VZCZCXRO3749
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHEK #1643/01 3241239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201239Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8595
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1813
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1381
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0385
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2228
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1611
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, SCA/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ASEC KG
SUBJECT: BATTLE BEGINS OVER NEW KYRGYZ CONSTITUTION 
 
REF: A. BISHKEK 1587 
     ¶B. BISHKEK 1586 
     ¶C. BISHKEK 1554 
     ¶D. BISHKEK 1537 
 
BISHKEK 00001643  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Kyrgyz government, opposition, and civil 
society leaders are still assessing the impact of the new 
constitution adopted November 9, and the political 
maneuvering over its implementation is well underway even 
though the official text has yet to be published.  Reactions 
to the new constitution have ranged widely, with some seeing 
it as a complete victory for the opposition and shift of 
power to Parliament, others seeing it as "win-win," and still 
others believing that nothing will change since the players 
remain the same.  Prime Minister Kulov characterized the new 
constitution as generally a step forward, though he and many 
others have noted that several irregularities needed to be 
worked out. 
 
¶2. (C) While the political compromise that led to the new 
constitution effectively ended the public protests for now, 
most observers agree that the Kyrgyz came very close to a 
more serious conflict, and that the political battles have 
just begun. Opposition members have made clear that high on 
their agenda is getting rid of PM Kulov, while presidential 
staff has told us they are calculating the benefits of 
calling new parliamentary elections soon.  There are 
indications that the tandem emerged stronger than ever and 
that the government will try to unite the various parties it 
controls.  Parliament, however, is showing some divisions. 
Already divided between pro-Bakiyev and anti-Bakiyev 
deputies, the opposition, having briefly united to force a 
new constitution, is now also exhibiting splits. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
What Does It All Mean? 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) A week after a compromise on a new constitution 
effectively ended the opposition's street protest (Ref B), 
Kyrgyz government, opposition, and civil society leaders are 
still assessing the impact of the new constitution, often 
based on divergent interpretations of the text, which has yet 
to appear in its official form.  (COMMENT:  There is some 
cause for concern as in 2003 President Akayev engineered a 
bait and switch with texts of the constitution.  While 
presidential administration sources tell us that &such a 
deception8 is not possible now, they remain quiet about 
exactly what the problems are with the November 8 text and 
when it will be officially issued.  In the meantime, the 
opposition is moving forward with the text they have in hand. 
 END COMMENT) Reactions to the compromise have ranged widely, 
with some characterizing it as a complete victory for the 
opposition, others saying it was "win-win," others saying it 
did not matter as all the players remain the same, and at 
least one (FM Jekshenkulov) maintaining that nothing 
fundamentally had changed -- at least in Foreign Affairs. 
 
¶4. (C) Most see the new constitution as only a first step. 
On November 13, Parliament began the long process of drafting 
legislation to conform existing laws to the new constitution; 
how the new Constitution is implemented will be key. 
Personalities will also play a big role.  Many serious 
differences remain between the president and opposition 
leaders, and the opposition has given no indication that it 
plans to back away from its other demands. 
 
Close to a Larger Conflict 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) There was a sense of relief that the week-long 
demonstrations ended peacefully, but there is a consensus 
 
BISHKEK 00001643  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
that the Kyrgyz came very close to a more serious conflict. 
Several commentators have said that the country came close to 
a "civil war."  Interior Minister Suvanaliyev told the 
Ambassador that he was glad that MVD troops had done a good 
job managing the demonstrations.  He said they had taken 
strong measures to separate the pro- and anti-Bakiyev 
demonstrators on November 6, because if there had been a 
clash, it would have been north vs. south, which could have 
led to a much more serious conflict.  Opposition MP Temir 
Sariyev also expressed concern to the Ambassador that they 
had come "very, very close" to a more serious conflict during 
the protest, with the President being "provoked" several 
times by Kulov to take stronger measures against the 
protesters. Sariyev said that during the demonstration, 
Bakiyev, fearing a repeat of March 2005, reached out to his 
neighbors, including Putin, for help.  In a &dry 
conversation8 Putin reportedly told Bakiyev that he "didn't 
need" demonstrations in the streets and for Bakiyev to "get 
this resolved in parliament." 
 
Bakiyev Stronger? 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Some of the president's supporters argue that 
Bakiyev's powers have been strengthened by the new 
Constitution.  State Secretary Madumarov said that the 
parliament could not form a new government without the 
approval of the President.  Foreign Minister Jekshenkulov 
said that the President was still in charge of foreign 
policy, and that he would still report to the President. 
Head of Presidential Administrative Department Kurmanbek 
Temirbayev told the Ambassador that he had advocated 
dissolution of Parliament on November 7, but the President 
chose the path of compromise and would rely on the support of 
pro-Bakiyev deputies in the Parliament.  Given the importance 
of political parties under the new constitution, he said 
pro-Bakiyev parties were already working to consolidate, so 
as to be able to form a majority in Parliament and control 
the government. 
 
¶7. (C) Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration 
Sadyrkulov told the Ambassador he was calculating the 
benefits of dissolving Parliament and calling new 
parliamentary elections ) and perhaps even new presidential 
elections so the president could reaffirm his mandate with 
the voters and sever his ties with the opposition leaders who 
brought him to power in March 2005.  Sadyrkulov said the 
Parliament was already dividing and it would be possible to 
engineer dissolution of Parliament from within, as was done 
in 1994.  He said the tandem had finally become a strong 
working partnership with Bakiyev and Kulov coming together on 
their own initiative on the critical night of November 6, 
rather than brought together by staff.  Foreign Policy 
Advisor Ibragimov told Ambassador that a number of advisors 
in the White House opposed the compromise with the opposition 
and implied they were working to walk it back. 
 
Sariyev:  The People Won 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Opposition MP Temir Sariyev told the Ambassador 
November 14 that he was very happy with the outcome of the 
opposition protest.  Sariyev believes that the parliament has 
the authority under the transitional provisions in the 
constitution to act immediately, and he laid out an ambitious 
list of reforms that the parliament would undertake. 
However, on November 17 when the first part of the Opposition 
agenda was to be passed, deputies could not convene a quorum. 
 AkiPress owner Marat Tazebekov made clear to Ambassador that 
government manipulation was to blame. 
 
Going After Kulov 
----------------- 
 
 
BISHKEK 00001643  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶9. (C) After months of criticizing the Bakiyev-Kulov tandem, 
the opposition now clearly has Kulov in its sights.  Sariyev 
acknowledged that Kulov was a "key figure" whom they had 
supported in the past, but the opposition was disappointed by 
his conduct during the demonstrations, when he played both 
sides but ultimately sided with Bakiyev.  Bakiyev clearly 
owes Kulov for sticking with him through this, but that also 
has made Kulov a target of the opposition.  Sariyev said that 
the opposition believes that Kulov will always kowtow to the 
President and therefore cannot move forward a reform program. 
 
 
¶10. (C) He said the Parliament would use its transitional 
authority to choose a new prime minister and cabinet of 
ministers.  (Note:   The new constitution allows all elected 
officials -- e.g. Bakiyev and Parliament -- to serve out 
their terms, but has no such guarantees for appointees -- 
e.g. Kulov and the ministers.  End Note.)  Sariyev said that 
there were three upcoming events -- the Prime Minister's 
accounting to the Parliament of the government's 
accomplishments for the year; the presentation of the budget; 
and the Parliament's confirmation of the government's program 
-- when the Parliament would be able to remove Kulov through 
(essentially) a vote of no confidence. 
 
¶11. (C) Kulov, for his part, has been critical publicly of 
the deal on the constitution.  He characterized the document 
as generally a step forward, but said the great haste of its 
drafting and adoption set a dangerous precedent and created 
irregularities and contradictions.  (Others in both the 
government and in the opposition agree that the constitution 
is not internally consistent.)  Kulov is probably also aware 
that under the transition provisions in the document, it 
appears that the existing parliament may have the power to 
choose a new prime minister who could, in turn, propose a new 
government.  Interpretations differ, however, and even 
opposition Parliamentarians agree that at a minimum a 
transition law would have to be passed in order to do this. 
Others have raised questions about whether parliament could 
take action to form a government without new elections, 
including Adilet Legal Clinic Director and opposition leader 
Cholpon Jakupova. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) In the aftermath of the demonstrations and apparent 
agreement on a new constitution, much of the dust has yet to 
settle.  While battles, both public and private, continue 
over the scope and meaning of the new constitution, it is 
clear that the political landscape has been re-aligned.  The 
current situation creates an opportunity for the Kyrgyz ) 
and also for the U.S.  The window is open wider for our 
assistance programs to be successful, whether they are 
anti-corruption programs such as the Millennium Challenge 
Account Program, or regional emergency reform programs. 
Widespread disgust over the lack of unbiased information in 
the media similarly could provide us a receptive audience for 
press reforms.  If efforts to reform the state-owned KTR 
television station are successful, we should be ready lend a 
hand in helping build a non-partisan news source for the 
benefit of all of Kyrgyzstan. 
 
¶13. (C) We should quickly evaluate current programs and see 
where are our opportunities for greatest success.  Problems 
of corruption and the state of the media have been the major 
issues in this latest conflict, and they will continue to be 
the driving issues in the coming months.  Now is the time for 
us to be creative in determining how to use our resources and 
increase our influence. 
YOVANOVITCH