VZCZCXRO8254
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #4506/01 3291021
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251021Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7676
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 004506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND; NSC FOR HINNEN; DOE FOR 
IE; STATE FOR EB/ESC, NEA/ARP, PM/PPA, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2016 
TAGS: EPET ENRG PTER KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND BRIEFING AND TOUR OF KUWAIT 
CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 4425 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 3071 
     ¶C. 05 KUWAIT 4400 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:  On 14 November, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT) 
Frances Fragos Townsend received a briefing from Director of 
the Kuwait National Security Bureau (NSB) Shaykh Thamer Ali 
¶A. Al-Salem Al-Sabah and senior managers of Kuwait National 
Petroleum Company (KNPC) regarding the status of Kuwait's 
critical energy infrastructure security and plans for 
improvements.  Shaykh Thamer outlined the responsibilities 
and organizational structure of the agencies tasked with 
managing Kuwait's energy infrastructure security, described 
existing and planned security systems and hardware 
installations, and referred to the development of standard 
operating procedures and doctrine.  The briefing was followed 
by a tour of selected security facilities at KNPC's Shuaiba 
and Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery complexes including a crisis 
response center, a refinery control room, and perimeter 
security installations.  Townsend emphasized the importance 
of a clear doctrine and unified chain of command and control, 
integrated communications, integrated response procedures, 
including the evacuation of surrounding populations if 
necessary, and frequent practice and refinement of procedures 
through repeated drills and exercises.  The NSB and KNPC 
briefers acknowledged that they had identified the same 
priorities and were in the process of installing the systems 
and developing the training and procedures needed to better 
deter possible threats and respond to major incidents whether 
they be terrorist attacks or industrial accidents. The 
Kuwaitis announced plans to conduct a major security exercise 
in December.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  On 14 November, APHSCT Townsend received a 
briefing led by Shaykh Thamer, Director of the Kuwait 
National Security Bureau and supported by KNPC Deputy 
Managing Director Suhail Yusef Bu-Grace and the Deputy 
Managing Directors of Kuwait's three refineries, Husain 
Ismail of Shuaiba, Asa'ad Ahmad Al-Saad of Mina-Al-Ahmadi, 
and Abdul Mohsen Ali Khajah of Mina Al-Abdulla.  The briefers 
explained that overall responsibility for energy 
infrastructure security was assigned to a high-level, 
inter-ministerial Security Decision Follow-up Committee. 
This committee is led by the President of the NSB, Shaykh 
Ahmed Al-Fahd, and reports directly to the Council of 
Ministers.  The KNPC Deputy explained that Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC), which manages all of Kuwait's oil 
industry, is in the process of consolidating security 
functions and organizations across all of its subsidiaries. 
A new KPC subsidiary called the Oil Sector Services Company 
(OSSCo) is gradually assuming the security responsibilities 
that were previously managed separately by each of the 
individual subsidiaries including the Kuwait Oil Company 
(KOC), Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC), Kuwait Gulf 
Oil Company (KGOC), and Petrochemical Industries Company 
(PIC).  OSSCo plans to gradually acquire these management 
responsibilities over a period of twelve to eighteen months. 
The security force for the oil sector is currently comprised 
of personnel from the Ministry of the Interior, the National 
Guard, the Coast Guard and security personnel employed by 
each of the KPC subsidiaries.  This last group is not allowed 
to carry arms.  OSSCo is also in the process of establishing 
a shore protection force to enhance the security of the 
seaward approaches to the refineries and loading terminals. 
Although OSSCo will eventually assume overall responsibility 
for security within KPC, the company is not expected to have 
control over Interior Ministry personnel. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Shaykh Thamer explained that in the event of a 
security incident, the MOI assumes operational control, 
whereas in the event of an industrial incident, the oil 
company operations managers take control.  Townsend suggested 
that this might be an artificial distinction and said that 
one lesson learned in the U.S. was that an integrated 
response was required including integrated communications and 
an integrated command-and-control structure.  The NSB and 
KNPC briefers acknowledged the need for greater integration 
and said that they were in the process of installing the 
communications systems and establishing the standard 
operating procedures and protocols required to enable this 
level of integration.  When Townsend asked about the quality 
of information sharing and management across the facilities 
 
KUWAIT 00004506  002 OF 002 
 
 
and companies, including the effective dissemination of 
threat information, the NSB and KNPC reps answered that there 
is currently no effective system for managing information. 
They said that moving from the current "ad-hoc" approach to a 
more systematic one was a high priority.  When Townsend asked 
about the development of crisis management doctrine, the 
Kuwaitis replied that the development and reinforcement of 
standard operating procedures is currently their greatest 
focus of activity.  They plan to test these systems and 
procedures during a major security exercise to be conducted 
in December.  Townsend stressed the importance of drills and 
exercises and also emphasized the need to be prepared to 
coordinate with local authorities during a major incident due 
to the proximity of the refineries to the city of Fahaheel. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  With regard to hardware and systems, Shaykh 
Thamer explained that each of the individual KPC subsidiaries 
had been working with its own private security contractor to 
identify gaps and prioritize hardware installations to fill 
those gaps.  The refineries have already completed a major 
upgrade of perimeter fencing (now three layers instead of one 
surrounding the entire facility and extending into the sea), 
a large-scale CCTV installation, placement of security buoys 
and a radar system in the maritime exclusion zone, and the 
establishment of a temporary Crisis Center.  The construction 
of a high-tech, permanent crisis center is part of the plan 
for a fully-integrated security system scheduled to be 
completed by 2009-2010. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  Following the briefing, Shaykh Thamer led 
Townsend on a tour of some of the security installations at 
the Shuaiba and Mina-Al-Ahmadi refinery complexes.  This 
began with a tour of the temporary Crisis Center which is 
manned 24-hours by a 5-person security watch section 
including KNPC and Ministry of Interior personnel.  From the 
Crisis Center, watchstanders can control and monitor an 
extensive network of security cameras, perimeter alarms, 
electrified fences, and radar.  They can also communicate 
with the guard force, security agencies, and the refinery 
control room.  En route to the next stop, the motorcade 
traveled along the perimeter to observe the triple-layer 
barrier, electrified fence, and perimeter cameras.  The next 
stop was the control center for the Shuaiba refinery which 
was manned by about 20 personnel who monitor plant operations 
and equipment status.  The monitoring and communications 
equipment appeared modern and comprehensive.  The final stop 
was an electronics shed near the perimeter that contained 
processing equipment and an operator-interface for the 
perimeter surveillance equipment, including cameras and 
alarms.  A security contractor demonstrated how the system 
responds to a perimeter alarm by alerting the operator, 
indicating the location of the intrusion, and slaving a 
camera to the location. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  In separate meetings with Townsend (septel) and 
earlier with the Ambassador (ref. A), President of the Kuwait 
National Security Bureau and former Energy Minister Shaykh 
Ahmed Al-Fahd expressed the desire to cooperate with the USG 
to enhance Kuwait's critical energy infrastructure as a top 
priority under the Gulf Security Dialogue. 
 
¶7.  (U)  This cable was cleared by APHSCT Townsend. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
Tueller