VZCZCXRO7176
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #7153/01 3060735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 020735Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2741
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 0908
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 6410
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1788
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0959

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TO FR
SUBJECT:  TOGO:  GILCHRIST OLYMPIO'S OCTOBER 23 MEETING 
WITH AMBASSADOR DUNN 
 
 
Classified By:  Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio on October 23 
told visiting U.S. Ambassador to Togo David Dunn that the UFC 
would be willing to participate in Togo's government of 
national unity under certain conditions, such as naming a UFC 
member to head a notional new ministry charged with oversight 
of democratization in Togo, consistent with the August 20 
Global Political Agreement ("the Agreement").  Olympio 
repeatedly accused the Faure regime of not complying with the 
Agreement, most notably in forming a new interim government 
unilaterally, and said that it seemed clear that Faure did 
not want the UFC to participate in the government.  Olympio 
and his associates also pressed for consensus-based 
decision-making in the CENI electoral commission (to counter 
the regime's numerical superiority in that body) and the 
rapid formation of the oversight commission ("groupe de 
suivi") that was supposed to be formed after the signing of 
the Agreement.  Noting that they were not now contesting the 
Faure regime, they also said that they would accept the 
results of the planned June 24, 2007, legislative elections, 
so long as these elections were transparent and fair.  If 
they lost fairly, they would stand down.  Gilchrist and 
company asked the U.S. to intervene with the Faure government 
to obtain its agreement to the UFC's positions and thereby 
enable it to participate in the government, and asked for a 
significant U.S. presence to observe the legislative 
elections.  Ambassador Dunn at numerous points reiterated the 
USG's continuing intention to promote democratization in Togo 
and he encouraged Olympio and the UFC to make a positive 
contribution to that effort.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio hosted a meeting 
October 23 with U.S. Ambassador to Togo David Dunn (in 
transit to Lome).  Olympio's associates Eric Amerding and G. 
Latevi Lawson were also present, along with Embassy Africa 
Watchers.  During the four-hour discussion, Olympio reviewed 
the twists and turns of Togo's politics and his and the UFC's 
policies, centered mainly on the August 20 Global Political 
Agreement ("the Agreement"), the period from Eyadema's death 
to the present, and the question of whether the UFC would 
agree to participate in the interim government the Faure 
regime has put in place in conformity with the accords. 
Throughout the meeting, Olympio alternately displayed 
disdain, anger, frustration, bitterness, bemusement, 
resignation, and cautious optimism as he discussed Togo, his 
political fortunes, the Gnassingbe clan, and Faure, 
underscoring his emotion of the moment by his repeated 
references to Faure as "the boy" or "le garcon."  During his 
discourse, Olympio frequently mentioned such figures as Kofi 
Annan and Presidents Obasanjo and Kufuor, among others, with 
all of whom he suggested he was on close terms and whose 
support and sympathy he believed he enjoyed. 
 
WILLING TO PARTICIPATE BUT OBSTACLES ABOUND 
 
¶3.  (C)  Olympio's main point was his willingness to agree to 
UFC participation in the interim national unity government 
(provided certain conditions were met), although he said that 
he personally could hardly accept a position, given the 
circumstances.  UFC participation so far had been impossible, 
for which he blamed the Faure government and its failure, in 
his view, to abide by the Agreement.  In addition to specific 
measures Faure had failed to honor, Faure had not lived up to 
certain "unwritten understandings" Olympio claimed the two 
sides had undertaken when the Agreement was signed and which 
would have provided certain assurances to the opposition on 
its role in government.  One of these "understandings," 
Olympio asserted, was an agreement that, in return for 
ceasing to question Faure's legitimacy, the UFC would be 
allowed to propose a Prime Minister for the national unity 
government.  Olympio said that Faure's refusal to comply with 
the Agreement and honor this understanding, along with the 
naming of an interim government without sufficient 
consultation, was the reason the UFC had not joined the 
government.  He stressed that Faure's naming of Yawovi 
Agboyibo, who heads an opposition party sometimes allied with 
the UFC, as Prime Minister, had violated the "understanding" 
with the UFC. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Olympio said that Faure's claim to be operating 
under Article 66 of the Constitution (concerning the 
president's power to appoint and dismiss officials) was also 
disingenuous, given the provisions of the Agreement, which he 
suggested took precedence.  Olympio said he had discussed the 
matter with Burkina Faso President Compaore, who reportedly 
agreed that this was "not normal."  Olympio said that neither 
he nor Compaore had received a response from the Faure regime 
 
PARIS 00007153  002 OF 003 
 
 
on this point after recently bringing it to the regime's 
attention.  In Olympio's view, this was one example of how 
Faure was seeking to marginalize Compaore, who had done a 
good job under difficult circumstances and had proved his 
ability to act independently. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Olympio said that the Faure regime should have 
established the oversight commission ("groupe de suivi") 
before acting to form the new electoral commission (CENI). 
The regime was refusing to name an opposition figure as head 
of the CENI and preferred that he or she be elected by 
commission members.  This would only guarantee a regime 
victory, Olympio complained, since the CENI was numerically 
tilted towards the regime.  There was also a question of 
provincial election boards -- according to a new law, only 
magistrates could head these boards, and the government had 
recently appointed about 100 new magistrates.  The regime's 
manipulation of the CENI and its subsidiaries meant that the 
need to reach decisions by consensus (rather than by majority 
vote) was greater than ever, Olympio and Amerding stressed. 
Lawson said that the opposition favored consensus not as a 
means to block action but as a way to encourage creative 
thinking to resolve differences. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Olympio said that the oversight commission ("groupe 
de suivi") would consist of nine people, six representing 
Togo's political parties and observers from ECOWAS, the EU, 
and Burkina Faso, with President Compaore serving as its 
chairman.  Olympio described efforts on Compaore's part to 
establish the commission, to which the Faure regime had not 
responded.  Olympio and his associates stressed the need for 
the oversight commission to be established soon.  Amerding 
said that the opposition had proposed that the U.S. be 
included in the oversight commission but that had been 
rejected. 
 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS A KEY 
 
¶7.  (C)  Olympio said that despite these problems, the UFC 
would continue to press for free and fair legislative 
elections in June 2007.  (NOTE:  The CENI has officially 
named June 24 as the date.  END NOTE.)  These elections, and 
how the regime prepared for them, would be an extremely 
important indicator of the regime's intentions, Olympio and 
his associates emphasized.  They said that if the elections 
were free and fair, and if Faure's side prevailed, they would 
accept the results.  But it was crucial that all parties, 
including interested non-Togolese, try to ensure the fairness 
and transparency of the elections.  Olympio requested that 
the U.S. send as many election observers as it could. 
Ambassador Dunn noted that several U.S.-based groups 
routinely send elections observers and he expected that they 
would do so in Togo's case, whether funded by the Embassy or 
not.  He reiterated U.S. support for democratization in Togo 
and that it would continue to press for free and fair 
legislative elections. 
 
STRONG REQUEST FOR U.S. PRESSURE 
 
¶8.  (C)  As the lengthy meeting began drawing to a close, 
Olympio and his associates increasingly focused on the role 
they hoped the U.S. could and would play in influencing 
events in Togo.  Along with their requests for a significant 
presence as election observers, they asked that the U.S. 
intervene directly with the Faure regime, both to insist on 
adherence to the Agreement and to press for the regime's 
acceptance of the opposition's positions.  If the regime 
showed flexibility towards the opposition, then the UFC could 
agree to participate in the government.  Olympio and his 
associates referred to the UFC's earlier demand for "two big 
and two small ministries" but said that the UFC could accept 
a position as "minister of state" in charge of a new GOT 
"ministry for implementation of the Agreement" (not well 
defined but clearly distinct from the oversight committee 
outlined in the Agreement).  "Offering us just the  Youth 
and Sports Ministry, will not be enough to get us back in," 
Olympio scoffed. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ambassador Dunn, while remaining non-committal on 
some of Olympio's specific points, repeated that the U.S. 
would continue to support a broad-based, inclusive process of 
democratization in Togo, and would continue to make this 
point in its dealings with the Faure regime, both privately 
and in its public diplomacy.  He encouraged Olympio, the UFC, 
and the rest of the opposition to seek ways to play a 
constructive and positive role, reminding them that with 
Eyadema's passing and the emergence of Faure, there was now 
an opportunity for positive change that had not existed for a 
 
PARIS 00007153  003 OF 003 
 
 
generation and that all parties should take care not to waste. 
 
¶10.  (C)  COMMENT:  The meeting was a friendly one, with 
Olympio generally alert and incisive, although he often 
digressed, showed signs of advancing age (both physically and 
mentally), and periodically fixated on the injustices he and 
his family had endured for decades.  As in our previous 
meetings, he displayed both defiance and resignation, and he 
seemed to appreciate that his animus towards Faure could 
never be the same as his animus towards Eyadema, with whom he 
would never be able to settle his family's score.  Amerding 
and Lawson intervened effectively, but, along with their 
leader, they seemed to realize that Faure, fairly or not, had 
stepped on the gas while the light was still yellow and that 
they were already in danger of being a lap down.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Ambassador Dunn has cleared this message. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON