VZCZCXRO2319
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHOS #1360/01 3211346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171346Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8170
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 8026
INFO RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH AFB UK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR GPERSON, CGAY 
TREASURY FOR ASEVERENS, SRENENDER, DFIELDS 
COMMERCE FOR KBURRESS 
STATE PASS USTR FOR ASST USTR SLISER 
STATE PASS TRANSPORTATION FOR MARAD 
STATE PASS OPIC FOR ZHAN AND MSTUCKART 
STATE PASS TDA FOR NCABOT 
STATE PASS EXIM FOR JRICHTER 
STATE PASS USAID FOR GWEYNAND AND SLAWAETZ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016 
TAGS: EPET ENERG ASEC PTER NI
SUBJECT: GON HAS SURRENDERED DEFACTO CONTROL OF CREEKS TO 
MILITANTS 
 
REF: A. LAGOS 1249 
 
     ¶B. LAGOS 1254 
     ¶C. LAGOS 1263 
     ¶D. LAGOS 1264 
     ¶E. LAGOS 1272 
     ¶F. LAGOS 1276 
     ¶G. LAGOS 1278 
     ¶H. LAGOS 1294 
     ¶I. ABUJA 2974 
 
Classified By: Consul General Brian Browne for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Consulate Lagos submits this missive to 
complement Abuja 2974.  This message provides the consulate's 
perspective which is in close accord with that offered in 
Reftel. As things now stand, the Government of Nigeria (GON) 
has surrendered de facto control over large swathes of the 
creeks and waterways to armed militants in the Niger Delta. 
Roughly one third of oil production was shut down for a time 
due to militant activity, although recently shut-ins have 
been reduced to approximately one fifth of production. 
International oil companies (IOCs) and oil service companies 
basically have pulled expatriate employees from working in 
the creeks.  The military has mustered on Bonny and Onne 
islands (Ref. G) and has reduced its presence in the creeks 
to a minimum.  Credible sources claim that militants recently 
took delivery of a handsome cache of weapons and a number of 
speed boats to add to their already considerable strength. 
The reduction in the military and oil company presence in the 
creeks may be temporary and tactical.  Nonetheless, the 
longer this retreat lasts, the more the militants will be 
imbued with confidence and the stronger they think they are 
getting.  The less likely will they be to desist in the very 
activities from which they believe they derive their 
puissance.  End Summary. 
 
Reduced Oil Flow, Reduced Company Presence 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  The situation in the Niger Delta has deteriorated 
over the past weeks.  Some weeks ago, the Government admitted 
800,000 barrels of oil per day, out of current average total 
production of 2.55 million barrels per day, had ceased 
flowing as the result of militant activity, although by 
end-October some militant-affected flowstations had come back 
on line, reducing shut-ins to approximately one-fifth of 
production (approximately 514,000 barrels per day shut-in). 
Small Nigerian oil companies, like Dubri and Oceanic, are 
completely inactive because of the danger of militant 
activity.  Violence and the threat of violence against 
workers and facilities have caused international oil 
companies (IOCs) to reduce work at most locations, and move 
most expatriate employees out of the creeks.  Oil services 
companies are in an increasingly difficult position.  As the 
IOCs reduce their operations, the services companies find 
their income reduced and have difficulty paying idle 
employees.  As a result, some oil services firms have begun 
to feel the impact of the slowdown, laying off local 
employees. (Ref. F) 
 
Reduced Military Presence in the Creeks 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Nigerian military has reduced its deployments in 
the Delta creeks.  This tacitly cedes control of large tracts 
of the area to the militants.  Although the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) has superior aggregate force, in its tactical 
encounters with the militants, the JTF patrols have been 
outgunned and outmanned by their militant antagonists on too 
many occasions.  Due to the disrepair of their air assets, 
the military cannot translate what should be an inherent 
superiority in its control of the airspace above the creeks 
into an operational advantage.  We know of no military aerial 
 
LAGOS 00001360  002 OF 002 
 
 
reconnaissance flights to locate the hostages or stolen 
barges taken in September and October. 
 
¶4.  (C) Recent reports suggest that JTF forces have pulled 
out of the creeks for concentrated deployment on Onne and 
Bonny Islands. (Ref. D)  Given the length of time the troops 
have been mustered in these two locations, this move appears 
more like an attempt to avoid further confrontations with the 
militants, rather than to prepare for imminent aggressive 
action. 
 
No Government Engagement With Militants Underway 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5.  (C) While GON forces are taking a passive approach on the 
ground, the GON also appears dormant in making any pacific 
overtures to the militants. (Ref. D)  GON policy towards the 
militants seems to revolve around placating the Warri-based 
Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) group, which 
engineered the January and February kidnappings and attack on 
oil installations.  By mollifying FNDIC, the GON seems to 
have initially thought that group would be able to contain 
the other militant groups.  This strategy has been proven 
ineffective by the reality and pace of recent events. 
 
Comment:  The Net Effect 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  Thus far, the GON policy in the Delta has been 
laconic in the pursuit of peaceful resolution to militant 
stirrings and irresolute in the application of force to 
contain the militants.  Because of the GON's failure to make 
progress in either talking to the militants or in outmuscling 
them, the Delta remains a place of significant uncertainty 
frequently punctuated by the kidnapping of expatriates, 
closure of oil facilities and eruption of localized political 
violence. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Almost imperceptibly, it seems the current balance 
of power has shifted towards the militants.  The GON military 
posture is less assertive and the oil companies are down to 
minimal staffing in the area.  Meanwhile, some militant 
groups are retooling and attracting recruits.  Fortunately, 
these groups currently believe their interests are best 
served by harassing the oil companies and not shutting them 
down. 
 
¶8. (C)  There is no countervailing reason to think the 
militants will reduce their level of activity.  They are in 
as favorable position as they could imagine.  We hope their 
next success does not embolden them toward ever more risky 
behavior.  Should the militants radicalize to the extent of 
trying to shut down ever greater amounts of production, the 
GON might be forced to abandon its passive military strategy. 
 Any large scale confrontation between the GON and militants 
could be dire.  The best way to prevent this is for the GON 
to engage more actively with representatives of the militants 
and other Ijaw groups in hopes of negotiating disruptive 
militant action down to a minimum.  End Comment. 
 
¶9.  (U)  This cable was cleared by Embassy Abuja. 
 
BROWNE