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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0122
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0025
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0231
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0114

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 002109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/SE, EUR/AGS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2031 
TAGS: PTER ETTC TU SZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY S/CT URBANCIC URGES SWISS ACTION ON PKK 
 
REF: SECSTATE 179961 
 
Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
1.(C) Summary: A USG interagency team led by Deputy 
Counterterrorism Coordinator Frank Urbancic visited Bern on 
November 13 to encourage the Swiss to step up efforts against 
PKK/Kongra-Gel criminal activity in Europe.  Swiss government 
officials appeared receptive to the USG proposal to cooperate 
on criminal investigations of the PKK, while setting aside 
bilateral differences over the PKK's status as a terrorist 
group.  Swiss officials also appeared receptive to the USG 
proposal to cooperate on criminal investigations of the PKK, 
while setting aside bilateral differences over the PKK's 
status as a terrorist group.  Swiss officials also were open 
to increased judicial assistance to the Turks in order to 
improve Ankara's ability to assemble cases that pass European 
muster when extradition requests are filed.  Pursuing the PKK 
is nonetheless likely to remain a low priority for Swiss law 
enforcement officials focused on more high-profile threats in 
Switzerland, unless persistently pushed by the USG, Turkey 
and European neighbors. End summary. 
 
2.(C) Deputy S/CT Urbancic led an interagency delegation, 
including EUR/SE director Doug Silliman, Treasury Department 
Advisor on Terrorism Finance and Financial Crimes Justin 
Serafini, and S/CT officer Zachary Rothschild, to Switzerland 
as the final stop in a six-nation swing through Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, UK, and Turkey.  The delegation's goal 
was to raise awareness of the PKK's criminal threat to Europe 
and to engender cooperation in diplomatic, law enforcement, 
financing, and intelligence sharing areas. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Overview of USG Strategy - Pursue as Organized Crime 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3.(C) In the meeting with Swiss interagency officials 
(paragraph 12), Urbancic laid out the USG's three-fold 
strategy for combating the PKK/Kongra-Gel.  First, with 
regard to the PKK's operational use of Northern Iraq, General 
Ralston had been appointed to work with Turkish and Iraqi 
counterparts to diminish PKK abilities there.  Second, the 
USG is working with Turkish authorities to improve internal 
law enforcement and judicial practices.  Third, the USG would 
work with key European capitals to tackle the PKK problem as 
an organized crime problem, effectively sidestepping the 
political question of whether the PKK is a terrorist group. 
The focus on this latter effort is to cut off the source of 
funding for the PKK. 
 
4.(C) EUR/SE Doug Silliman offered an overview of PKK 
criminal activity, including trafficking in persons, drug 
trafficking to the UK, extortion, and protection rackets. 
The PKK raises an estimated 100 million Euros per year in 
Europe.  A large part of this money goes toward the PKK's 
media operations, including KOJ TV out of Denmark and various 
print outlets.  The second largest use for the funds is 
maintenance expenses for PKK/Kongra-Gel operatives in Europe. 
 Another large sum is converted into cash and carried by 
couriers into northern Iraq to finance terrorist activities 
directly. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Some Receptivity, but Swiss Standards High 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5.(C) Urs von Daeniken, Director of the Swiss Service for 
Analysis and Prevention (the internal intelligence service) 
described the PKK presence in Switzerland as small and mostly 
non-violent domestically.  While the Swiss do not label the 
PKK/Kongra-Gel a terrorist group, the Federal Police consider 
it a violent extremist organization and keep tabs on its 
activities, he claimed.  He described cooperation within 
Europe as very good and noted that, since 1996, there had 
been 20 U.S.-Swiss bilateral exchanges of information 
(Comment: According to ORCA, nearly all of these "exchanges" 
involved one-way provisions of information to the Swiss.  End 
comment.) 
 
6.(C) According to Von Daeniken, PKK/Kongra-Gel in 
Switzerland comprises 400 members, of which about 100 are 
officers.  In addition, some 1.5 million Swiss Francs are 
estimated to be collected in Geneva and 1 million more in 
Basel; funds are routed by couriers, not banks.  In the past, 
Swiss police confiscated documents and attempted to prosecute 
PKK members for extortion, but cases inevitably faltered due 
to withdrawn testimony from victims.  There was evidence of 
the PKK "taxing" drug smugglers as well, but insufficient to 
prosecute a case.  He also averred that the PKK were involved 
in human smuggling and forged documents.  Von Daeniken 
welcomed evidence of funding connections to northern Iraq.  A 
hopeful sign, he offered, was that the police had detected a 
fall-off in PKK fund-raising success in recent years.  He 
asserted that, as extremists, suspected PKK/Kongra-Gel 
members are not permitted to own firearms.  Anyone suspected 
of extremism is denied entry. 
 
7.(C) On this last points, Urbancic challenged von Daeniken 
as to why the European head of PKK/Kongra-Gel, Zubeyir Aydar, 
was living in Switzerland.  Von Daeniken skirted the 
question, noting that the organization seemed not to be very 
hierarchical; the Zurich head of the organization seemed to 
operate fairly independently from other PKK officials. 
 
8.(C) Asked what type of information Swiss authorities would 
need to pursue the PKK, Von Daeniken expressed interest in 
evidence about the courier routes and destinations for funds 
raised in Switzerland.  He assured the delegation that U.S. 
intelligence information could be used in Swiss courts 
without the sources and methods being divulged to the 
defense.  Swiss Federal Prosecutor Claude Nicati interjected 
that all information would be welcomed, as long as it added 
value.  For the Swiss to launch a criminal investigation, 
there needed to be a criminal act beforehand, he stressed. 
Nicati concurred that pursuing the PKK through criminal 
investigation was a promising avenue, but underscored that 
Swiss standards are very high.  To prosecute someone for 
giving funds for a criminal or terrorist activity, it must be 
proven that the giver knowingly and willingly did so.  Asked 
to define further the level of evidence needed, Nicati 
replied that he would prefer that there be at least one 
witness to interview.  Silliman and Legatt expressed hope 
that the Swiss would be prepared to take USG leads and launch 
their own investigations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Immigration Track -- Denial the Easiest Tool 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.(C) Pius Betschart of the Federal Office of Migration 
described the challenges his office faces in deporting 
extremists already granted asylum.  Just as asylum is granted 
through an administrative procedure, so it can be revoked in 
the event of a crime or the determination that there is a 
security threat.  However, a judicial appeal can supersede 
deportation if a judge determines there is a risk of torture 
in the destination country.  This remains the problem with 
Turkey.  The easiest option, Betschart asserted, would be to 
have as much information on suspected PKK members before they 
apply for entry, since the threshold for denial of entry is 
very low. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Improving Turkish Judicial Practices 
------------------------------------ 
 
10.(C) Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs Center for Security Policy emphasized the 
importance of improving both the Turkish penal system and 
practice of assembling cases along Western lines.  It was not 
sufficient for the Turks to ask for the extradition of a 
suspect if the charges were solely "member of a terrorist 
group."  Asked if the Swiss would be willing to assist the 
Turks in this field, Pitteloud readily agreed. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Turkish Ambassador: Complaints, some encouragement 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
11.(C) Following the lunch, Urbancic and DCM called on the 
resident Turkish Ambassador, Alev Kilic.  Urbancic laid out 
the three-pronged USG strategy on the PKK, as described in 
paragraph 3.  Kilic provided the USG delegation with a 
one-page outline of PKK activity in Switzerland, wherein he 
estimated the PKK/Kongra-Gel strength here at 4 thousand. 
The paper accused Swiss authorities of tolerating a PKK 
presence, allowing use of Swiss banks, and not intervening 
when Kurdish protesters stoned the Turkish Embassy in March 
¶2006.  The paper also mentioned the July 2006 meeting between 
the Geneva-based NGO "Geneva Call" and PKK/Kongra-Gel 
members, in which the NGO asked the PKK to refrain from using 
land mines against the civilians (but not the Turkish 
military).  The Turkish Ambassador expressed some optimism 
that the Swiss were becoming more cooperative with the PKK -- 
an imminent test will be Bern's willingness to extradite PKK 
member and suspected murderer Mehmet Esiyok.  Ambassador 
Kilic was very grateful for Urbancic's visit. 
 
------------------ 
Swiss Participants 
------------------ 
 
12.(U) The Swiss participants in the delegation meetings were 
as follows: 
 
Mr. Urs von Daeniken, Director, Service for Analysis and 
Prevention, Federal Police; 
Mr. Claude Nicati, Chief Prosecutor, Department of Justice 
and Police; 
Mr. Pius Betschart, Chief, Analysis Division, Federal Office 
of Migration; 
Amb. Jacques Pitteloud, Chief, Center for International 
Security Policy, DFA (also at lunch); 
Ms. Christine Schraner, Counterterrorism Coordinator, DFA 
(host of lunch); 
Mr. Riccardo Sansonetti, Chief, Financial Crime Section, 
Department of Finance 
Mr. Andre Schaller, Chief of Western & Central Europe, DFA 
(also at lunch); 
Ms. Simona Morosini, Sanctions Division, State Secretariat 
for Economic Affairs (also at lunch); 
Mr. Heinz Walker, Deputy, Economic & Financial Affairs 
Division, DFA; 
Mr. Urs Hammer, Deputy, Americas Division, DFA; 
Mr. Dieter Cavalleri, Deputy to the Counterterrorism 
Coordinator, DFA; 
Mr. Zolt Madaasz, Chief of Staff, Security Committee of the 
Federal Council (lunch only). 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.(C) These consultations were more encouraging than might 
have been expected, given the low priority accorded the 
pursuit of the PKK/Kongra-Gel by the Swiss.  Swiss officials 
were receptive to using organized crime fighting methods 
against the group; more so because politicians are reluctant 
to categorize groups as terrorist entities, absent a UN 
resolution.  It will likely take regular prompting by 
ourselves, the Turks and -- most fruitfully -- European 
neighbors to keep the Swiss interagency even minimally 
focused on the PKK threat. 
 
14.(C) Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator Urbancic and 
EUR/SE Director Silliman cleared on this message. 
CONEWAY