VZCZCXRO3994
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #1944/01 3241454
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201454Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7235
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0680

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 001944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: "TRNC DAY" SPEECH: TALAT STICKS FOOT IN MOUTH WITH 
EU, QUARRELS WITH TURKISH MILITARY 
 
REF: NICOSIA 1916 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat delivered 
a petulant rhetorical broadside during November 15 
commemorations of the 1983 Turkish Cypriot unilateral 
declaration of independence (UDI).  The "good" parts of 
Talat's speech (throw-away references to the need for rule of 
law and democracy, close relations with the EU, and Cyprus 
reunification) were overshadowed by angry accusations against 
Tassos Papadopoulos and -- more worryingly -- the provocative 
suggestion that EU "discrimination" against Turkish Cypriots 
resulted from a "Nazi" or "Crusader" mentality.  Talat's 
overwrought and ill-timed speech has soured the diplomatic 
atmosphere on the island, drawn attention away from the 
Turkish Cypriots' (comparatively) constructive attitude in 
the recent UN process (reftel), and lent credibility to Greek 
Cypriot claims that Talat is "just another Denktash."   The 
Turkish Cypriot press has largely ignored the language of the 
speech itself and focused instead on Talat's argument with 
local military commanders -- who reportedly changed the 
November 15 order of ceremonies without Talat's permission, 
inserting unwanted "separatist" speeches calling for the 
"TRNC" to "live forever."  The fact that Talat's November 15 
performance is viewed in the north as a courageous 
pro-settlement gesture in the face of military pressure shows 
just how far Turkish Cypriot public opinion has drifted since 
the unambiguously pro-EU days in 2004.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SHAKING HIS TINY FIST AT THE SKY 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) "TRNC President" Talat delivered a provocative and 
ill-timed speech during November 15 ceremonies marking the 
23rd anniversary of the Turkish Cypriot UDI (full text 
emailed to EUR/SE).  With Turkish FM Gul (who also spoke 
about not giving in to Greek Cypriot "blackmail") looking on, 
Talat accused the Greek Cypriot leadership of trying to 
swallow the Turkish Cypriots with a policy of "osmosis" and 
personally attacked ROC President Tassos Papadopoulos as the 
"lawyer, financial consultant, and psychological supporter of 
Milosevic, who slaughtered his people of Bosnian and Albanian 
origin in the middle of Europe and in the eyes of the EU." 
 
¶3. (C) Turning his ire on the Europeans, Talat criticized 
them for "embracing" Papadopoulos -- and (implicitly) of 
condoning his dilatory behavior.  He accused the European 
Union of failing to deliver on its 2004 promise to end 
Turkish Cypriot isolation.  How should the Turkish Cypriots 
respond to this? Talat asked.  Perhaps Europe was 
"approaching the Turkish Cypriots with discrimination, 
cultural racism, and religious hostility that resembles 
mentality of the Crusaders and Nazis." 
 
¶4. (C) Talat made some attempt to counter-balance this 
outrageous rhetoric, but it was half-hearted at best.  He 
expressed hope that the Europeans would fulfill the ideal 
Turkish Cypriots aspired to -- that different cultures, 
religions, and societies should be seen as "richness" and 
accepted.  He also stressed his continued desire for 
reunification.  Rather than an act of division, the UDI 
should be viewed as a step toward solution, since the "TRNC" 
would eventually evolve into "one of the principal pillars" 
of a federal, united Cyprus.  Talat went on to call for 
continued internal reform, democracy, rule of law, and 
"social justice." 
 
SKUNK AT THE PICNIC 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Reaction to Talat's speech was swift and negative. 
Hovering above the fray with visible satisfaction, ROC 
spokesman Christodoulos Pashardis said he would not respond 
to Talat's "insults and accusations."  But the pro-government 
press had a field day with Talat's remarks, accusing the 
Turkish Cypriot leader of slinging mud, of racism, and of 
"toeing" Turkey's hard line. 
 
¶6. (C) More importantly, however, European and UN diplomats 
are furious at Talat's remarks -- especially in light of 
current Finnish-led efforts to broker a ports/Varosha deal 
that could finally unblock Turkish Cypriot trade with the EU. 
 At a meeting the following day with P-5 poloffs, UN DCM 
Cibor and our French and British counterparts agreed that the 
Nazi reference, especially, was insulting and could only 
damage the EU and UN negotiating atmosphere.  Several EU 
ambassadors today told Ambassador Schlicher that they were 
sending the message to Talat that he should apologize for his 
"Nazi" and "Crusader" references. 
 
 
NICOSIA 00001944  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) Turkish Cypriot advisors close to Talat privately 
acknowledge that the "president's" rhetoric has backfired. 
One "minister" who is a childhood friend expressed 
frustration that the "ill-considered" reference to Nazis and 
Crusaders has drawn attention away from the fact that the 
Turkish Cypriots have resumed "a more flexible" stance on the 
UN track.  The UN decision to submit its bridging proposal in 
writing (reftel) was a "victory" for Talat that should have 
put "Papadopoulos on the run."  Instead -- for now, at least 
-- the Greek Cypriots were off the hook. 
 
ARE WE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME SPEECH? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Talat's friend went on to say, however, that the 
"president" was understandably frustrated with the failure of 
his "constructive policies" to bring a solution any closer. 
Turkish Cypriot voters were frustrated by the fact that 
Papadopoulos seemed to suffer no penalty for his litany of 
sins ("after all," he noted, "Tassos really did work for 
Milosevic and he really did block a solution in 2004") -- and 
were furious at the EU for "doing nothing" to help them. 
Neither Turkish nor Turkish Cypriot politicians could get 
away with taking a "soft line" toward the EU these days, he 
claimed.  The Nazi talk was "a little much," he admitted, but 
"some angry words" were unavoidable. 
 
¶9. (C) Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Turkish Cypriot 
press has virtually ignored the provocative content of 
Talat's speech.  Instead, Turkish Cypriots are abuzz with 
controversy over reported tensions between Talat and the 
Turkish military over the order of ceremonies at "TRNC Day." 
Apparently unaware that the military protocol office had 
inserted a speech by a serving officer, Talat sat in visibly 
stunned silence when the uniformed man took to the podium and 
delivered a Denktash-style address calling for the "TRNC" to 
"live forever" -- and promising that the military would 
"never abandon" the Turkish Cypriots.  Talat pointedly 
refused to clap for the speech, and summoned the local force 
commander to his office the following day for what aides say 
was a furious dressing-down.  Noting that Talat has 
previously clashed with the military over protocol and 
ceremony (to say nothing of differences over who ultimately 
wields real power in the north), Turkish Cypriot media have 
spun the "TRNC Day" ceremony as a clash of wills between a 
democratically-elected, pro-solution civilian leader and the 
Denktashian old-school military establishment. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Talat's remarks have done damage to his reputation 
and to his ability to deliver for his constituents. 
Bicommunal barbs, while harmful, are nothing new and 
Papadopoulos has made his share of outrageous statements 
(including a famous denial that any Turkish Cypriots were 
killed in the intercommunal violence of 1963).  But Talat's 
attack on the EU is a new low and undercuts his most 
important asset -- credibility as a serious pro-solution, 
European-oriented interlocutor.  Talat's remarks are unlikely 
to derail UN efforts to kickstart a settlement process and 
they do not change the fundamental dynamics of the Finnish 
proposal.  They do, however, poison the atmosphere of trust 
that will be required for progress on either track.  That 
this has not dawned on most Turkish Cypriots is evidence of 
how far public opinion in the north has shifted since 2004 -- 
and how difficult productive bicommunal dialogue has become. 
END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER