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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002904 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV MARR NP
SUBJECT: CPN-UML AND NC-D WEIGH IN ON ARMS MANAGEMENT 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 2538 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  On October 27, the Ambassador met with General 
Secretary of the Nepal Communist Party - United Marxist 
 
SIPDIS 
Leninist (CPN-UML) MK Nepal and Nepal Congress-Democratic 
(NC-D) President Sher Bahadur Deuba to discuss the 
Ambassador's consultations in the U.S. and the status of 
peace talks, particularly the contentious issue of arms 
management.  The Ambassador and Deuba agreed that the two 
main issues on the table have remained the same for six 
weeks: arms management and enforcement of law and order 
(reftel).  MK Nepal expressed the need for a phased strategy 
for Maoist arms management but emphasized that the process 
had to be complete before constituent assembly elections 
tentatively slated for next spring.  While MK Nepal assumed 
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would be confined to 
UN-monitored barracks, he expressed real concern that Maoist 
militias still operated with impunity in the countryside. 
Deuba also emphasized that PLA arms management was not 
enough--extortion and intimidation by Maoist militia and the 
reassertion of a GON security presence in the countryside had 
to be addressed in the peace settlement.  MK Nepal felt the 
GON and Maoists were moving towards a settlement and that 
both a third People's Movement and an armed Maoist uprising 
were unlikely. 
 
MK Nepal and Deuba Briefed on USG Views 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In separate meetings with CPN-UML General Secretary 
MK Nepal and NC-D President Deuba, the Ambassador emphasized 
that U.S. senior policymakers had stressed in his meetings in 
Washington October 11 - 14 that Maoist separation from arms 
was a necessary first step for Maoist participation in 
government. Absent effective management of arms, the USG 
feared the Maoists could take over the government from within 
or intimidate voters in the lead up to constituent assembly 
elections.  He also referred to the grave concerns he had 
heard, including at U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, regarding 
continuing Maoist violations of the Ceasefire Code of Conduct. 
 
MK Nepal and Deuba Say Armed Maoist Uprising Unlikely 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  MK Nepal and Deuba expressed doubts regarding the 
potential for an armed uprising by the Maoists.  Because of 
insufficient military strength and lack of support from the 
Nepali population, MK Nepal said the Maoists would be 
"foolish" or even "suicidal" to make an armed move to take 
over power.  He also discounted the potential for a third 
People's Movement, unless the Maoists were able to convince 
other political parties to join their cause.  Instead, he 
feared, the Maoists would continue their intimidation tactics 
in the countryside.  Deuba said that a delay in the peace 
process would only hurt Maoists and that he had advised the 
Prime Minister to take his time with peace talks. The 
Ambassador agreed that the longer the peace talks continued, 
the more difficult it would be for the Maoists to leave the 
negotiation table, attempt a violent confrontation, or 
convince Maoist cadre to return to the jungle without losing 
face and splintering Maoist ranks.  Deuba noted that civil 
society had already toned down its pro-Maoist tendencies. 
 
MK Nepal on Arms Management:  A Phased Strategy Prior to 
Elections 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (C)  MK Nepal described a phased arms management process 
in which combatants from the People's Liberation Army would: 
1) be confined to barracks; 2) be subject to a verification 
and registration process; and 3) be separated from their 
arms.  MK Nepal was clear that these steps had to be taken 
before the constituent assembly elections slated tentatively 
for spring 2007.  The Ambassador re-emphasized that under 
such a scenario, it would be important to ensure that Maoists 
were not let into the government with easy access to arms. 
In contrast to MK Nepal's election deadline, Deuba maintained 
his position that Maoists had to separate from arms before 
joining an interim government. Deuba also noted that the new 
Foreign Minister in India, Pranab Mukherjee, was "very 
anti-Maoist" and that his insistence on arms separation 
helped strengthen the GON position.  MK Nepal went on to 
describe the need to anticipate longer term reintegration 
options for combatants, including whether Maoists were 
integrated into the security forces or reintegrated into 
communities with the opportunity for training and income 
generation.  He also stressed the importance of changing the 
mindset of the combatants from that of fighters. Maoists had 
a "tradition" or a "habit," he said, of overcoming 
adversaries with arms. 
 
¶5.  (C)  MK Nepal mentioned the ongoing discussions regarding 
who would "hold the key" to weapons and ammunition caches in 
an arms management effort, including the possibility that 
Prachanda would be the sole key holder and/or that the UN 
would control video cameras and other monitoring devices. 
The Ambassador highlighted to MK Nepal and Deuba the danger 
of a "one-key policy," noting the population would not be 
reassured if the Maoists were able to claim that they still 
had unimpeded access to their weapons.  He raised the 
possibility of dual or multiple key-holders, including a 
neutral party such as the UN.  The Ambassador stressed the 
symbolic importance of Prachanda not retaining sole access to 
Maoist arms and the confidence that could be built by having 
neutral observers playing a central role. 
 
The Real Concern is Militias 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  While assuming the PLA would be confined to 
UN-monitored barracks and begin an arms management process, 
both MK Nepal and Deuba expressed real concern over the lack 
of a plan to address Maoist militias operating in the 
countryside.  MK Nepal expressed incredulity at the 
"billions" of Nepali rupees (NRS) the Maoist militia were 
extorting, describing the NRS 50,000 to 60,000 he believed 
the Maoists could draw in one day from illegal highway 
checkpoints, not to mention the amounts collected at customs 
posts they had seized. (Note: 1 billion NRS is approximately 
13.5 million U.S. dollars)  MK Nepal stressed the militia 
dilemma: if they were not given alternate income generation 
opportunities, they would continue their extortion and 
intimidation tactics. Deuba also noted that unless the 
militias were separated from their arms, the rural 
population's fear would persist.  MK Nepal emphasized that 
without changing the mindset of Maoist militia, even if they 
were subject to an arms management process, they would find 
other ways to obtain additional arms.  He noted Nepal's 
porous borders. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  In the face of Maoist criminality in the 
countryside, MK Nepal highlighted the paralysis of GON 
security forces, particularly the police. He noted the 
massive Maoist violations of the Ceasefire Code of Conduct 
that had gone unchallenged by the GON, saying the state had 
"kept its eyes closed." He emphasized the importance of the 
GON reasserting control in the countryside, and countering 
Maoist militia and any parallel Maoist security and 
governance structures, as central to guaranteeing free and 
fair elections.  The Ambassador acknowledged the 
deterioration of law and order and upsurge of fear in the 
countryside.  While acknowledging the need to address the 
Maoist militia, he again raised the symbolic importance of 
the PLA separating from their weapons, demonstrating that the 
Maoists were serious about transforming into mainstream 
political players.  He also described his understanding of 
the power that the militia obtained from the presence of an 
armed PLA, intimidating local populations with the threat 
that they were backed by "hundreds of fighters in the hills." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  MK Nepal and Deuba appear convinced that a third 
people's movement or a violent Maoist uprising is 
increasingly unlikely at this phase in the negotiation 
process.  The negotiation process offers the Maoists their 
best chance for gaining power, with the key being what kind 
of arms management deal (if any) they can convince the GON to 
accept.  The devil will likely be in the details and 
sequencing of a complex arms management process:  Who will 
hold the key to arms caches? Will the vetting/verification 
and arms separation process occur before the Maoists enter 
the government or before the constituent elections? MK Nepal 
seems to be taking a softer line on the timeframe for arms 
separation than Deuba, reflecting the views of a strong 
CPN-UML faction which is more sympathetic to the Maoists. 
The Maoist militias, who are currently outside the arms 
management process but perpetrators of the majority of 
ongoing extortion and intimidation, remain a key issue. 
Options for reasserting GON presence and dealing with the 
Maoist militia outside Kathmandu Valley demand more attention 
and will be central to the achievement of free and fair 
elections. 
MORIARTY