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R 031342Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1350
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 6418
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 0914
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2377
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1794
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0968

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO/FRENCH MFA:  AMBASSADOR DUNN'S OCTOBER 24 
CONSULTATIONS 
 
Classified By:  Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  In an October 24 meeting with U.S. 
Ambassador to Togo David Dunn, MFA DAS-equivalent Bruno 
Foucher said that Togo was evolving well.  He complained that 
German caution was impeding the unblocking of EU funding for 
Togo; resuming economic assistance rapidly would help prevent 
Togo from become a "criminalized" state.  Faure was doing a 
good job but needed to reduce the influence of old-guard 
members of his entourage.  Post-transition Togo remained a 
concern, however, with many economic challenges.  Foucher 
tended to downplay Gilchrist Olympio,s role in Togo,s 
evolving political scene but agreed that the Faure regime 
might consider offering him an honorific post of some kind 
should he and the UFC decide to participate in the 
government.  Togo had asked France to help reform its army, 
which Foucher and Ambassador Dunn agreed was necessary, as 
was the development of a civilian or gendarme-like force for 
internal security.  China was becoming a more important actor 
in Togo and regionally, although a local backlash seemed to 
be developing.  Foucher offered brief comments on Togo,s 
neighbors Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Cote d,Ivoire. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
GERMAN RECALCITRANCE 
 
¶2.  (C)  MFA West Africa DAS-equivalent Bruno Foucher on 
October 24 met with visiting U.S. Ambassador to Togo David 
Dunn and Embassy Africa Watchers.  Foucher opened by saying 
that Togo was evolving well and could serve as a model for 
other states undergoing transition.  He then sharply 
criticized Germany for its excessive caution in evaluating 
Togo and refusal to agree to unblock EU funding.  He said 
that German resistance seemed to emanate from its mission in 
Lome and not from Berlin.  Foucher said that German reticence 
in Togo was similar to German reticence in other parts of 
Africa, such as Guinea and Chad.  He considered the German 
attitude puzzling but possibly a result of the violence 
directed against Germany during the April 2005 election 
period.  Ambassador Dunn noted that the "Group of Five" in 
Lome (the U.S., French, and German missions, along with the 
EU and PNUD representatives) worked well together and 
consulted frequently.  Foucher nonetheless repeated his 
frustration with the Germans. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Renewed funding was important for Togo, Foucher 
continued, in order to strengthen the economy and reduce the 
possibility that Togo would become a "criminalized" state. 
He expressed concern about increased illegal drug trafficking 
as a real threat, especially given Togo,s unsettled state in 
the wake of Eyadema,s death and the impoverishment 
compounded by years of withheld donor assistance. 
 
FAURE:  "A GOOD LEADER" 
 
¶4.  (C)  Foucher,s evaluation of Faure was quite positive. 
He said Faure was a "good leader" and "progressively moving 
forward."  Foucher acknowledged the unhelpful influence of 
the "old guard" members of his entourage, largely carryovers 
from his father's days.  He was cautiously optimistic that 
Faure would distance himself from them over time. 
 
ECONOMIC CONCERNS 
 
¶5.  (C)  The period after the present phase of transition and 
stabilization would present challenges, Foucher predicted, 
particularly with respect to the economy.  He commented on 
the need to develop investor confidence and arrangements with 
the international financial institutions.  Ambassador Dunn 
said that Togo,s human resources were a distinct positive. 
The Togolese work-ethic enjoyed a positive reputation 
regionally and compared favorably with that of neighbors such 
as Ghana.  He also predicted that stability would encourage 
the return of Togolese who had left Togo during the Eyadema 
years, prospered, and were now in a position to contribute 
economically upon returning.  Debt relief was also a 
possibility.  That said, Ambassador Dunn noted that the 
economy needed reform, with better management of Togo,s 
phosphate and cotton industries, two of the country's major 
economic sectors. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Foucher said that France was encouraging Togo more 
and more to take action on its own when dealing with 
institutions such as the EU -- there was still an expectation 
among Togolese that France would serve as Togo,s advocate in 
 
such fora.  The French were thus advising the Togolese not to 
look reflexively to the former colonial power, Foucher 
explained.  In this and in other respects, France was pushing 
Togo to come out of the isolation engendered by the Eyadema 
years. 
 
GILCHRIST OLYMPIO 
 
¶7.  (C)  When asked about UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio, 
Ambassador Dunn said that it would serve Togo,s interests if 
he became more energized and involved.  He reviewed 
Olympio,s original decision not to join the new 
reconciliation government and his present change of course 
leaning toward participation, contingent on obtaining an 
important role for the UFC, if not for himself personally. 
Foucher and Ambassador Dunn discussed the generational change 
in Togo, Olympio,s advancing age, his longstanding ties to 
France (and corresponding long absence from Togo), and his 
uncertain prospects for the next presidential elections in 
the 2010/2011 period.  Foucher tended to discount Olympio,s 
importance as a political factor over time.  Ambassador Dunn 
noted that Eyadema,s death may have shifted Olympio,s focus 
from retribution to ways to improve Togo,s prospects. 
Foucher agreed with the notion that the Faure regime could 
offer Olympio an honorific position or title that could help 
heal old wounds and allow both sides to save face.  The 
position could be more than honorific -- Olympio could serve 
as mediator of the republic or as a senior economic advisor, 
something he would be qualified to do. 
 
IMPROVED CLIMATE 
 
¶8.  (C)  Ambassador Dunn noted the positive changes in Togo 
since his arrival at post at the beginning of the year, when 
the opposition was in boycott mode and distrust and suspicion 
were high.  Tensions were noticeably reduced since then, with 
a general acceptance of Faure's mandate. 
 
REFORMING THE ARMY 
 
¶9.  (C)  Foucher agreed that finding a role for the army, 
keeping it out of internal security and police work, and 
developing a civilian force or gendarmerie to maintain law 
and order would be important, given the army's history of 
heavy-handed repression in the service of the Gnassingbe 
clan.  Foucher said that the Faure regime had approached 
France about assisting in reforming the army.  Change would 
take time given the entrenched views of the military and the 
continuing influence of retired military and their continued 
allegiance to the Gnassingbes.  Foucher noted the good 
performance of Togolese troops in a number of international 
peacekeeping operations and commented that continued or 
expanded Togolese participation in these missions was one way 
of keeping the army busy and at the same time allowing it to 
develop expertise and professionalism. 
 
CHARLES DEBBASCH 
 
¶10.  (C)  Speaking of the old guard, Foucher was scathing in 
his criticism of French citizen Charles Debbasch, a longtime 
advisor to Eyadema and still close to the Gnassingbes. 
Debbasch had been convicted of fraud in France and although 
the judgment remained to be executed, there was no specific 
warrant for his arrest, a loophole that had allowed him to 
travel to France once or twice since Eyadema,s death. 
Foucher believed Debbasch was instrumental in Faure's "coup" 
following Eyadema,s death.  Among several of Debbasch's 
unsavory activities was his recent attempt to protect his 
properties in France by having them designated as Togolese 
diplomatic facilities, which Foucher said the GOF had 
rejected.  Foucher said that the French regularly remind 
Faure of the need to rid himself of people like Debbasch. 
 
CHINA 
 
¶11.  (C)  Foucher and Ambassador Dunn agreed on China's 
growing presence in Togo and in the region, with a focus on 
the sugar industry and motor scooters, and with a broader 
objective of eliminating Taiwan's influence.  Foucher said 
that China's engagement in Africa was a growing concern of 
Japan.  Foucher said that a backlash was developing, however, 
with Africans resentful of the Chinese and viewing them 
increasingly as predators.  Some of the Chinese "laborers" 
were also convicts promised reduced sentences for working in 
Africa, where some chose to stay when their sentences were 
 
completed. 
 
BENIN, BURKINA FASO, GHANA, COTE D,IVOIRE 
 
¶12.  (C)  Asked to comment on regional issues affecting Togo 
and its neighbors, Foucher said that the situation in BENIN 
was not bad.  Its new president represented a new style of 
leadership for Benin and his political position was 
consequently not strong and could even be described as 
"fragile," Foucher commented.  However, the atmosphere had 
improved since the elections.  Foucher described BURKINA FASO 
as a "bon eleve" (good student) and President Compaore as 
quite astute and clever, and able to receive a good amount of 
international financial support.  Compaore had moderated 
Burkinabe policies towards COTE D'IVOIRE and Libya, enhancing 
his credibility.  However, problems remained, including the 
cotton sector, rising corruption, and the still unverified 
nature of support provided to rebel forces in Cote d,Ivoire. 
 Still, Compaore on balance had been useful to the region and 
had made valuable contributions to Togo. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Foucher said that GHANA seemed focused more on 
domestic than international issues, with France disappointed 
in Ghana's half-hearted engagement in the Cote d,Ivoire 
problem, noting that Kufuor did not attend the recent AU PSC 
summit on Cote d,Ivoire.  Ghana had also blocked UN 
Sanctions Committee efforts on Cote d,Ivoire before recently 
relenting.  France viewed Kufuor favorably notwithstanding 
Ghana's Cote d,Ivoire policies, Foucher said, adding that 
one could appreciate Ghana's reservations about getting 
involved in an issue that could have repercussions in Ghana 
if Cote d,Ivoire continued to deteriorate.  Moreover, Ghana 
was able to profit from instability in Cote d,Ivoire in 
terms of its ports, cacao production, diamond trafficking, 
and the like. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Ambassador Dunn has cleared this message. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON