VZCZCXRO0805
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHCN
DE RUEHCI #0509/01 3101554
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061554Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1120
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0440
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 0442
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0273
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0273
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0185
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0035
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0210
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM JECG HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1542

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC MARR PTER PHUM IN
SUBJECT: DEADLY BOMB ATTACKS IN ASSAM KILL 12 PEOPLE AND INJURE 50 
 
REF: CALCUTTA 0481 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Following Assam's bloodiest month of 
insurgent violence this year, November began with one of Assam's 
deadliest bombings in recent years.  On November 5, two bomb 
explosions in Assam's capital Guwahati killed 12 people and 
injured at least 50 others.  GOI and state law enforcement 
officials blamed the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) for 
the attacks and have met to discuss the deteriorating security 
situation in the Northeast.  Security officials are increasingly 
concerned that they are unable to contain the violence and blame 
political interference for restraining anti-insurgency activity. 
 The increasing frequency of ULFA's attacks, the deadliness of 
the latest explosions and the targeting of Assam's capital are 
all strong indications that ULFA is escalating its activities 
and shifting its focus from targets in more remote areas to key 
urban centers to demonstrate its strength.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On November 5, two bomb explosions in Assam's state 
capital, Guwahati, killed 12 people.  One bomb detonated in the 
crowded Fancy Bazaar market and the other at Noonmatai, near an 
oil refinery.  More than 50 people were injured by the 
explosions.  Assam Police Intelligence Chief Kagan Sharma told 
post that there was no doubt that the United Liberation Front of 
Asom (ULFA) committed the attacks.  Sharma observed that ULFA 
has been gradually intensifying its operations over the past two 
weeks and he believed that the initial overtures for talks 
earlier this year were just a ploy to enable the outfit to 
reorganize and rearm.  The district deputy commissioner in 
Guwahati said that the blast at Fancy Bazaar may have targeted 
the Hindi-speaking community, which dominates that area, a 
community perceived as outsiders by the ethnic Assamese ULFA. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (U) October was the bloodiest month in Assam so far this 
year, with 31 civilian deaths due to insurgent violence.  Other 
peak months were:  February (12), June (24), July (10), August 
(20); with only single-digit casualties in January (8), March 
(3), April (7), May (2) and September (7). 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) While Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi told the press 
that initial reports suggested that the blast was the handiwork 
of ULFA, Assam Chief Secretary S. Kabilan said the blasts could 
be by ULFA or possibly some Muslim Jihadi groups.  Most 
observers do not share Kabilan's view of possible Jihadi 
involvement.  Assam's Unified Command, which includes all of the 
state law enforcement and military forces present in the state, 
met on November 6 to coordinate an action plan to respond to the 
escalating violence in Assam. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U) The peace initiative that began in September 2005 
between ULFA's representative People's Consultative Group (PCG) 
and the GOI derailed in late September 2006 for several reasons: 
 ULFA refused to name its team of negotiators and stuck to its 
demand for release of five of its detained leaders, while the 
GOI insisted on written assurance from ULFA that it would commit 
to peace talks.  After three rounds of GOI-PCG talks, Delhi 
announced a unilateral ceasefire on August 13, but the 
suspension of security operations was revoked September 24, 
following reports of ULFA's intensified extortion, attacks on 
police patrols and the killing of a tea planter. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The almost equal number of militant and the security 
casualties this year have forced GOI officials to assess whether 
the militants are possibly gaining an upper hand.  For the last 
decade the security forces have always suffered significantly 
fewer fatalities than ULFA.  Security sources in Assam cite the 
reduction of operations against ULFA as the reason for ULFA's 
return to violence, saying, "It is the restraint forced on the 
security forces by the political establishment that is behind 
 
CALCUTTA 00000509  002 OF 002 
 
 
the trend."  State Congress Party officials had asked the 
central government to limit anti-insurgency activity in the 
run-up to state assembly elections in May this year, in an 
effort to garner votes from Assamese sympathetic to ULFA. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The escalating violence is exacerbating existing 
divisions between GOI military leadership and politicians on the 
best approach to dealing with ULFA.  The Army was opposed to 
peace talks, convinced that ULFA was just using the lull in 
fighting to reorganize.  Many law enforcement officials are also 
unhappy about the perceived failure of the "political" solution. 
 An Inspector General of Assam Police told post that the 
situation is very grim and that the government's "soft approach" 
has contributed to the rise in violence. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment:  ULFA is increasing its insurgent activities 
in the Northeast and security forces seem unable to stem the 
violence.  The large number of casualties from the latest bomb 
attacks and the fact that the attacks occured in the state 
capital are strong signs that ULFA is stronger and more 
emboldened after the recent ceasefire.  Growing press coverage 
of attacks in Assam and the Northeast is forcing the GOI to take 
a closer look at the security situation in a region often 
wracked by violence but out of the general public eye.  However, 
pressure on the security forces to clamp down on ULFA may result 
in an indiscriminate response and human rights violations. 
Indian paramilitary forces, like the Assam Rifles, are notorious 
for their heavy handed approach to insurgents, which has 
contributed to a cycle of greater violence. 
JARDINE