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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1454

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001812 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PREF MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: LTTE DEBRIEFS CO-CHAIRS; GOVERNMENT 
TELLS LTTE TO CEASE HOSTILITIES BEFORE JAFFNA HIGHWAY WILL 
OPEN; GROUND FIRE AND AIR STRIKES CONTINUE 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1802 
     ¶B. COLOMBO 1792 
 
Classified By: DCM James R. Moore for reasons 1.4(b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
delegation gave a post-mortem on the Geneva talks to Co-Chair 
Ambassadors minus the U.S. this morning, November 1. 
Political Wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan claimed the Government 
of Sri Lanka (GSL) had not heeded the LTTE's "humanitarian" 
demand to open the A9 highway through to the Jaffna peninsula 
and was not prepared to discuss a substantive way forward. In 
public statements October 31, GSL Geneva delegation leader 
Nimal de Silva suggested the A9 could be opened if the LTTE 
ceased hostilities, while Defense spokesman Keheliya 
Rambukwela called on the Tigers to allow ICRC ships to carry 
food and supplies to Jaffna.  Meanwhile, Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL) security forces and the LTTE exchanged mortar and 
artillery fire at a Forward Defense Line in Trincomalee 
district and the Sri Lanka Air Force conducted raids over the 
Tiger-controlled "Vanni" to neutralize artillery positions. 
End Summary. 
 
Tigers Express Disappointment in GSL to Co-Chairs 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) The Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE gave a 
post-mortem on the Geneva talks to Co-Chair Ambassadors minus 
the U.S. this morning, November 1.  The Co-Chairs met the 
Tiger delegation at an airport hotel in Colombo on arrival 
from Geneva.  Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar accompanied them 
by helicopter to Kilinochchi later in the day.  The German 
Ambassador gave DCM a readout after the meeting. 
 
¶3. (C) Tamilselvan reported that after the opening session in 
Geneva on October 28, when the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) 
delegation indicated they wanted to discuss core political 
issues, the LTTE team phoned Prabhakaran to ask if they had 
such a mandate.  Prabhakaran agreed, but rather than 
encompassing core issues, the talks got bogged down on the 
issue of the A9 highway connecting the Jaffna peninsula and 
the LTTE-controlled Vanni to the south.  Tamilselvan 
maintained that the humanitarian situation associated with 
the closing of the A9 was a core issue for the LTTE. 
 
¶4. (C) The GSL, however, was adamant that it was not prepared 
during the Geneva session to discuss the opening of the A9. 
The LTTE delegation expressed to Co-Chairs their 
disappointment that the GSL, in their view, was driven by a 
military agenda at the talks.  The LTTE team told the 
Co-Chairs that they now expect a major offensive by the Sri 
Lanka Army at the Muhamalai Forward Defense Line (FDL) in 
Jaffna. 
 
¶5. (C) The LTTE also criticized to the Co-Chairs the GSL for 
allegedly showing one face to the international community - 
its pursuit of peace and interest in a political solution - 
without discussing seriously those objectives in Geneva. 
Tamilselvan argued that the GSL was not prepared to discuss a 
political solution, and that the GSL's opening statement had 
been little more than a recitation of LTTE ceasefire 
violations rather than a way forward. 
 
¶6. (C) The LTTE delegation told Co-Chair Ambassadors that 
they were not opposed to the continuation of talks, but 
acknowledged that a new date had not been set.  The Co-Chairs 
questioned the contradiction of this stance, noting that the 
Tigers say they want talks, but insist on the re-opening of 
the A9 as a prerequisite.  Tamilselvan was not forthcoming in 
his response to this question, claiming the LTTE leadership 
would have to "reflect" on this point. 
 
¶7. (C) The Co-Chairs brought two principal messages to the 
 
COLOMBO 00001812  002 OF 002 
 
 
Tigers in today's meeting.  First, the Tigers must show 
maximum restraint and adhere to the Ceasefire Agreement 
(CFA).  Second, any serious escalation of the conflict could 
prevent the Co-Chairs from performing a useful role. 
 
Government Keeps Up Pressure on the LTTE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In October 31 statements to the media, Geneva 
delegation leader Health Minister Nimal de Silva suggested 
the A9 could be opened if the LTTE ceased hostilities. 
Defense spokesman Keheliya Rambukwela, on the other hand, 
said the A9 would remain closed for the time being and 
questioned the LTTE's sincerity on humanitarian issues, 
calling on the Tigers to allow ICRC ships to carry food and 
supplies to Jaffna.  In a November 1 conversation with 
poloff, United National Party (UNP) advisor Dinesh Weerakoody 
said he thought that while the GSL Peace Secretariat might 
wish to consider reopening the land route to Jaffna, the 
defense establishment would not allow it. 
 
 
Military Engagement As Usual 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Meanwhile on November 1, a military spokesperson 
confirmed to POL FSN that GSL security forces and the LTTE 
exchanged mortar and artillery fire at a Forward Defense Line 
in Trincomalee district and the Sri Lanka Air Force conducted 
raids over the Tiger-controlled "Vanni" to neutralize 
artillery positions. 
 
Toward Consensus or Polarization? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Comment:  The Norwegians have cautioned the 
international community not to see the Geneva talks as a 
complete failure, despite the lack of flexibility of the GSL 
and the LTTE on the A9 issue.  We and other Co-Chairs see the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) as a 
possible way forward.  Eighty percent of the "southern" 
Sinhalese polity support the two parties combined.  Such a 
large bloc committed to a negotiated settlement could provide 
a strong mandate for peace to the GSL.  However, such an 
alliance could also polarize the south, leading the hardline 
defense establishment to react by pursuing a more aggressive 
military campaign against the LTTE.  End comment. 
 
BLAKE