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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001602 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (TEXT) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
DS/IP/SPC DON WEINBERG DS.IP/NEA-SA F SCOTT GALLO 
ASTANA FOR LEGATT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG
SUBJECT: EAC MEETING RE ABDUCTION OF USAID OFFICER'S SPOUSE 
 
BISHKEK 00001602  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Marie L. Yovanovitch for reasons 1.4 (d) & (g) 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Bishkek 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on November 13.  Present at 
the meeting were:  AMB, DCM, POL/ECON, POL/RA, MSG, PAS, MGT, 
DAO, SAO, CONS, USAID, MED, INL, CLO, RLA, USAID, RSO, Peace 
Corps, U.S. Treasury Representative, and Manas Air Force Base 
representatives. 
 
¶2. (C)  RSO summarized the events of the past two days, 
describing the abduction of Gulnura Abduldayeva, the spouse 
of USAID Country Director, Cliff Brown, at gunpoint at 
approximately 1530 on Saturday, November 11, 2006.  It 
appears that the spouse was specifically targeted because of 
her relationship with her husband, who is the USAID Country 
Director. The three Kyrgyz abductors, reportedly in their 
early 20's, specifically stated that her husband owed their 
boss $300,000.  It appears that they had been surveilling her 
and when she exited a downtown hair salon and entered her 
vehicle, they forced their way into her diplomatic licensed 
vehicle, commandeered it, tied her hands and feet and forced 
her into the back seat and onto the floor.  They drove to 
Tunguch, a remote location southwest of downtown Bishkek, 
where they tossed her into a ditch and drove away in her 
vehicle.  A young child came by and was able to unfasten the 
rope binding her feet, enabling her to walk to a nearby field 
where workers untied her hands and offered her a cell phone 
to call her husband. 
 
¶3.  (C) The abductors stated that they knew where she lives, 
naming the address (only partially correct), and her 
husband's position, and that he owed their boss $300,000. 
When they approached the area where they deposited her in the 
ditch, one of the abductors commented that their boss was in 
the area because they had passed the boss's car.  The 
abductors kept the spouse's keys (vehicle, apartment and 
commissary warehouse) and purse, which contained her 
identification, embassy security badge, cell phone, and 
wallet. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The husband phoned the RSO at approximately 1700, 
who alerted the A/RSO and the DCM.  The DCM informed the 
Ambassador.  At this point, only preliminary information 
regarding the incident was available.  The RSO accompanied 
the victim and her husband to the two district police 
stations whose jurisdiction was involved, to file a claim and 
answer several hours of police questions.  At approximately 
2330, the police took the victim back to the field where she 
was released, and recovered the belt and rope used to bind 
her.  The police released the victim at approximately 0200 on 
November 12.  At RSO's recommendation, the couple spent the 
evening at the DCM's residence. 
 
¶5.  (C)  RSO informed the EAC that the incident appeared to 
be focused exclusively on the USAID couple, and at no point 
was there any indication of a threat to other Americans in 
the community.  The RSO reported on security measures 
implemented to protect the USAID couple, including: staying 
at the DCM's residence; changing the locks on their apartment 
the morning of November 12 and initiating change of key for 
the building on November 13.  In addition, and until there 
are further developments in the case, on November 12 RSO, 
assigned surveillance detection team members to monitor the 
apartment building; on November 12 the RSO assigned 24-hour 
Embassy and 24-hour SNB armed MVD guards to the apartment 
building.  On November 13 the RSO coordinated the assignment 
of an MVD body guard to the USAID Director and his spouse and 
provided an armored Embassy vehicle for them to travel in at 
all times.  In addition, on the morning of November 12 the 
Embassy activated the emergency phone tree to notify all 
Embassy employees of the incident. 
 
¶6. (C)  USAID officer Country Director reported that he had 
held a USAID staff meeting prior to the EAC meeting and in 
discussing the abduction with his staff, was reminded that 
approximately three months ago, USAID had made a decision to 
discontinue a water and energy project in southern Kyrgyzstan 
near Osh.  The former chairman of the board of directors for 
this project had called and requested a meeting with the 
USAID Country Director, but he referred the issue back to the 
local organization responsible for the project.  In that 
phone call the former chairman, Toktaim Umetalieva, was very 
upset and stated that USAID owed her project $300,000.  The 
USAID Country representative Director agreed to accompany RSO 
to revisit the local police to share this new information 
 
BISHKEK 00001602  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
later on November 13. 
 
¶7. (C) The EAC discussed the option of sending the USAID 
Director and spouse out of the country until the perpetrators 
are apprehended and the matter resolved; the effect their 
leaving the country might have on resolution of the case; and 
the location of other NGO implementers involved in the 
discontinued project that may also be at risk. The EAC 
concluded there was no information suggesting a threat to the 
wider American community that would warrant issuing a Warden 
Message. 
 
¶8.  (C)  As of the time of the EAC meeting, news of the 
abduction had not been reported on local news outlets.  The 
Ambassador asked the PA officer to draft an Embassy response, 
which was shared with Washington, for use in case this news 
is publicized.  The incident has since been briefly reported 
by a local wire service, citing local police sources. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Some members of the EAC expressed discomfort with 
the way and timeliness that decisions were made regarding 
notification of Embassy personnel, especially the 
notification of the four other embassy personnel who live in 
the same apartment building as the USAID couple, since 
building security was compromised with the loss of the 
couple's keys.  The health unit was not contacted to assist 
with a medical and psychological evaluation, including 
referral for additional resources available to victims of 
such events.  The MGT officer suggested including a core EAC 
committee in the decision-making process, as this would offer 
a broader base of information to draw from.  The Ambassador 
agreed to consider these suggestions. 
 
¶10.  (C)  MGT officer reminded the EAC that there have been 
several threatening incidents between embassy personnel and 
other inhabitants of the apartment building where the USAID 
couple live.  The Ambassador asked MGT officer to evaluate 
the overall security of this apartment building and determine 
whether its should remain in the Embassy housing pool.  Later 
in the day, RSO was informed of possible surveillance of the 
apartment building.  As a result, RSO coordinated placement 
of two marked MVD vehicles at the building's entrance 
beginning the afternoon of November 13.  The Embassy offered 
all Embassy employees resident in the building the option of 
moving to either a local hotel or to a residence in the 
community.  None of the Embassy employees in the apartment 
building decided to leave the building, but the offer remains 
open to them. 
 
¶11.  (C)  It was noted that this attack indicates that 
diplomatic license plates did not deter the perpetrators, and 
that we need to put the Kyrgyz government on notice that we 
take this incident very seriously.  EAC members asked if the 
FBI will be involved in the investigation, and commented that 
if they were, it would send a very effective message to 
Kyrgyzstan that these attacks against Embassy personnel are 
viewed very seriously by the U.S. government.  RSO contacted 
Astana Legatt on November 13 to inform him of the incident 
involving an "internationally protected person" for 
consideration of a possible FBI role in the investigation. 
The Ambassador spoke with MVD Minister Suvanaliev on November 
13, who responded positively to all of the Embassy's requests. 
The Ambassador also spoke with Acting FM Sarbayev, who also 
pledged full GOK cooperation. 
 
¶12. (C)  ARSO recommended that EAC consider whether or 
not it is safe for the couple to remain at post; 
additionally, RSO recommended that EAC consider whether the 
apartment building remains safe for other embassy personnel 
(four employees and two dependents) housed at that location. 
The EAC determined that all necessary support will be given 
to accommodate the couple. 
 
¶13.  (C)  The Ambassador reminded committee members that 
Kyrgyzstan is considered a high threat post, which is one of 
the components making this a hardship differential post.  She 
urged all employees to be alert and cautious, and asked RSO 
to distribute a reminder to all embassy personnel regarding 
vehicle safety and security awareness.  RSO distributed the 
security reminder later on November 13. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  The RSO, DCM and Ambassador will monitor this 
situation over the next few days and will convene another EAC 
Committee meeting later in the week, if deemed necessary. 
 
BISHKEK 00001602  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
YOVANOVITCH