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Viewing cable 06PARIS7335, TOGO: MEETING WITH ERIC AMERDING (UFC)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PARIS7335 2006-11-09 16:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO4998
PP RUEHAG RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #7335/01 3131608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091608Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3026
INFO RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0919
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0953
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1359
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1811
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0988
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO:  MEETING  WITH ERIC AMERDING (UFC) 
 
REF: PARIS 7153 
 
PARIS 00007335  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  Senior UFC member Eric 
Amerding on November 8 said that he had discussed Togo with 
EU Commission members on November 7, in response to an EU 
request for UFC views on developments in Togo.  Amerding told 
the EU representatives that the Faure regime was not acting 
in good faith with respect to the August 20 Global Political 
Agreement, particularly with respect to the CENI and the 
follow-up committee.  UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio confirmed 
to us that he will represent the UFC and attend the November 
13 meeting.  Amerding indicated that the UFC would focus on 
the June 24, 2007, legislative elections in an effort to 
ensure that they are free and fair, noting the Faure regime's 
failure to pursue EU elections assistance in a timely manner 
and to present a calendar of steps leading to the elections. 
Amerding expressed concerns about China's growing presence in 
Africa and how China could provide a tempting but possibly 
unsavory alternative to Western support for the elections. 
He criticized France for backing Faure and showing little 
interest in the opposition's concerns, with other Europeans 
following France's lead.  Amerding worried that the Faure 
regime would continue to try to manipulate and chip away at 
the August 20 Agreement while trying to present a plausibly 
acceptable image to the outside world.  He requested that the 
U.S. remain firmly engaged in Togo and do its best to 
pressure Faure to meet his obligations under the agreement. 
Despite Amerding's detailed explanation of the state of play 
and UFC thinking, he gave the impression that the Olympio 
camp is still focusing more on process-like issues than in 
finding a way to become actively engaged.  END SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT. 
 
DISCUSSION AT THE EU 
 
2.  (C)  Senior UFC member Eric Amerding, one of UFC leader 
Gilchrist Olympio's closest associates, meet with Assistant 
Africa Watcher November 8, following Amerding's request for a 
meeting.  He began by describing his November 7 discussions 
in Brussels with EU Commission officials Lopez Branco and 
Bruno Gatta, who work for Louis Michel, European Commissioner 
for Development and Humanitarian Aid.  Amerding explained 
that Michel's office had invited him to go to Brussels. 
Michel had just sent a team to Togo to check progress on the 
election planning and other matters related to the 
transition.  Amerding said that the team had returned to 
Brussels, was not happy with what it saw in Togo, and had 
invited the UFC to send Amerding to Brussels to provide the 
UFC assessment of developments. 
 
FAURE REGIME NOT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH 
 
3.  (C)  Amerding told the EU officials that the Faure regime 
was not acting in good faith in implementing the August 20 
Global Political Agreement (the "Agreement").  He emphasized 
two cases.  First, the GOT had rejected a UFC proposal to 
name a UFC person or other opposition figure as head of the 
CENI.  Amerding said this was very important because election 
commission chiefs in the past (1998, 2003, 2005) had issued 
results ordered by the presidency, not the "real" results of 
elections in those years.  Amerding told the EU officials 
that having a Faure crony as head of the CENI would be a 
mistake, giving the GOT leverage over the commission that it 
had exploited in the past. 
 
4.  (C)  The second point Amerding raised in Brussels was the 
"comite de suivi," the follow-up committee (the "Committee") 
to be formed after the signing of the Agreement that would 
oversee its implementation.  Amerding described the Faure 
regime's efforts to complicate UFC participation.  According 
to him, Burkina Faso President Compaore, as head of the 
Committee, had in the last week of October prepared letters 
to all committee participants.  These letters were 
hand-carried by a Compaore aide to Lome and given to the GOT 
to distribute.  The letters said that the six participant 
groups were each to name a Committee member and 
vice-member/alternate by November 6.  Amerding said that all 
of the letters were delivered except the one addressed to the 
UFC.  The UFC found out about the contents of the letter from 
the CDPA party.  Amerding said he had no doubt that the GOT 
had deliberately failed to deliver the letter in order to 
complicate UFC action.  However, the UFC was able to meet the 
November 6 deadline and had faxed its response to President 
Compaore. 
 
PARIS 00007335  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5.  (C)  The UFC named Gilchrist Olympio as its Committee 
member and G. Latevi Lawson as his alternate.  Amerding said 
that he was not sure Olympio would accept the position or 
travel to Ouagadougou for the November 13 meeting.  He had 
been considering a trip to Lome on November 15, during which 
he planned to meet with his followers but did not plan to 
meet with the GOT.  (NOTE:  Olympio contacted us later on 
November 8 and said that he would represent the UFC on the 
Committee and would attend the November 13 meeting in 
Ouagadougou.  END NOTE.) 
 
LITTLE TRUST IN FAURE 
 
6.  (C)  More generally, Amerding predicted that Faure would 
continue to chip away at the Agreement, cutting corners here 
and there, always probing to see what he could get away with. 
 Meanwhile, he would continue to give the impression of being 
more open and modern than his father, and in this way meet 
the minimal demands of the international community. 
 
NO SHORT-TERM UFC STRATEGY 
 
7.  (C)  When asked what the UFC and other opposition 
elements intended to do in the short term and whether there 
were other battles looming, Amerding had no ready answer.  He 
indicated that UFC and opposition attention would now shift 
to the June 24, 2007, legislative elections.  It was 
important that each and every step of the elections process 
be transparent, fair, and open to outside scrutiny.  He had 
no doubt the GOT would put up obstacles wherever it could. 
 
8.  (C)  The Faure regime was already showing its 
shortcomings.  Amerding noted the failure of the GOT to 
announce an election calendar that would show the steps 
leading to the June 24 vote.  All of these steps were 
important -- taking an accurate census, registering voters, 
organizing polling stations, printing ballots, registering 
candidates, and the many other activities necessary for 
holding fair elections.  So far, there was no evidence the 
Faure regime had done any of these things or was even 
thinking about such tasks. 
 
9.  (C)  Another problem was outside support for the 
elections.  Amerding said that the EU generally required 
eight months of lead time to organize its participation in 
elections, particularly with respect to funding issues. 
Amerding said the GOT had so far done nothing to seek EU 
support, with time running short.  Amerding said that Olympio 
had recently written to the EU and Compaore alerting them to 
this problem.  "Once again, Olympio is doing the work of the 
GOT," Amerding lamented. 
 
QUALMS ABOUT CHINA 
 
10.  (C)  At this point, Amerding expressed unease about 
China's increasing presence in Africa.  He said that China's 
"no strings attached" policies and general indifference to 
human rights, good governance, and similar issues were 
potentially quite appealing to leaders like Faure, who might 
find in China a generous partner that did not make life 
difficult over issues like human rights.  "They appeal to the 
worst instincts of some of Africa's leaders," he commented. 
Amerding said that, while perhaps unlikely, it was possible 
that China could provide assistance to Togo (either general 
funding or funds earmarked for elections support) that Faure 
could use to finance the elections.  If so, Faure would then 
not need EU or Western support (and would avoid the oversight 
that would come with it).  Amerding said that China had a 
quite visible presence in Togo and that the Chinese community 
there was becoming a factor in the economy, at all levels. 
 
11.  (C)  To illustrate changing PRC attitudes, Amerding said 
that China had some years previously financed a sports 
stadium project in Lome.  Originally, the GOT was supposed to 
provide 25 percent of the funding.  Initially, when the GOT 
failed to follow through, the Chinese stopped work on the 
facility, with the project left dormant.  Not long ago, the 
Chinese said they would resume the project even without the 
GOT's contribution, thus "forgiving" the obligation. 
Amerding said the project was completed with the facility now 
in use. 
 
LITTLE FAITH IN EUROPEANS 
 
12.  (C)  Amerding said that France had "chosen to go with 
 
PARIS 00007335  003 OF 003 
 
 
Faure" and was not much interested in the concerns the 
opposition had been raising.  One problem was that the other 
Europeans seemed to take their lead from France, in 
Amerding's view.  He mentioned especially Germany and 
Finland, and noted that the UK was not interested in Togo. 
For most Europeans, the Togo issue was restricted to the EU's 
engagement. 
 
U.S. NEEDS TO MAINTAIN ITS ENGAGEMENT 
 
13.  (C)  For all of these reasons, Amerding said that the 
U.S. role was becoming more important, and he urged a 
continued strong U.S. engagement in order to keep the Faure 
regime on track and to keep Togo moving in a positive 
direction.  We repeated the U.S. goal of promoting democracy 
in Togo and our intention to remain engaged with the 
opposition, as demonstrated by Ambassador Dunn's extensive 
consultation with Olympio, Amerding, and Lawson during his 
recent visit to Paris (reftel).  We suggested also that 
despite recent setbacks, the UFC should continue to seek a 
way to play a constructive role in Togo's transition. 
 
FRANCOIS BOKO 
 
14.  (C)  In closing, Amerding discussed briefly Francois 
Boko, Togo's former Interior Minister who had to leave Togo 
for exile in France after he called for the postponement of 
the April 2005 presidential elections.  Amerding said that 
Boko and Olympio had not had direct contact, one reason being 
Boko's unwillingness to be viewed as a member of Olympio's 
camp.  Amerding said that the other reason was one understood 
by both Boko and Olympio -- everyone knew that Boko was privy 
to much sensitive information during his tenure as Interior 
Minister.  If he were seen in close contact with Olympio, the 
GOT would come to believe that Olympio would then be privy to 
Boko's secrets.  In Amerding's view, Boko and Olympio had 
decided to maintain a certain distance for that reason, in 
addition to Boko's own desire not to be viewed as an 
associate of Olympio. 
 
COMMENT 
 
15.  (C)  Amerding gave a good accounting of UFC thinking and 
its concerns.  However, he continued to give the impression 
that the UFC is still preoccupied with process-related 
matters -- for example, Faure's failure to deliver Compaore's 
letter and the problems this caused -- rather than thinking 
of a way for the UFC to become actively and productively 
engaged.  END COMMENT. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON