VZCZCXRO8724
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #2236/01 3071157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031157Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0332
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 002236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC - DAMON WILSON AND ADAM 
STERLING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2011 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON HU
SUBJECT: ON THE CONTRARY: FIDESZ OFFERS OPPOSITION WITHOUT 
ALTERNATIVES 
 
REF: BUDAPEST 2229 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Ambassador Foley's November 2 meeting with 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Zsolt Nemeth 
highlights the inability of FIDESZ to match its ideological 
zeal with a detailed policy agenda in the ongoing 
confrontation with the Gyurcsany government. 
 
Divide and Destroy ... 
 
¶2.  (C) After expressing great satisfaction with his recent 
trip to the U.S., particularly his meetings with EUR P/DAS 
Volker and DAS DiCarlo, Nemeth turned to Hungary's domestic 
political situation.  He asserted that "only our side is 
post-communist," and that accordingly the political divide in 
Hungary is "not between conservatives and liberals as it is 
in Poland, but between communists and anti-communists."  He 
commented that the "monolithic" MSZP realizes that the 
present conflict is for the "survival of the communist elite" 
and that FIDESZ's goal must be "the ultimate destruction of 
the communists."  In the near-term, he noted, they would 
continue efforts to divide the MSZP over the issue of 
Gyurcsany's continued leadership. The upcoming referendum 
(septel), he continued, would serve as a public referendum on 
the Gyurcsany government.  He explained that the seventh 
question proposed for the referendum had been designed in 
particular to "hold Gyurcsany accountable for his campaign 
promises" and their impact on the deficit. 
 
¶3.  (C) Ambassador Foley highlighted the economic risks of 
continued political gridlock, underscoring the "mutual 
irresponsibility" of both the government and the opposition 
for their unrealistic campaign promises.  DCM Reeker added 
that the opposition's "disturbing focus on the past" had led 
many to question what FIDESZ stands for.  For example, he 
continued, FIDESZ portrays the MSZP as "communists" but has 
itself maintained that the government should "provide 
everything from the cradle to the grave." 
 
But Don't Define 
 
¶4.  (C) Nemeth suggested that specific policy questions be 
discussed "by experts," responding only that FIDESZ had never 
"consciously misled the public" and had managed the economy 
responsibly during the Orban government.  He charged that 
"Medgessey/Gyurcsany government" was to blame, and drew 
little distinction between the two.  The MSZP government is a 
"media government," focused only on keeping power and lacking 
the political conviction and the public credibility to 
undertake fundamental change.  For its part, FIDESZ would 
support "incentives and investment," though Nemeth stated 
that multi-national corporations should work "as an engine" 
driving the growith of local SME's rather than creating a 
division between rich and poor "like Latin America's dual 
economy."  Ambassador Foley responded that if "working like 
an engine" meant "being taxed to death" then this would 
hardly meet with the private sector's support. 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning briefly to the more familiar territory of 
foreign policy, Nemeth underscored FIDESZ's commitment to 
separating Hungary's international obligations from its own 
political agenda, specifically reiterating his support for 
the "crucial" PRT mission in Afghanistan and for our approach 
on Kosovo status.  In what he admitted was a rare word of 
praise for the PM, he supported Gyurcsany's decision not to 
meet with Slovak PM Fico, noting that "some signal from 
Bratislava" would be a necessary precondition. 
"International relations," he concluded, "will not suffer 
because of our internal issues." 
 
¶6.  (C) Returning to the domestic political scene, Nemeth 
noted FIDESZ's plan to publish a book detailing "horrifying" 
charges of police brutality.  He charged that the police had 
instigated violent incidents and had kept many of their 
"victims" in long-term detention.  He also alleged that the 
police had compelled individuals to sign statements that 
"nothing happened" as a precondition for their release from 
custody.  The government's goal, he concluded, is to portray 
the opposition as criminal and thus alienate the public, 
whatever the risk to Hungarian democracy. 
 
¶7.  (C) Ambassador Foley responded that FIDESZ's 
demonstrations had attracted violent elements whatever the 
party's intentions.  Nemeth flatly maintained that "it was 
all the police" and said that FIDESZ will organize another 
demonstration November 4 in Pest to mark the entry of Soviet 
forces during the 1956 Revolution. 
 
BUDAPEST 00002236  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Every Caricature Tells a Story 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment: FIDESZ's opposition to the Gyurcsany 
government is emotionally deep but often substantively 
shallow.  Even Nemeth, who the party often uses in its 
contacts with the international community, is often more 
visceral than intellectual in his views.  As with many in the 
opposition, he is quick to reduce the present situation to a 
caricature of "communist oligarchs" who "learned at Kadar's 
knee," while seemingly blind to FIDESZ's own mix of populism 
and paternalism.  Though flexible in their tactics, moving 
rapidly from their initial call for a "government of experts" 
to their present insistence that "the majority must change 
its mind," they have been constant in their goal: Gyurcsany's 
removal.  Indeed, the party seems to believe that the 
opposition's role is simply to oppose rather than to offer 
constructive alternatives.  Although the end result of this 
campaign remains to be seen, the immediate result has been to 
wrest the initiative from a government that seemingly remains 
one accusation behind.  End Comment. 
FOLEY