VZCZCXRO5847
PP RUEHHM
DE RUEHHM #1246/01 3050500
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010500Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1696
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 1190
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 0009
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1785

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 001246 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP, DRL, DRL/IRF, PRM, L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PINR SOCI PREL KIRF PGOV PREF VM
SUBJECT: ADJUDICATING ETHNIC MINORITY PRIORITY-ONE REFUGEE CASES 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General Seth Winnick for reasons 1.5 b/d. 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraphs 11, 12 
and  13. 
 
¶2. (C) Over the past few months, the Mission P-1 Committee has 
been working to develop information on a potential political 
refugee (P-1 visa) case involving an ethnic minority individual 
from the Central Highlands province of Dak Nong.  The individual 
in question, Y Than, in his early 20s, is the son of the Chief 
Pastor of the GVN-recognized Southern Evangelical Church of 
Vietnam (SECV) in the province.  In mid-July, Y Than and his 
mother -- a deacon in the SECV -- contacted us to complain of a 
sharp increase in police harassment.  Y Than, who headed the 
SECV youth wing in the province, was being summoned by police 
for multiple interrogation sessions, some lasting a few days. 
Three friends, also reportedly affiliated with the SECV were 
detained.  The four men were being interrogated about suspected 
links to ethnic minority separatist groups.  Police informed Y 
Than's parents that they believed he had violated Vietnamese law 
by communicating with ethnic minority activists living in the 
United States and by using money received via wire transfer from 
the U.S. to fund anti-government activities. 
 
¶3. (C) Mother and son denied any involvement with separatist 
groups.  They said that Y Than shuttled ethnic minority 
individuals from the Central Highlands to HCMC for medical 
treatment and helped ethnic minority families with relatives in 
the U.S. to collect remittances.  These families were too 
uneducated or too scared to collect funds on their own, Y Than 
said.  (Comment:  We have interviewed dozens of other ethnic 
minority families with relatives in the United States in private 
in HCMC as they apply for family reunification under the 
VISAS-93 program.  Many of these individuals are marginally 
educated at best, but very few have reported any problems in 
securing their remittances on their own.  End Comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) Y Than was remanded to his parents' custody, but is 
periodically called in for questioning.  He noted that his 
father's prominent position in the church has kept him out of 
jail thus far.  However, police scrutiny was so intense that, in 
effect, he was under house arrest and had to discontinue his 
church activities. 
 
¶5. (C) Y Than explained that his troubles with the Vietnamese 
government began in June 2001 when he crossed into Cambodia to 
seek resettlement in the United States "at the behest of 
friends."  An uncle separately also had crossed to Cambodia 
earlier in the year and was in a refugee camp.  Y Than said he 
did not participate in anti-Government protests in February 2001 
or in April 2004 organized by separatist organizations, 
maintaining that there were no such demonstrations in the area. 
 
¶6. (C) Y Than said that his uncle was resettled in the United 
States.  However, Y Than decided to return in March 2002, after 
appears from the GVN and his family.  He claimed that he feared 
that, if he did not return, the government would retaliate 
against his family.  His family received assurances that he 
would not face police pressure after his return.  After two 
months, police required him to submit detailed reports of his 
activities to the local government every three months and to the 
provincial government every year.  However, until mid-2006, 
there was no additional police pressure and the family noted 
that conditions for the Protestant church in the province are 
gradually improving. 
 
¶7. (C) Y Than noted that in mid-2006, he had spoken via cell 
phone with his uncle in Greensboro, North Carolina.  He denied 
that his uncle was a member of any organization that supported 
ethnic minority separatism inside Vietnam.  He said he briefed 
his uncle about religious freedom restrictions, disputes over 
land between ethnic minorities and ethnic Vietnamese migrants in 
the Central highlands and on whether the provincial government 
was providing land to ethnic minorities in accordance with GVN 
policy. 
 
COMPLICATIONS AND HOLES IN THE STORY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Based on Y Than's statement and our general knowledge of 
conditions in the Central highlands we filed a P-1 nomination on 
Y Than's behalf.  However, as we pursued the case, 
inconsistencies and questions emerged.  For example, Y Than's 
father and national representatives of the SECV baulked at 
raising Y Than's problems with police with more senior GVN 
officials.  (Comment:  The refusal of the SECV national board to 
involve itself in the case is significant.  In other cases, the 
national board has intervened with provincial and central 
government officials to resolve religious freedom incidents 
involving ethnic minorities elsewhere in southern Vietnam.  SECV 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001246  002 OF 002 
 
 
pastors have told us that some of their officials, especially in 
Dak Lak and Dak Nong provinces were involved the separatist 
movement in the past, complicating their ability to legalize the 
status of some congregations in the Central Highlands.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶9. (C) Additionally, one of our most reliable contacts in the 
Central Highlands and a senior member of the SECV, told us that 
Y Than's family told him privately that their son was involved 
with a separatist cell in the province.  His parents tried to 
discourage his participation, but to no avail.  Our contact said 
that he did not know the specifics of the activities of the 
group with which Y Than was involved. 
 
A Wide Range of Possible Activities 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Speaking to us in general about the activities of the 
separatist groups, Vietnamese government officials say that 
these groups have organized protests and sought to invite 
violence -- sometimes using knives, dynamite and homemade 
weapons -- to try and destabilize the Central Highlands and 
invite international intervention.  Activists reportedly 
clandestinely distributed maps of the Central Highlands 
delineating the area of an ethnic minority state.  According to 
the government, some activist organizations use symbols closely 
resembling the flag of "FULRO," which conducted an armed 
insurgency against the GVN in the Central Highlands until 1992. 
Government officials also allege that separatist operatives 
spread the word that "GVN collaborators" in the ethnic minority 
community will "lose their land and be kicked of the Central 
Highlands" along with the ethnic Vietnamese.  Such operatives 
have threatened village elders and church leaders who did not 
support the separatist movement reportedly.  The government also 
alleges that some ethnic minority advocacy groups in the U.S. 
divert donations for development to fund anti-GVN activities. 
The GVN has not shown us any physical evidence to support its 
claims, although it is clear that GVN intelligence and police 
heavily target the separatist movement.  (Note: The GVN does not 
differentiate between peaceful political activism -- organizing 
peaceful protests to demand ethnic minority rights -- and what 
we would view as proscribed activities, such as inviting 
violence. End Note.) 
 
¶11. (C) Action Request:  In other P-1 cases that the Mission P-1 
Committee has adjudicated -- principally involving political and 
religious freedom activists -- we looked at two basic criteria: 
 
-- Whether the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution 
in Vietnam, and, 
 
-- Whether the activities of the individual were permissible in 
the United States, for example, engaging in activities that 
would be considered protected speech. 
 
¶12. (C) Y Than undoubtedly has a well-founded fear of 
prosecution, if not persecution, should he remain in Vietnam. 
However, it is not clear to us whether Y Than's activates would 
be proscribed in the United States.  Our sense is that Y Than 
likely was involved in political activities that sought to 
promote a sense of ethnic minority exlusivism and the creation 
on an independent ethnic minority state.  Such activities could 
promote tension and violence inside Vietnam, and run contrary to 
USG policy upholding the territorial integrity of Vietnam.  His 
activities may have gone further than that.  However, it is 
unlikely that we will ever be able to document Y Than's precise 
actions. 
 
¶13. (C) A further area of uncertainty is the applicability of 
the Lautenberg Amendment to this case and other possible cases 
involving the estimated 1.1 million ethnic minority individuals 
(sometimes referred to as "Montagnards") from the Central 
Highlands.  Does Y Than fall under the scope of the Lautenberg 
Amendment -- although neither he, nor his family have any 
apparent Vietnam War-era association with U.S. force?   If so, 
then what are the implications for P-1 Committee deliberations 
on the merits of his case?  Mission P-1 Committee requests 
Department's legal and policy guidance on the case of Y Than, 
which would then serve as a guide for evaluating cases involving 
WINNICK