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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 003507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ DIRTY TRICKS, THE ROSALES "BUBBLE," AND THE 
POTENTIAL FOR ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE 
 
CARACAS 00003507  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES, 
REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Apart from a few rock-throwing attacks by 
Chavistas, the Rosales and Chavez campaigns have to date 
largely stayed away from each other.  However, the December 3 
presidential election will inevitably put ardent activists of 
both camps in close proximity.  Both the Chavez and Rosales 
campaigns are predicting victory and urging their voters to 
gather outside polling stations around closing time on 
December 3, despite a government decree that prohibits public 
gatherings that day.  A sizable Chavez victory, such as a 
10-20 point win as predicted in recent polling, is more 
likely to pop the prevailing "bubble" of optimism in the 
Rosales camp, than it is likely to spark violence.  But the 
closer the margin of victory for either side the greater risk 
that there could be some election-related violence.  This is 
particularly true if the government commits widespread 
electoral fraud to win or to increase its margin of victory. 
Moreover, there remains a real risk that the Chavez 
government could create scattered election day incidents or 
overreact to any opposition claims of election day fraud. 
Embassy has taken appropriate steps for the contingency of 
election-related violence.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Pre-Election Shadow Boxing 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) President Chavez' supporters have been responsible for 
election campaign violence to date.  On several occasions, 
opposition candidate Manuel Rosales' campaign entourage has 
been pelted with rocks and bottles by Chavistas at campaign 
stops.  After such incidents in early September, President 
Chavez suggested that Rosales was "provoking" electoral 
violence by trying to campaign in traditional Chavez 
strongholds.  Rosales supporters allege that the November 19 
shooting of a Merida state Rosales campaign official was 
politically motivated.  Ironically, Chavez and other BRV 
officials continue to warn, without substantiation, of 
U.S.-backed opposition plans to declare fraud and launch a 
"destabilizing" demonstration campaign in Venezuela.  These 
government warnings may be convenient cover to lay future 
blame on the opposition for the government's own plans to 
create election day incidents or part of a broader electoral 
strategy to intimidate Rosales voters into staying home on 
December 3. 
 
¶3. (C) The Rosales camp urged its supporters some weeks ago 
to "defend the vote" by gathering outside polling stations 
before the 4:00 p.m. official closing time.  While Rosales' 
advisors acknowledge that the campaign will not be able to 
generate crowds outside all of the over 11,000 polling 
stations, they still hope that, at the polling stations where 
they can mobilize groups, local officials will feel compelled 
to comply scrupulously with poll closing, reporting, and 
auditing procedures.  The Ministry of Interior and Justice 
(MIJ) issued on November 25 a resolution prohibiting during 
December 2-3 all public meetings and demonstrations that 
might affect the electoral process. 
 
¶4. (C) The resolution claimed the prohibition was to maintain 
order.  The opposition has interpreted this as an effort to 
inhibit pro-Rosales groups, as well as evidence of 
nervousness in the Chavez camp.  Rosales campaign advisers 
tell us that they still plan to mobilize their supporters 
outside polling stations in Rosales-friendly neighborhoods on 
December 3.  Moreover, compounding the prospect for election 
day clashes, the Chavez campaign is also now encouraging its 
supporters to gather outside polling stations.  In addition, 
Chavez has urged his supporters to rally in front of the 
Miraflores presidential mansion at 8:00 p.m. on December 3. 
 
---------------------- 
Election Day Scenarios 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Buoyed by the impressive turn-out at Rosales' November 
25 Caracas rally and other well-attended rallies in numerous 
states, many Rosales supporters, including at least some top 
aides, appear convinced that Rosales will win on December 3. 
Rosales has carefully tried to project himself to potential 
voters as the underdog who has enough political momentum to 
pull off an upset on December 3.  At the same time, his close 
advisers tell us that Rosales is prepared to publicly accept 
an electoral defeat so long as the Rosales camp believes that 
 
CARACAS 00003507  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the National Electoral Council's (CNE's) official tally truly 
reflects the voting results on December 3.  The campaign is 
mounting an extensive effort to deter and detect electoral 
fraud, including contracting exit polls, conducting a quick 
count, and collecting 100 percent of the polling place 
"actas" to make an independent tally.  It is still unclear, 
however, whether the campaign has both the personnel and 
technical resources to do a credible job (septel). 
 
¶6. (C) Should Rosales' advisors conclude that Chavez won by 
10-20 percentage points, as predicted by a number of 
pre-election polls, at this point there is little prospect 
that Rosales would urge his people on to the streets, as 
Chavez continues to allege.  Rosales' senior advisor Angel 
Emiro Vera told the DCM November 30 that Rosales is prepared 
to recognize a "clean" defeat.  On the other hand, Vera told 
the DCM November 30 that if Rosales wins by a "single vote," 
the campaign will "not permit" the CNE to "fix" a Chavez 
electoral victory.  Vera said the campaign will mobilize 
supporters at centers where no conflict is expected as a 
means to motivate activists to come out on the streets more 
broadly.  Rosales' close advisors frequently note that 
Rosales stood up to government fraud before to secure his 
re-election as governor of Zulia in 2004 and stress that 
people from Maracaibo ("maracuchos") do not back down. 
 
¶7. (C) Rosales' top advisor Omar Barboza told "El Universal" 
recently that this call does not refer to "violence," but 
rather is designed to put "people in the street" and ask the 
"Armed Forces to comply with their responsibility" with 
respect to safeguarding the voting process.  MAS Secretary 
General Leopoldo Puchi told poloff recently that there is a 
lingering internal dispute within the Rosales camp as to 
whether to accept the CNE's official results.  Puchi noted 
that there are a minority of "ultra-right" opposition 
activists who are arguing that Rosales should mobilize 
supporters in the event the election turns out to be close. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Opposition activists frequently tell us that they will 
not "repeat the mistake" of the 2004 presidential recall 
referendum, when many opposition activists suspected fraud, 
but tamely accepted the results  -- which they now believe to 
have been fraudulent -- and did not mobilize demonstrations 
immediately after the CNE announced the official result.  The 
sense among many Rosales activists that this may be their 
last chance to unseat Chavez appears to make many of them 
even more prepared to be confrontational.  There is a 
possibility that some determined opposition activists will 
launch some street protests in the wake of a Chavez victory 
as a result of both their deep mistrust of the CNE and their 
profound frustration with the authoritarian Chavez government. 
 
------------------- 
Chavez Dirty Tricks 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Chavez government has a track record of concocting 
"plots" immediately before national elections as a way of 
trying to discredit the opposition.  In the run-up to the 
2004 recall referendum, the BRV arrested over 30 Colombians 
in Caracas and alleged that they were paramilitaries 
contracted to participate in a coup attempt.  Prior to the 
December 2005 parliamentary elections, the Armed Forces 
detained 11 people in the state of Zulia for allegedly 
preparing homemade incendiary devises and security forces 
responded to an alleged explosive device discovered in a 
major Caracas plaza.  In addition, an oil pipeline running 
between the states of Zulia and Lara was hit by two 
explosions (but were put out almost immediately) and a third 
explosive device was discovered (but was found remarkably 
quickly in the night and detonated).  In the run-up to 
December 3, the armed forces have occupied parastatal 
enterprises along the coast, purportedly to prevent "attacks 
and sabotage." 
 
¶10. (C) Chavez may also spur election day violence to 
discourage opposition voter turn-out.  Noted media 
commentator Jose Toro Hardy told DCM November 29 that there 
are rumors that 1500 members of the Francisco Miranda Front, 
a hard-core BRV-backed Chavista civilian vanguard, are armed 
and are planning to cause election-related disturbances. 
Toro Hardy could not confirm the veracity of the rumors. 
Chavez also enjoys the support of numerous radical groups, 
such as the Tupamaros or Lina Ron's Popular Union of 
Venezuela (UPV), who regularly "patrol" the heart of downtown 
 
CARACAS 00003507  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Caracas.  They have made the areas around the National 
Assembly and Miraflores, the president mansion unofficial 
"Chavez territory" and presumably stand ready to mix it up 
with any opposition demonstrations. 
 
¶11. (C) There is also a possibility that the Chavez 
government, particularly if it needs to cover its tracks in 
the wake of electoral fraud, could overreact in an effort to 
smother opposition protests before they spread.  Chavez has 
explicitly threatened independent media with shutdowns and 
arrests if they broadcast any projected electoral results 
before the CNE reports its official results.  Some pro-Chavez 
leaders have even called on Chavistas to occupy media outlets 
that transmit such information.  Chavez also reiterated at 
his November 26 mass rally in Caracas that his supporters 
need to be prepared to "do battle on two fronts" -- getting 
out the vote and, as necessary, confronting the opposition on 
the streets. 
 
--------------- 
Embassy Actions 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (C) While we have no information that leads us to believe 
that the government or opposition is planning specific acts 
of violence, Embassy is taking reasonable precautions given 
the highly polarized state of politics and recent history of 
confrontations between the Chavez government and the 
opposition.  Embassy has: 
--- urged all sides to avoid election violence and to respect 
the democratic process; 
--- pressed international observers to be more proactive in 
seeking improvements in electoral conditions, including the 
elimination of fingerprinting (digital scanning) machines; 
--- issued a warden notice related to the upcoming election 
to advise Americans to take sensible precautions related to 
the upcoming elections; 
--- requested and received additional protection for the 
embassy; 
--- provided additional training for local guard force 
personnel; 
--- conducted weekly radio checks among the embassy community; 
--- will hold an EAC on December 1; and, 
--- will have staff in the Front Office, POL, PAS, RSO, and 
ORA on December 3. 
 
¶13. (C) In addition, the pairs of embassy personnel who 
participate in post's informal electoral observation in 
Caracas and eight states  all received appropriate training 
and briefings and will be in regular phone contact with an 
Embassy election control center on election day.  RSO vetted 
all polling stations to be visited, and all embassy observers 
for areas outside of Caracas have been provided a local 
police contact name and telephone number. 
 
BROWNFIELD