is visibly unhappy with his role and with 
his up-and-down relationship with the President. Parliament 
has little to show for its first session; many of its 
members, particularly those of the upper house, have spent 
almost as much time overseas as they have on the floor. 
Despite some positive news on the economic front, nothing has 
been done about Haiti's unemployment problem, garbage is 
piling up in the cities, and electricity outages are even 
more frequent. Two brutal kidnapping/murders of children in 
Port-au-Prince have focused Haitians on the government's 
failings on the security front.  The current atmosphere is 
worrisome to many of our contacts, even those who support 
Preval. 
 
¶3. (C)  The President recognizes this growing frustration but 
has done little thus far to address it. He told me that he 
will continue to keep working behind the scenes, rather than 
strike out on a bold new path. He brushes aside any 
suggestion that government has stalled, although he does tell 
friends privately that when he assumed office, he found the 
country's problems much worse that he anticipated. In 
meetings, he is alternatively upbeat and defensive about key 
issues, such as security. He has continued his efforts to 
reach out to business and political leaders, although these 
sessions are apparently fewer and farther between. The 
President's plan to begin traveling around the country on 
December 1 to press the flesh has been put on hold as he 
leaves for Cuba to celebrate Castro's birthday with Daniel 
Ortega and others. Another international trip, this one to 
Costa Rica, is slated for December 10. 
 
4,  (C)  The new administration has indeed been slow off the 
mark, in part due to Preval's reluctance to delegate. Key GOH 
initiatives, such as judicial and educational reform and 
improving the infrastructure, have bogged down. Apart from 
the 2007 budget, little signficant government-sponsored 
legislation has been submitted to Parliament; papers and 
progams are delayed. The government's highly vaunted 
disarmament policy is floundering. Sensitive issues, such as 
the vendetta between HNP Director of Judicial Police Lucius 
and a magistrate, were allowed to play out in public too 
long. Rumors of disagreements between the president and his 
colleagues, including both PM Alexis and long-time advisor 
Bob Manuel (who just returned from yet another "vacation" in 
Guatemala), are pervasive.  Preval has publicly dressed down 
cabinet officials for their perceived failures, later telling 
a colleague that the ministers are "good men", but not 
sufficiently experienced. For their part, ministers report 
having little contact with the president -- or being 
micromanaged by him. 
 
¶5. (C) A recent up-tick in kidnappings in the last few weeks, 
 
PORT AU PR 00002289  002 OF 003 
 
 
after a period of relative calm, reinforces the popular view 
that the government has yet to get a real handle on security. 
Although the Prime Minister recently ascribed renewed 
violence to our resumption of deportations, some GOH 
officials privately acknowledge the government is at a loss 
to deal with the matter. Preval still maintains tight control 
over the security function but often sends conflicting 
signals to both the HNP and MINUSTAH. His famous statement of 
"disarm or die" to the gangs notwithstanding, GOH security 
policy has shown little teeth thus far.  A number of contacts 
blame the contradictory GOH response for the renewed 
violence; increasingly, the President's talks with gang 
leaders are coming under attack. Friends of the President 
report that he was shocked that mourners at the funeral of a 
young girl murdered two weeks ago (ref A)  castigated him for 
negotiating with the gang lords.  Assessing the security 
situation, Preval has tended to blame others - MINUSTAH, the 
drug lords, the international community, the deportees. It is 
less clear if he believes that he bears any responsibility as 
well. (Note. This is a pattern we are seeing in other areas 
as well.End Note.) 
 
¶6. (C)  Preval argues that Haitians must take the long view 
of their circumstances. Security, he has said to me, is a 
short term problem, not a long term issue. It will be solved 
sooner or later. The longer term issues, including judicial 
reform, economic opportunities, education and health, are the 
areas in which Haitians should focus their attention, he 
says.  That being said, Preval has done virtually nothing to 
convey to the Haitian people his goals or his vision for the 
future.  For example, we often find it hard to get an 
official GOH representative to attend USAID project openings, 
even those in which the president or prime minister has 
expressed a particular interest. Even Preval's friends fault 
him for his reluctance to communicate his vision, to rally 
the country around and speak frankly about the challenges 
ahead.  The President doesn't want to do it -- and he won't 
let the Prime Minister try. 
 
¶7. (C) The current wave of public malaise has taken a variety 
of forms.  There have been a few scattered small 
demonstrations (less than 1000 people, often much less) over 
the past month in front of the Presidency and the Parliament. 
These appear to represent a collection of causes from 
shareholders of a failed banking and credit institution to 
anti-globalization students supporting Castro and Chavez. We 
have not been able to discern any specific political backing 
or intent to these demonstrations, but cannot rule out that 
they are -- or will be -- manipulated by those wishing to 
undermine Preval.  Public criticism, both from the private 
setor  and the press, are on the upswing: two prominnt 
business leaders argued passionately for morethan an hour at 
my Thanksgiving table whether Preval has failed or not in his 
first months at post 
 
 ¶8. (C) Obscured in the handwringing underway is the fact 
that there has indeed been some good news since Preval's 
inauguration.  Compared to one year ago, the overall security 
climate has actually improved in the capital and the 
countryside is relatively calm.  There is now a visible HNP 
presence on the streets of Port-au-Prince and deeper HNP 
engagement with MINUSTAH. Political discourse is on going; 
Haiti's civil society is beginning to play a significant role 
in public debate.  Economic indicators show some signs of 
modest growth and inflation is trending downward, while 
remittances and government revenues are up.  Most observers 
believe that Sunday's local elections will go forward without 
incident. The government has released a number of prisoners 
detained for excessive periods without trial. However, much 
remains on the government's agenda and there is little sense 
thus far that it, or the President, has established clear 
priorities. 
 
¶9. (C)  Comment. The question is, of course, what does all 
this really mean seven months into the Preval mandate? Is he 
truly in trouble?  The short answer is no.  It's way too 
early to write Preval II off, although there are those (as 
always in Haiti)  who are quite willing to do so. The 
President retains much of the popularity built during his 
first term, particularly in the countryside though the 
foundation of that popularity, his willingness to travel 
among the people and speak plainly, is slowly crumbling.  If 
he gets off the stick, moves his government to act and gets 
 
PORT AU PR 00002289  003 OF 003 
 
 
out of the Palace, this malaise will fast be forgotten. The 
real question is, will he do it? Frankly speaking, it's hard 
to imagine Rene Preval making a significant change in his 
style or outlook; it seems to go against both his nature and 
his character.  But he is a shrewd politician, if not a 
particularly inspired one, as well as a survivor, and he is 
smart enough to know that his window of opportunity won't 
stay open long. 
SANDERSON