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RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0361
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0945
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1603
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2868
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2041
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0364
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1421
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0926

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 NDJAMENA 001382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958:   N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CD
SUBJECT:  CHADIAN ELECTIONS IN 2007 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  The Chadian 
government estimates that the 2006 
communal elections and the 2007 
legislative elections will cost 
around $11.65 million; and it has 
requested financial assistance from 
the US, France, Germany, the European 
Union, and the United Nations 
Development Program.  The GOC has 
accepted the EU's offer to provide 
Euros five million toward 
reconstituting the electoral lists, 
revamping the independent election 
commission, and reworking the 
electoral code, along with a one-year 
experts' mission to establish an 
electoral timetable and benchmarks. 
President Deby is unlikely to want an 
independent legislature holding him 
to account as he fights for his life. 
The ruling party is comfortable with 
the perks of power. The political 
opposition detests Deby and does not 
believe there can be a fair election; 
convincing them otherwise will be a 
hard sell.  Unresolved rebellion and 
communal violence in the East will 
militate against credibility. 
Nevertheless, the GOC's early start, 
the EU's plan, and the arrival of an 
activist EU ambassador give Chad a 
slim hope for a plausible legislative 
election.  We should support these 
efforts.  End Summary. 
 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/ 
The Election Request 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/ 
 
¶2.  (U)  In a letter dated October 5, 
2006, Chadian Prime Minister Pascal 
Yoadimnadji requested aid from the 
United States, France, Germany, the 
European Union and the UNDP to 
conduct communal (local) elections at 
the end of 2006 and legislative 
elections sometime in 2007, estimated 
to cost in excess of CFA 6 billion 
($11,650,000 at $1 = CFA 515).  The 
PM's aid estimate is based on costs 
for logistics, materials, equipment, 
documents, civic education, training 
for officials, redefining urban 
district boundaries, and updating 
voter lists. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Separate studies funded by 
the UNDP and the EU concluded that 
the electoral process is broken; 
virtually no one outside the ruling 
party has confidence in it.  Even the 
ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement 
(MPS) acknowledges "problems". 
According to the studies, Chad needs: 
 
--a population census (the last one 
dates from the early 90s) to which we 
plan to contribute $150,000 in ESF; 
 
--a complete reworking of the 
electoral lists (voter registration); 
 
--new voter identification 
procedures; 
 
--redistricting; 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00001382  002 OF 008 
 
 
--revamping of the electoral code; 
 
--a permnent, trained, and truly 
Independent National Elction 
Commission (CENI); 
 
--comprehensive training for election 
officials down to the precinct level; 
and 
 
--comprehensive and fair voter 
education. 
 
The PM's request includes some, but 
not all, of these items. 
 
¶4.  (U)  CENI is currently 
reconstituted for each election on an 
ad hoc basis.  The government--which 
tends to install its partisans-- 
controls the membership; and there is 
no permanent staff.  There are 
competing proposals on how to reform 
the Commission, but all include 
representation by opposition parties 
and concerned civil society groups, 
as well as the creation of a 
permanent, "neutral" staff to provide 
expertise and continuity. 
 
¶5.  (U)  There are also competing 
proposals for reform of the election 
code; but most independent observers 
agree that a revised law must include 
provision for a permanent CENI, 
provision for outside observers, an 
effective appeals procedure, and a 
ballot preservation/recount 
procedure. 
 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/ 
The Donor Response 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/ 
 
¶6.  (U)  The European Union, 
including the bilateral French and 
German missions, responded to the 
Prime Minister on October 12 with an 
offer of five million Euros to redo 
the electoral lists, overhaul the 
electoral code, and reconstitute 
CENI.  The EU-proposal, which the GOC 
accepted on November 3, would focus 
on the 2007 National Assembly 
elections and ignore the 2006 
communal elections.  (Although the EU 
believes that the time is too short 
to organize successful communal 
elections before the end of 2006 and 
sees merit in postponing them, it 
also does not consider them 
significant given the predominantly 
rural character of the Chadian 
population.)  Upon acceptance of its 
proposal by the Prime Minister, the 
EU would dispatch an "experts team" 
to Chad to determine an electoral 
calendar, establish milestones, and 
monitor reform progress. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  In a November 3 meeting 
with the US, German, and French 
embassies, the EU mission, and the 
UNDP, former French Ambassador Jean- 
Pierre Bercot explained EU (plus 
German and French) thinking on 
Chadian election reform. 
 
NDJAMENA 00001382  003 OF 008 
 
 
Essentially, the EU would fund 
reforms on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.  The opposition would be 
encouraged to accede, but the reforms 
would go forward whether they bought- 
in or not.  This yes/no approach 
represents a break from earlier 
attempts to craft an electoral system 
acceptable to both the government and 
the opposition.  Previously, there 
was hope to gain acceptance of each 
step in the process by both sides. 
The EU's current approach can be read 
as dissatisfaction with both the 
Chadian government and the political 
opposition, a frustration palpable in 
the former French Ambassador's 
forceful presentation.  The EU urged 
the donor community to support its 
approach and not allow the GOC to 
play the donors against each other. 
 
¶8.  (U)  In a letter dated November 3 
to the EU, the Prime Minister 
accepted the EU's proposal. 
 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - - / 
The Chadian Players 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/ 
¶9.  (U)  President Deby's Patriotic 
Salvation Movement controls 123 of 
the 155 seats in the National 
Assembly (NA).  Allied parties 
control 6 seats.  Three opposition 
groupings control 26 seats. 
 
THE PATRIOTIC SALVATION MOVEMENT 
(MPS) 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - / 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The MPS assures Deby's 
dominance of the legislative branch 
of the Chadian government.  While the 
NA may occasionally question a 
minister, it never challenges Deby 
himself or his priority programs and, 
in the end, never seriously threatens 
a minister.  The Chadian legislature 
under the MPS is the quintessential 
rubber-stamp. 
 
¶11.  (U)  With backing from Libya and 
Sudan, President Deby founded the MPS 
in 1989 as the vehicle for his revolt 
against Hissene Habre.  Today, the 
MPS has transformed into Chad's most 
diverse political party, garnering 
representation and support from all 
regions of the country.  While 
Muslims form its backbone, the party 
has a solid cadre in Christian areas. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Virtually all observers 
agree that President Deby and his MPS 
are unwilling to risk losing control 
of the National Assembly.  While the 
party's national base would almost 
guarantee its continued control of 
the legislature, the national power 
structure is probably unwilling to 
risk any significant diminution of 
its power, especially with the regime 
facing rebellion in the East. 
Additionally, MPS adherents may 
simply not be prepared for a stiff 
contest in a transparent environment. 
 
NDJAMENA 00001382  004 OF 008 
 
 
UNDP Director Kingsley Amaning posits 
Chad's MPS as an amalgamation of 
three groups: 
 
--Warriors.  This group stems from 
the ancient and pragmatic tradition 
of desert warfare.  The warriors 
would accept political and electoral 
reforms but would insist that they 
(the MPS) retain power, despite the 
reforms. 
 
--Semi-activists.  This is the second- 
level power structure, the 
secretaries general, the party's 
 
SIPDIS 
water carriers.  They lack a culture 
of competition.  They know that they 
are next in line to feed at the power 
trough, and they do not want to 
gamble their future fortunes on the 
whims of an electorate. 
 
--Techno-bureaucrats.  These are the 
militants who hold the patronage 
jobs, and want to keep them.  They 
have never faced any real competition 
and are clueless about running a 
competitive political campaign.  They 
are risk-averse and comfortable with 
the status quo. 
 
In essence, the MPS has no interest 
in free, fair, and transparent 
elections. 
 
THE OPPOSITION 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - / 
 
¶13.  (U)  Chad's 36 opposition 
parties have two things in common:  a 
profound distrust of President Deby 
and a desire for power.  In the 
estimation of many of these leaders, 
Deby has variously destroyed the 
Chadian state, fomented the Darfur 
crisis, plundered the treasury, and 
repressed the masses.  He can do no 
good, according to them; and he will 
steal the National Assembly in 2007. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Many of the political 
opposition parties are regionally or 
ethnically based.  Some are formed 
around a particular individual who, 
in many instances, has previously 
served in the Deby regime.  Most have 
no vision for Chad other than to 
begin a national dialogue among the 
various actors, including the eastern 
rebels.  The goal of such a 
conference, they say, would be to 
develop a framework for transparent 
elections, reform the military and 
security services, and reform the 
justice system and public sector 
finance. 
 
¶15.  (U)  The opposition can be 
separated into two groups:  Those who 
competed for the National Assembly in 
the 2002 elections and those who 
boycotted. 
 
--The joiners.  Five parties split 
the 26 opposition seats with ten 
going to the Rally for Democracy and 
Progress (RDP), nine to the Front for 
 
NDJAMENA 00001382  005 OF 008 
 
 
the Action Forces for the Republic 
(FAR), two to parties allied to FAR, 
and five to the National Union for 
Democracy and Renewal (UNDR).  The 
leaders of the RDP and the FAR (19 
seats) have indicated that they are 
dissatisfied with the NA, calling it 
a useless and powerless institution. 
As things stand, both leaders plan to 
have their parties boycott the 2007 
elections.  At this time, the UNDR 
appears ready to compete.  The views 
of the two one-seat parties are 
unknown. 
 
--The boycotters.  The Coordination 
of Political Parties for Defense of 
the Constitution (CPDC) is the 
umbrella organization for 28 
opposition parties (including the non- 
boycotting UNDR).  With the exception 
of UNDR, it currently appears that 
most of the  CPDC members plan to 
continue their boycott in 2007.  Like 
the RDP and the FAR, the leaders of 
these parties see the NA as nothing 
more than a rubber-stamp for 
President Deby; and they are 
convinced that Deby and the MPS will 
steal their way to victory. 
 
OPPOSITION PARTICIPATION IN THE 2007 
ELECTIONS? 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - / 
¶16.  (SBU)  At least some of the 
opposition party leaders, however, 
might be open to eventual 
participation in the upcoming 
legislative election, should "real" 
reform take place.  Poloff spoke to 
the major party leaders individually, 
away from their opposition homologues 
and the shell of the CPDC, and asked 
them if EU-type proposals would 
encourage them to participate. 
Salibou Garba of the National 
Alliance for Democracy and 
Development and Lol Mahamat Choua of 
the RDP (currently in the NA) 
indicated that they would consider 
taking part in the 2007 contest if 
the international donor community 
could guarantee meaningful reforms 
along the lines posed by the EU. 
They would want to examine the 
reforms, however, before they 
committed; and they would want to 
scrutinize the international 
community's transparency guarantees. 
In the end, they believe that Deby 
will find a way to steal the 
election; and convincing them 
otherwise will be a hard sell. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Other parties indicated 
openness to participation but 
attached conditions exceeding the EU 
proposals.  A national dialogue in 
advance of the elections was the 
favorite.  A guarantee of Deby's 
retirement at the end of his current 
term was another.  Demonstrating that 
it was impossible for Deby to 
circumvent the reforms was a third. 
In essence, profound distrust of Deby 
may negate any goodwill generated 
 
NDJAMENA 00001382  006 OF 008 
 
 
from international donor community- 
backed reforms.  FAR leader Yorongar 
simply stated "[participating] is not 
worth the trouble". 
 
THE PRESIDENT 
/- - - - - - - - - - - - / 
 
¶18.  (U)  President Deby is the locus 
of politics in Chad and the "bete 
noir" of the opposition.  He has held 
power for 16 years and has been 
elected three times.  He changed the 
constitution to permit himself a 
third term, a tarnished election in 
the view of most international 
observers.  The international 
community, the political and rebel 
oppositions, and probably most 
Chadians believe that President Deby 
intends to remain president for life. 
 
¶19.  (U)  According to observers, 
President Deby views himself as a 
desert warrior chief who almost 
certainly believes no one can rule 
Chad better than he.  He appears to 
take counsel from no one.  Due to the 
insurgency in the East and communal 
violence along the border with Sudan, 
Deby is presently detached from the 
everyday concerns of government and 
the non-military needs of his 
country.  He is fighting for his 
political life--and perhaps his 
physical life too. 
 
/- - - - - - - - - - / 
The Probability 
/- - - - - - - - - - / 
 
¶20.  (U)  Despite the best efforts of 
the international donor community, 
free, fair, and transparent 
legislative elections will be 
extremely difficult to pull off in 
¶2007. 
 
¶21.  (U)  President Deby has no 
interest in permitting a legislative 
body that could oppose his plans, 
question his priorities and his use 
of state money, or undercut his 
efforts in the East.  The MPS has no 
interest in jeopardizing the 
employment of its adherents and the 
privileges of rank.  The opposition 
has no interest in legitimizing what 
it believes will be a fraudulent MPS 
victory.  The EU and the 
international community ultimately 
cannot guarantee the sanctity of the 
ballot box in the absence of the 
government's unwillingness to cede 
power. 
 
¶22.  (U)  Exacerbating electoral 
credibility are the security 
situation in the East and the 
implementation of press censorship. 
Rebellion and communal violence in 
the East have resulted in tens of 
thousands of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP) whom it will be 
extremely difficult to keep track of 
as election day approaches.  The 
Chadian military and security forces, 
 
NDJAMENA 00001382  007 OF 008 
 
 
already stretched thin along the 
eastern and southern borders, would 
be hard pressed to provide security 
at every polling station or offer 
even modest assurances of safety for 
international observers in the border 
regions.  Finally, the provision for 
press censorship banning reports on 
rebel activities and communal 
violence contained in the current 
State of Emergency--which the 
National Assembly extended on 
November 24 for six months--would 
make it impossible for the opposition 
to discuss issues that could 
reasonably be expected to play a 
major role in a national legislative 
election. 
 
¶23.  (U)  Given the current power 
structure's incentives to retain 
power and the difficulty inherent in 
conducting free, fair, and 
transparent elections in a censored 
and volatile environment, the GOC 
would find it extremely difficult to 
conduct elections meeting even 
minimal international standards of 
credibility. 
 
/- - - - - - - - - - / 
The Possibility 
/- - - - - - - - - - / 
 
¶24.  (U)  Nonetheless, there is a 
possibility.  The Chadian government 
has begun preparing for the 
legislative elections almost a year 
in advance, which represents a 
significant improvement in its 
planning process.  The European 
Union, with the full backing of the 
French and German bilateral missions, 
has committed significant funding to 
the electoral process, as well as a 
plan that the EU believes will 
provide institutional backbone for a 
transparent election.  The European 
Commission's new Ambassador to Chad, 
Gilles Desesquelles, recently arrived 
from Togo where he participated in 
the effort to reform that country's 
election process, is committed to 
pushing the plan forward in 
cooperation with the donor community. 
The Chadian Prime Minister has 
accepted the European plan on behalf 
of the government.  Some Chadian 
opposition party leaders have 
indicated a qualified willingness to 
participate in the legislative 
elections if certain reforms are 
implemented. 
 
¶25.  (U)  Settling the framework and 
finances for the NA election gives 
the EU's experts time to develop 
voter registration procedures, 
electoral code changes, and a 
structure for the election commission 
that is acceptable to reasonable 
observers.  The experts' electoral 
timetable and progress indicators 
will give the international donor 
community and the opposition 
objective milestones by which to 
measure the government's headway--and 
 
NDJAMENA 00001382  008 OF 008 
 
 
commitment to reform. 
 
¶26.  (U)  Although prospects for a 
free, fair, and transparent vote next 
year remain unlikely, the convergence 
of the GOC's unexpectedly early 
planning process, the EU's well- 
funded plan, and the arrival of an 
allied ambassador with experience in 
problematic electoral environments 
gives Chad a slim chance for a 
somewhat more credible process in 
¶2007.  To the extent these reforms 
can be implemented, this will make it 
harder to manipulate the electoral 
process during the presidential 
elections in 2011.  While avoiding 
any false hopes of rapid progress, we 
nonetheless believe we should support 
efforts for electoral reform in Chad 
next year and urge that resources be 
made available to allow us to do so. 
 
¶27.  (U)  Tripoli minimize 
considered. 
 
Wall