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S E C R E T BOGOTA 010214 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016 
TAGS: PROG PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: ARAUCA AND CATATUMBO: 3 KEYS TO SECURITY 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S)  Security in Arauca department is much improved, with 
no pipeline attacks this year and the population increasingly 
cooperating with the COLMIL.  Three keys to this progress are 
U.S.-funded helicopters for combat air mobility, judicial 
processes against militias relying on out-of-town 
prosecutors, and U.S.-aided intelligence centers.  Despite 
this progress, the ELN and FARC retain military capacity in 
Arauca.  Further down the pipeline in the Catatumbo region 
(N. Santander), the COLAR has generated impressive results 
combating a heavier FARC and ELN threat, but it is at only 
the early stages of replicating the territorial gains 
achieved in Arauca.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ARAUCA: Pipeline and Populace More Secure 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Security in Arauca is much improved.  No attacks have 
occurred this year on the Arauca stretch of the Cano-Limon 
oil pipeline, compared to a peak of 127 in 2001, and 
electrical tower bombings (which also halt production) have 
declined.  Transport is now secure from the mines, attacks, 
road blocks, and extortion tolls that once made highways 
impassable.  About 70 percent of the 18th Brigade's force 
strength is dedicated to holding territory, including a 
specialized battalion for protecting energy installations. 
The 18th Brigade stresses above all that its relations with 
the public have turned around "180 degrees," with contact no 
longer impeded by locals' fear of FARC or ELN reprisal. 
 
------------------------------- 
KEY #1: Air Mobility for Combat 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  Progress against ELN and FARC dates back to 2002. 
The turning point, says Occidental's security chief, came 
when the 18th Brigade "left its garrisons" and went on the 
offensive.  Key to that change, says COL Ricardo Gomez, were 
U.S.-funded helicopters.  Air transport was critical not only 
for quick reaction to intelligence, but also for insertion of 
forces directly on enemy targets, evading ubiquitous militia 
who would have alerted guerrilla fighters to COLAR movements 
overland.  The FARC used to show off its comprehensive 
surveillance in a nightly radio broadcast detailing positions 
of area COLAR units.  The guerrillas now avoid engagement and 
have retreated to remote areas, including across the border 
with Venezuela. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
KEY #2: Militia Arrests and Trials; the EDAs 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  With the guerrillas now lying low, COLMIL emphasis 
has shifted from hard combat against armed fighters in the 
field to 'soft' legal action against militias who are the 
guerrillas' protective 'eyes and ears.'  The COLMIL depends 
on civil law enforcement investigators to gather the evidence 
and issue arrest warrants.  In this process, deserters and 
informant networks are primary sources of information. 
Psyops campaigns over radio and by community outreach 
encourage informants to come forth.  The result is an arrest 
rate that exceeds combat kills (137 vs. 19 in an ongoing 
operation). 
 
¶5. (C)  The judicial war hinges on an innovative new tool of 
the Prosecutor General (Fiscalia), the so-called Support Team 
(Equipo de Apoyo, or EDA).  This is a group of specialized 
anti-terrorist investigators and prosecutors from Bogota, 
rotated into Arauca on temporary duty and housed on the 
military base.  Prior to the EDA's creation in 2002, there 
had been no arrests for terrorist action in Arauca for 20 
years due to pervasive guerrilla influence and intimidation, 
says Occidental's security chief.  In the latter's view, 
"judicialization is the key to winning this war."  Both the 
arrest rate and related decline in attacks are measures of 
the EDA's success.  There are now five EDAs nationally, in 
zones of highest violence.  DoJ aims to support the Fiscalia 
in further expanding the program. 
 
---------------------------- 
KEY #3: Intelligence Centers 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S)  Intelligence is at the heart of both military and 
judicial strategies.  The COLMIL has established intelligence 
centers in three main conflict zones of Arauca, including a 
U.S.-administered joint unit (COLAR, COLAF, COLMAR) assisted 
by a newly arrived U.S. intelligence officer on temporary 
duty.  The intelligence hubs serve three functions: 
 
- information collection on enemy fighter positions, as a 
basis for offensive combat operations; 
 
- collection of profiles of militia members -- including 
photos, documents, and deserter debriefs -- for assembling 
arrest warrant dossiers; and 
 
- a counterterrorism effort to fuel feuding between FARC and 
ELN. 
 
------------------- 
FARC's "War" on ELN 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Despite clear COLMIL gains in Arauca, FARC-ELN 
fighting remains a significant story.  The two terrorist 
groups avoid direct contact with the COLMIL and battle for 
territory, mobility corridors and access to the Venezuela 
border, coca crops, pipeline royalties, and other extortion 
revenues.  Arauca is a traditional ELN stronghold the FARC 
has vowed to take over, issuing an ultimatum in October 2004 
that the ELN be subsumed into the FARC or eliminated; combats 
increased after an ELN leader killed a FARC commander last 
December.  As the weaker of the two, the ELN is reported to 
have sought mediation to end the feud, but the FARC's 
declaration of war is still in effect.  Expanses of 
unpopulated and/or dense terrain offer space for the FARC and 
ELN to hide out and to carry on their feud. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
CATATUMBO: Early Efforts to Confront Guerrilla Dominion 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶8. (C)  Catatumbo provides a striking contrast to Arauca: 
there have been 17 attacks this year on this stage of the 
pipeline and more on electrical towers.  Compared to Arauca's 
flat savannah, Catatumbo's hilly jungle makes repairs 
difficult.  The FARC and ELN still have dominion over much of 
the region.  The COLMIL is only beginning to mobilize: the 
Division headquarters has moved forward into the region to 
drive commanders harder, and 30th Brigade has moved to the 
Venezuela border nearer the locus of attacks.  The Division 
has concentrated offensive elements in the area: a new mobile 
brigade (BRIM) was formed in January, two battalions were 
seconded, and the Division's elite rapid response unit 
(FURED) is deployed.  Aggressive combats supported by a loan 
of Arauca's helicopters yielded 24 FARC kills and 59 captures 
in a recent week. 
 
¶9. (C)  Further steps are needed to replicate in Catatumbo 
the success seen in Arauca.  An application is pending for 
DoD funding for equipment and training.  The 30th Brigade is 
newly vetted, and a U.S. MilGroup planning and assistance 
training team (PATT) has just arrived. Psyops and civil 
affairs programs are not yet well organized, an important 
area where PATT guidance will help.  An EDA has been created 
but is not yet staffed from outside the area, hampering its 
independence.  Above all, the guerrillas are well dispersed 
throughout the vast and heavily forested region, which COLAR 
troops have barely penetrated past the pipeline. 
 
 
DRUCKER