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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO:  FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR'S OCTOBER 26 
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DUNN 
 
 
Classified By:  Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Presidential Africa Advisor Michel de 
Bonnecorse on October 26 said that the recently announced 
Togolese government was a "reasonable formula," in a meeting 
with transiting Ambassador David Dunn.  He characterized 
Gilchrist Olympio, his UFC associates, and other 
non-participants in the new government as "extreme," and 
expressed his belief that the UFC could split into "moderate" 
and "extremist" factions.  Ambassador Dunn cautioned that 
Olympio and the UFC remained important factors and that he 
saw no evidence yet of a split.  Bonnecorse viewed Faure 
favorably, and said that he could be a good president for a 
long time.  Both Ambassador Dunn and the French agreed that 
the June 2007 elections and how they would be held would be 
important indicators of the direction Togo would take. 
Moving forward on elections would help facilitate the 
resumption of EU assistance.  Participation in elections 
monitoring by the U.S., the EU, and other outsiders would be 
important.  Equally important would be post-election reform 
of the army, which should return to military duties and leave 
internal security to enhanced civilian or gendarme-like 
institutions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
"REASONABLE FORMULA" 
 
¶2.  (C)  U.S. Ambassador to Togo David Dunn and Embassy 
Africa Watchers met on October 26 with Presidential Africa 
Advisor Michel de Bonnecorse and his deputy, Jacques 
Champagne de Labriolle.  Bonnecorse began by noting that 18 
months after the post-Eyadema elections in Togo, the Faure 
regime had presented a "reasonable formula" that included 
most political actors, with the exception of the "most 
extreme," including Gilchrist Olympio, his UFC allies, and 
other non-participants whom Bonnecorse believed fell in that 
category. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Bonnecorse expressed the view that the UFC could 
split into "moderate" and "extremist" factions, with the 
former more willing to cooperate with the Faure regime and 
the latter (the Olympio camp) continuing to withhold 
cooperation.  Bonnecorse believed that the June 2007 
legislative elections would be a key indicator of Togo's 
direction, and the UFC split might take place in anticipation 
of the elections.  The June elections would be important in 
terms of how they would be conducted and their results. 
Would they be free and fair, and risk the end of RPT 
dominance?  Or would they be "controlled," with the RPT 
remaining in power regardless of the will of the electorate? 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ambassador Dunn said that he was not aware of a 
split within the UFC, but Bonnecorse said that it appeared 
likely.  Labriolle noted generational changes in Togo, with 
Olympio viewed as an "old chief."  Ambassador Dunn said that 
the UFC seemed the strongest opposition element but evidence 
was admittedly anecdotal, in the absence of any legitimate 
elections in recent memory.  The legislative elections would 
help determine its true strength.  Olympio retained a certain 
cachet, which was important.  However, it was quite possible 
that some of Olympio's fire had gone out with Eyadema's 
death.  His key associates appeared loyal both inside and 
outside Togo.  Ambassador Dunn commented on Eric Amerding's 
closeness to Olympio and the confidence Olympio placed in 
him.  Bonnecorse observed that Amerding, like Olympio, was 
"not really Togolese either."  If Olympio ever became 
president, Bonnecorse predicted that Amerding would be his 
foreign minister. 
 
"A GOOD PRESIDENT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS" 
 
¶5.  (C)  Bonnecorse said that Togo had been moving in a "more 
or less" favorable direction, with the Faure regime 
marginalizing "extremists," cooperating with Burkina Faso 
President Compaore's efforts, and responding to outside 
pressure, including that of the U.S.  Faure had also 
demonstrated that he was a more enlightened leader than his 
father.  Relatively well educated and exposed to the outside 
world, Faure was aware of good governance, Bonnecorse noted. 
Faure could be "a good president for a number of years, with 
the Togolese people viewing him as a balancer," Bonnecorse 
observed. 
 
OLYMPIO, UFC STILL IMPORTANT FACTORS 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ambassador Dunn acknowledged that developments over 
the past 18 months were more substantially positive than one 
might have expected after Eyadema's death.  However, things 
could sour, and the June legislative elections would, as 
 
PARIS 00007182  002 OF 003 
 
 
Bonnecorse noted, be an important step.  The challenge was to 
keep Togo on track regarding democratization.  Gilchrist 
Olympio and the UFC remained important factors, if only for 
the financial resources they could provide, and should not be 
discounted, he advised.  The UFC continued to develop a 
following among the young and was viewed by the GOT as the 
most serious opposition element. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Discussion turned to Olympio, with Ambassador Dunn 
pointing out his continuing influence and Bonnecorse noting 
his equivocation and his more European than Togolese outlook 
and background.  Olympio would always seek legal and 
constitutional changes that would allow him to run, even if 
he did not intend to do so, Bonnecorse believed.  This would 
allow him to claim a moral victory over the Gnassingbes and 
keep the door open.  Returning to the issue of an "out of 
touch" Olympio, Bonnecorse noted his relatively opulent 
lifestyle and uncertainty about his sources of income. 
 
DATE FOR ELECTIONS FACILITATES EU AND IFI ENGAGEMENT 
 
¶8.  (C)  Ambassador Dunn provided documentation indicating 
that legislative elections would take place on June 24, 2007, 
news that pleased Bonnecorse.  An official date for 
elections, he indicated, would facilitate a resumption of EU 
engagement and financial assistance.  He mentioned in passing 
that the Germans now seemed willing to move forward. 
Ambassador Dunn noted progress Togo has made with the IMF and 
the possibility of debt relief if the GOT maintained its 
forward momentum.  These developments augured well for Togo's 
still very fragile economy.  Bonnecorse said that giving a 
date for the elections would likely have a calming effect. 
He said that the U.S., France, and other partners would have 
to watch the elections process closely to avoid slippage.  He 
and Ambassador noted good cooperation between the U.S. and 
French missions in Lome and both agreed it should continue. 
More broadly, Labriolle stressed the need to end Togo's 
isolation and to support its economy.  He noted the risk of 
Togo's becoming a criminalized state, with drug trafficking, 
which had not existed previously, on the rise. 
 
¶9.  (C)  In response to Labriolle's hope that the U.S. would 
be involved in elections monitoring, Ambassador Dunn said 
that the U.S. was likely to play a role.  He noted the role 
of a number of NGOs (e.g., Carter Center, NDI, IRI) in 
elections monitoring and preparations and their likely 
interest in Togo.  Labriolle stressed the importance of early 
involvement and not waiting until the weeks just before the 
vote.  Ambassador Dunn hoped that the EU would send a robust 
monitoring team to Togo, and he noted the EU's positive role 
in previous elections in Africa.  Bonnecorse said that France 
would raise Togo's elections in discussions at the EU in 
Brussels. 
 
TOGO'S ARMY AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
 
¶10.  (C)  Bonnecorse emphasized the need to reform Togo's 
army, which he said should be a post-election priority. 
Faure had agreed on the need for a more balanced army in 
terms of ethnic representation, but problems existed.  One 
challenge would be to help develop a civilian security 
capability, which would allow the army to focus on military 
tasks and not on police or internal security tasks, which 
might best be performed by the gendarmerie.  Bonnecorse 
thought that an ethnically balanced, 2,500 member gendarmerie 
or internal security force could be sufficient.  Ambassador 
Dunn noted that U.S. laws made it easier to assist in 
military reform than engage in internal security training. 
He said that member of the Togolese defense establishment had 
raised with him the subject of recruiting more southerners 
into the army, to counterbalance the dominance of northern 
ethnicities.  Bonnecorse repeated the need to limit the army 
to military tasks -- "we don't want them running the ports, 
customs services, or out in the streets" -- a view Ambassador 
Dunn shared.  Ambassador Dunn remarked that ethnic relations 
in Togo were better than in a number of other countries. 
There was less bitterness and hatred directed at the army 
than in some countries, and refugees were returning. 
 
¶11.  (C)  COMMENT:  Bonnecorse's assessment that the UFC will 
split and fade from the political scene may be attributable 
to wishful thinking, given the rocky relationship that has 
existed for years between the UFC and GOF.  This view carries 
implicit risks.  One of the biggest threats to smooth (and 
fair) elections next year will be lack of agreement and 
public bickering between the UFC and Togolese government 
concerning the electoral process, and ignoring the problem 
will not make it go away.  END COMMENT. 
 
PARIS 00007182  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶12.  (C)  Ambassador Dunn has cleared this message. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON