VZCZCXRO6597
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHCP #1555 3261138
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221138Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3003
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0194

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 001555 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL EUN TU CY DA
SUBJECT: DANES WANT TO AVOID "TRAIN WRECK" ON TURKISH EU 
ACCESSION 
 
REF: STATE 189542 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Bill Mozdzierz, reasons 1.4b,d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Denmark agrees that the current row over 
Turkish relations with Cyprus should not be allowed to result 
in Turkey's exclusion from the EU accession process, Danish 
MFA Director for EU Enlargement Lars Bo Moller declared to us 
November 22, even as the Danish government maintains that 
Turkey must bear some consequences for its failure to live up 
to its obligations to the EU.  Moller was skeptical about the 
prospects for a negotiated solution in advance of the 
December 14-15 European Council meeting, but indicated that 
Denmark will work within the EU for a moderated response. 
Danish officials continue to engage the parties in support of 
the Finnish EU presidency's efforts, Moller reported, 
observing that Greece seems to recognize the importance of 
keeping Turkey in the accession process, and might even prove 
helpful in restraining Nicosia.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Like most EU member states, Moller explained, Denmark 
wants to prevent the Turkey issue from dominating the 
European Council meeting, where a more politicized approach 
is all but certain.  Unfortunately, he noted, the prospects 
are not great for the Finns to succeed in the next few weeks 
where so many others have failed.  Moller observed that both 
the Turks and the Cypriots have drawn red lines on the same 
issue (Varosha), apparently precluding any agreement.  Some 
compromise on opening ports may yet be possible, he allowed, 
and certainly the Danes have been encouraging the parties to 
seize these remaining opportunities (most recently during 
last week's meeting here between FM Per Stig Moller and 
Turkish EU negotiator Ali Babacan), but it now appears 
increasingly likely that the EU will have to decide on its 
response to Turkish noncompliance. 
 
¶3. (C) Moller suggested that the debate in the EU will center 
on the number of acquis chapters to suspend, with member 
state preferences running from the UK's three (the ones most 
closely related to customs union) to perhaps all 35 in the 
case of Cyprus.  Many countries, Moller said, such as Germany 
and Denmark, will be somewhere closer to the British 
position, favoring suspension of a few additional chapters 
but not so many as to force the Turks to conclude that the 
overall process is in jeopardy.  Moller indicated that his 
government's conversations with the Cypriots suggest that 
they understand the danger of provoking Ankara on one level, 
but find the temptation to overplay the EU card simply too 
strong to resist.  Athens is more realistic, he remarked, 
maintaining that the Greek government recognizes its 
strategic interest in keeping Turkey engaged in the accession 
process; Moller suggested that the Greeks may make the 
difference in persuading Cyprus not to press this issue to 
its limits. 
 
¶4. (C) Danish officials are also keen to avoid a situation in 
which Turkish PM Erdogan sits "fuming" in Ankara while EU 
summit participants deliberate, Moller said, remarking that 
the Turks might make matters worse by suggesting that Turkey 
can do without the EU.  Erdogan may even see some political 
advantage in withdrawing from the process, Moller feared. 
 
¶5. (C) Moller emphasized that Denmark will do what it can to 
help moderate the EU's approach, maintaining that the Danish 
government supports Turkey's accession despite many concerns 
and the unpopularity of that position.  It is in everyone's 
interest to ensure that this situation not degenerate into a 
"train wreck," he said.  It is imperative, however, that 
Turkey meet its obligations and demonstrate its readiness for 
membership, Moller argued; likewise, the EU must show that it 
will not accept sustained failure to adhere to the rules. 
CAIN