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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO TU CY UNO
SUBJECT: APPROACHING FRANCE ON TURKEY-EU 
 
REF: A. PARIS 7102 
 
     ¶B. PARIS 6946 
     ¶C. PARIS POINTS OF 11/14 
     ¶D. STATE 189542 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION RECOMMENDATION:  Widespread public 
opposition to Turkish EU membership in the run-up to France's 
presidential elections severely limits the GOF's flexibility 
in dealing with the Turkey-Cyprus issue, notwithstanding 
Chirac's foreign policy prerogatives and his long-standing 
pro-Turkish sentiments.  While France could accept even 
temporary solutions to push the issue past France's May 
elections, failure to achieve anything by the time of the EU 
Summit could compel the GOF to support and perhaps even take 
the lead in pushing for a hard-line response.  Even if Turkey 
fails "on the merits," we believe it may still be possible to 
leverage Chirac's interest in Lebanon and the Middle East, as 
well as his desire to avoid a "clash of civilizations," to 
persuade him of the need to reduce the consequences for any 
such failure vis-a-vis the EU to an absolute minimum.  Given 
that Chirac himself will need to be convinced, the President 
may have to engage him at the Riga Summit, followed by A/S 
Fried and U/S Burns with French Political Director Araud and 
NSA Hadley with Presidential Diplomatic Advisor 
Gourdault-Montagne.  End summary and action recommendation. 
 
French Room for Maneuver 
(and Political Courage) Limited 
------------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) Per ref A meeting between Interior Minister Sarkozy's 
diplomatic advisor and EUR DAS Matt Bryza, the leading French 
presidential candidates and their parties -- as the National 
Assembly's recent majority vote in favor of criminalizing 
denial of the so-called Armenian "genocide" aptly 
demonstrated -- will probably not be in a position to take a 
more positive view of Turkey at least until after the end of 
the Chirac presidency.  Likely center-right presidential 
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy is on record as opposing Turkish EU 
membership (and FM Douste-Blazy has an interest in pleasing 
Sarkozy as a means of being retained in the Cabinet if 
Sarkozy is elected president).  The recently designated 
Socialist Party candidate, Segolene Royal, has not gone 
beyond acknowledging that any decision on Turkish membership 
would be subject to popular referendum -- as now mandated by 
the constitutional amendment that Chirac pushed through 
before the May 2005 referendum in an attempt to deflect, at 
least in part, popular opposition to the EU constitutional 
treaty.  Thus, even if Chirac's prerogatives in foreign 
policy remain largely intact even as his presidency draws to 
a close and his influence begins to wane, as a practical 
matter his room for maneuver for dealing with Turkey has been 
significantly reduced as a result of growing public sentiment 
against not only Turkish accession, but enlargement in 
general.  Moreover, his decision during his visit to Yerevan 
to call on Turkey to recognize the Armenian "genocide" has 
itself been largely perceived as having opened wider the gate 
to anti-Turkish sentiment. 
 
France Needs a Fig Leaf 
----------------------- 
¶3.  (C) Per ref B meeting with MFA A/S-equivalent for Europe 
Gilles Briatta, France has supported Finnish Presidency 
efforts to find a solution to the current impasse and would 
also find a way to live with any kind of temporary 
arrangement -- ideally one that would enable the GOF to push 
any further decisions down the road until after the early May 
final round of the presidential elections.  If no exit is 
found, however, Briatta also made clear that France would not 
fail to react to Turkey's failure to implement the Ankara 
Protocol -- even if Briatta stopped short of specifying what 
that reaction might entail.  Per ref C, Minister-Delegate for 
Europe Catherine Colonna warned the Turks following the last 
meeting of EU foreign ministers that such a Turkish failure 
would not allow accession negotiations to proceed "as if 
nothing had happened," adding that it would be incumbent on 
the Council to "draw conclusions" from Turkish obduracy. 
Although she was careful to say that "no one" had asked for a 
complete suspension of accession negotiations in the event of 
no progress, she suggested that anything was possible short 
of total suspension (which no one wanted) and complete 
inaction (which France rejected).  To prepare effectively for 
the December 14-15 EU Summit, she called on the Finnish 
presidency to circulate its recommendations "well before" 
that date, or by December 6 at the latest. 
 
Avoiding the Worst 
By Leveraging Middle East Issues 
-------------------------------- 
¶4.  (C) It may be possible to leverage Chirac's personal 
 
PARIS 00007508  002 OF 002 
 
 
stake in supporting Lebanese sovereignty, his interest in 
improving the situation in the Middle East, and his 
self-defined role in preventing a "clash of civilizations" to 
encourage the GOF privately to support a course of action 
toward Turkey that, at a minimum, "does the least possible 
harm."  Our sense is that it would not be overly difficult to 
convince Chirac, and the GOF more broadly, that it is not in 
France's or Europe's interest to alienate Turkey, the only 
successful Muslim democracy, at a moment when its support is 
critical for UNIFIL/Lebanon, the Middle East, and 
Afghanistan.  Nor would Chirac want the "loss of Turkey" to 
be part of his legacy.  Our message would have to be that we 
are not asking France to ignore Turkey's omissions in 
fulfilling its commitments to the EU, but rather to seek to 
push a confrontation down the road in the name of a larger 
strategic interest. 
 
Approaching the French 
---------------------- 
¶5.  (C) On tactics for France in responding to ref D, Post 
will continue to approach French officials as before, but the 
President should consider approaching Chirac directly on the 
margins of the NATO Summit in Riga.  Ideally, we get the 
Germans on board with such an approach, so that the French 
position can be depicted also as showing a willingness by 
France and Germany to work together responsibly in the 
pursuit of Europe's larger interests.  Finally, U/S Burns and 
A/S Fried should follow up with French Political Director 
Gerard Araud during his visit to Paris December 5-6.  France 
presumably would have knowledge of the Finnish proposals by 
that time, and A/S Fried could engage directly with Araud on 
French thinking for the end game, with follow-up by U/S Burns 
(with Araud) and NSA Hadley (with Chirac's Diplomatic Advisor 
Gourdault-Montagne) as required. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON