VZCZCXRO4857
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2402/01 3131558
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091558Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5104
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0144

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2026 
TAGS: PREL KNDP ECON ETRD RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: BILATERAL RELATIONS UPDATE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In a November 8 meeting with the 
Ambassador, DFM Kislyak expressed concern over the potential 
impact of US congressional elections on WTO and bilateral 
nuclear cooperation.  He argued again that US sanctions 
against Sukhoi were symbolic of the failings in bilateral 
relations -- deeply offending Putin, who would likely raise 
the topic with the President at APEC.  Kislyak flagged a 
possible visit to Washington in early December to consult 
with U/S Joseph in advance of the next round of the Strategic 
Security Dialogue.  He praised the inauguration of the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, pushed for immunity 
in the Kuznetsov case, welcomed an Embassy Baghdad briefing 
on the Yousifiyah power plant, and urged closure on the 
Putin-Bush meeting time in Hanoi-- noting that DFM Denisov 
would represent the GOR at the APEC ministerial prior to FM 
Lavrov's November 18th arrival.  Kislyak agreed it was time 
to revisit commitments to the International Science and 
Technology Center, and welcomed planning for the 200th 
anniversary celebration.  Iran portion of conversation 
reported septel.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (C)  US-Russian Relations Post-Elections:  Kislyak 
expressed concern that US-Russian relations would be "held 
hostage" to congressional elections, with ratification of key 
elements of the presidential checklist -- WTO and "123" -- 
subject to a more critical reception.  Kislyak interpreted 
the language of the Iran Non-Proliferation Act amendments as 
a bellwether of congressional activism.  The Ambassador 
responded that WTO would be a signal accomplishment, but 
agreed that it would face tough scrutiny.  While a "123" 
agreement would provide Congress with a 90 day period to 
react, but no formal requirement to vote, the Ambassador 
stressed that Russian cooperation on North Korea and Iran 
would remain important factors in congressional 
deliberations.  The Ambassador reminded Kislyak that prior to 
the mid-term elections, congressional skepticism towards 
Russia was acute: a strong case would need to be made on the 
merits of US-Russian cooperation. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Sukhoi:  Launching into a lecture on the failure of 
the US to be a predictable partner in foreign affairs (citing 
shifting US budgetary support for CW destruction and CTR), 
Kislyak revisited GOR unhappiness over the US decision to 
impose sanctions against Sukhoi.  The company that had done 
the most to advocate long-term cooperation with the United 
States, he argued, had been singled out for punishment. 
Kislyak argued that an apology was in order, taking 
particular offense at the Federal Register language that 
labeled Russian firms overseen by Putin as proliferators. 
Noting that he had made the same points with U/S Joseph, 
Kislyak rejected US explanations that the Federal Register 
language mirrored the legislation, and repeated that it was 
unacceptable that an official US document labeled Russian 
parastatals as proliferators.  The Sukhoi sanctions were 
symbolic of what was wrong in the relationship and 
constituted a personal offense to Putin, who would raise the 
issue with the President in Hanoi.  The Ambassador responded 
that Kislyak's conversation with U/S Joseph had been a 
positive first step in reviewing the Sukhoi issue.  The focus 
now needed to be on careful consultations on the facts and 
moving forward. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Possible Kislyak Visit Early December:  Kislyak 
noted that he might add a Washington leg to an early December 
trip to Central America in order to consult with U/S Joseph 
prior to the next round of the Strategic Security Dialogue 
scheduled for Moscow before year's end.  The Ambassador 
encouraged the visit, reminding Kislyak that the 15th 
anniversary of the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement 
would give momentum to the Bratislava checklist, but also 
provide an opportunity to assess how best to move forward. 
He underscored that a Washington visit would not obviate the 
need for a follow-on session of the Strategic Security 
Dialogue in Moscow. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: 
Kislyak praised the inaugural session of the Global 
Initiative in Morocco, underscoring his appreciation for the 
work of U/S Joseph's team.  With the next session in Turkey 
to be followed by a larger event in Astana, Kislyak noted 
that it did not take much GOR persuasion to win over 
President Nazarbayev to the merits of hosting the 
high-profile gathering.  Some doubts were quietly expressed 
to the GOR by Turkey and Kazakhstan over the fact that the 
summits were exclusively in Muslim countries.  Kislyak said 
he refuted the notion of a faith-based selection process. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Kuznetsov Immunity:  Kislyak reiterated Lavrov's 
written request to the Secretary for a "political and 
 
MOSCOW 00012402  002 OF 002 
 
 
extrajudicial" determination of the case, arguing that 
regardless of the SYG's decision to waive immunity, the US 
made its own determination of immunity through the visa 
process.  The Ambassador noted that a written response to 
Lavrov's letter was forthcoming, but did not provide any 
grounds for optimism that the US would change its position. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Yousifiyah Power Plant:  The Ambassador informed 
Kislyak that Embassy Baghdad had extended an offer to brief 
the Russian mission on the state of play at the facility, 
which was still the site of numerous and severe security 
incidents, and was awaiting a response.  Kislyak said that he 
would send instructions for the Russian mission to set up the 
meeting, adding that it was not in the interest of either the 
US or Russia for the facility to be further damaged. 
 
¶8.  (C)  APEC/Putin-President Bilateral:  Kislyak pushed for 
closure on the timing of the presidential bilateral in Hanoi, 
noting that Putin accords "great importance" to his meeting 
with the President, which meant that the rest of his schedule 
was in limbo.  He clarified that First DFM Denisov would 
precede Lavrov to Hanoi and would represent the GOR at the 
ministerial.  Lavrov arrives on the 18th and is available to 
meet the Secretary on the 18th or 19th, with his preference 
the 18th. 
 
¶9.  (C)  International Science and Technology Center (ISTC): 
The Ambassador flagged the upcoming visit of ISN DAS Semmel 
as an opportune time to address the status of the ISTC, 
noting declining US budgetary support for the center. 
Kislyak said that he had raised this issue with Rosatom 
Kiriyenko, who had asked for more time to come up to speed on 
the issue.  The GOR valued the ISTC for the transparent rules 
and world standards that it propagated.  Kislyak agreed in 
principle that the ISTC needed to adapt to new realities and 
conditions. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  200th Anniversary: Expressing appreciation for 
Putin's letter endorsing the official commemoration of 200 
years of diplomatic relations in 2007, the Ambassador said 
the Embassy would work closely with the MFA on the range of 
US-supported events that were under consideration.  Kislyak 
said the MFA was committed to the project, and valued the 
public diplomacy dimension that it added to US-Russian 
relations. 
BURNS