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PP RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1743/01 3181359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141359Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5152
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0473
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001743 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO AADP CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: BEMBA FOCUSING ON POLITICAL FUTURE IN OPPOSITION 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1740 
 
Classified By: PolCouns DBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba has 
effectively recognized he has lost the October 29 DRC 
elections, but is laying the groundwork for claiming 
electoral fraud.  Nonetheless, he increasingly is focusing on 
his political future.  He told the Ambassador he and his 
troops plan to move to a military camp on the outskirts of 
Kinshasa temporarily so that their presence will not be a 
pretext for violence when the electoral commission announces 
provisional results.  He called on the international 
community not to ignore the opposition and remain engaged in 
constructing the DRC's new democracy.  He described working 
"correctly" with President Joseph Kabila and senior 
government security officials to defuse the November 11 
violence.  He acknowledged that both he and Kabila have 
"crazies" in their camps who need to be contained.  Bemba 
would not commit, however, to a forthcoming statement urging 
calm concurrent with CEI publication of election results. 
Bemba appeared relaxed, and the atmosphere around his 
residence did not suggest a state of alert.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ambassador met with Vice President Jean-Pierre 
Bemba November 12 for an exchange of views on the DRC 
electoral process and the November 11 confrontation between 
Bemba supporters and police (reftel); PolCouns sat in as 
notetaker.  The meeting took place at Bemba's private 
residence on the riverside.  Atmospherics were positive. 
 
¶3.  (C) Bemba said he did not know when the Independent 
Electoral Commission (CEI) planned to announce its nationwide 
provisional vote count, but said the CEI had promised to give 
him advance notice.  He noted he had sent four letters to the 
CEI alleging fraud and had not yet received any response, but 
did not press the point in subsequent conversation.  He 
clearly laid the groundwork, however, for later claims of 
election fraud.  The Ambassador pointed out that Bemba has 
some allies in his coalition who are extremists and capable 
of provoking unrest.  Bemba acknowledged that both camps have 
their "crazies" who need to be contained, and asserted firmly 
that he had passed the message to his men to respect the 
democratic process.  He said he wanted to be sure that he and 
his camp are not the source of problems when election results 
are announced. 
 
¶4.  (C) Bemba provided additional details on an accord to 
garrison the greater part of his troops which the CIAT 
learned of the afternoon of November 12.  He said he would 
move his forces, with the exception of a small number of 
troops and their families, from his official and private 
residences to an existing military camp at Maluku, just 
outside of Kinshasa, prior to announcement of election 
results.  MONUC and EUFOR would cooperate to ensure security. 
 Bemba said he would move temporarily to the camp as well to 
eliminate any pretext for renewed violence in the Gombe area 
of Kinshasa.  He said MONUC had agreed to take responsibility 
for security outside his official residence downtown. 
 
¶5.  (C) Although Bemba did not specifically acknowledge that 
he had lost the election, he spoke at length on the 
importance of an opposition as a check on government and as a 
means of preparing to govern in the future.  He said that 
African governments usually seek to rid themselves of 
opposition.  He called this "short-term" thinking and 
expressed concern that Kabila's AMP alliance is moving in 
that direction.  He specifically asked that the international 
community respect the position of the opposition as well as 
the government in order to sustain the creation of a new 
democracy. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the United States 
intends to remain engaged.  He said we would continue to 
insist on the importance of a viable opposition and a 
functioning democracy.  He noted that a monopoly on power by 
any party is dangerous and unstable, and that all should 
participate openly and responsibly in the political process. 
Bemba agreed with all points.  Preliminary totals released by 
the CEI confirm his strong base of support in the western, 
Lingala-speaking half of the country.  The Ambassador noted 
that his party could win control of four or five of the new 
provincial governments. 
 
¶7.  (C) Bemba's description of the November 11 violence 
(reftel) stands in contrast to the confusion that contributed 
 
KINSHASA 00001743  002 OF 002 
 
 
to the violence of August 20-22.  It was evident he sees his 
intervention as crucial to resolving it.  He said he called 
President Kabila immediately after learning of the initial 
shootings.  He asserted that he persuaded Interior Minister 
Denis Kalume to order police forces to halt firing into the 
air, which had alarmed Bemba's troops.  He also claimed to 
have convinced Congolese army chief General Gabriel Amisi not 
to deploy troops to areas of the firefight.  He similarly 
said he convinced General Dieudonne Banza not to call out the 
Presidential Guard.  He indicated he was satisfied with the 
contacts among the parties to end the violence, 
characterizing his coordination with the various officials as 
"correct." 
 
¶8.  (C) Bemba also essentially confirmed several agreements 
brokered by MONUC.  He said he had reached agreement for 
joint patrols by his forces, the FARDC 7th Integrated Brigade 
and the guards of Air Force General John Numbi of the 
cemetery across the road from his downtown residence.  Numbi 
lives nearby and his guards participated in the November 11 
fight.  The cemetery has been a constant site of tension 
among armed forces present in the area and was a focus of the 
Saturday shooting. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador said that all parties should work 
together to ensure that the current situation did not 
deteriorate.  Bemba repeatedly stated that his side would not 
be the source of problems.  The Ambassador emphasized that we 
need to continue working together to ensure that people are 
aware that a new era has begun. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador encouraged Bemba to make a public 
statement at the same time of the CEI's announcement of 
election results, reiterating a call for calm, and 
potentially signaling his intent to continue to participate 
politically in the DRC.  Bemba demurred, vaguely stating the 
content of any such announcement would depend on what kind of 
response he got from the CEI regarding the election process. 
He did assert again that he would do everything necessary to 
ensure that MLC forces are not responsible for any new 
violence, but would not commit to the kind of statement the 
Ambassador was proposing. 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment.  Bemba appeared relaxed and in good humor 
and expressed none of the aggressive rhetoric we have seen 
from some of his allies in recent days.  While the usual 
assortment of guards and hangers-on were around his house, 
the atmosphere around the compound did not suggest a state of 
alert.  It is clear he can read the numbers and is focusing 
on his political future.  Moving his troops out of central 
Kinshasa for the anticipated announcement of election results 
will significantly reduce the prospects of armed clashes.  In 
addition, it promises to win him points with the same 
international players whose support he will need to create a 
viable opposition force to an expected Kabila government. End 
comment. 
MEECE