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C O N F I D E N T I A L        BERLIN 03402

SIPDIS
CXBERLIN:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   CHRON FAS DAOBONN PAO ECON DCM AMB JIS DAO
CX2BERLN:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   CHRON FAS DAOBONN PAO ECON DCM AMB JIS DAO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: POL:JKOENIG
DRAFTED: POL:MMARTIN,BMCCUEN
CLEARED: ECON:CCONWAY, POL:JBAUMAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL ZKGM EU GM
SUBJECT: ENGAGING WITH THE GERMANS ON THEIR EU CENTRAL ASIA 
STRATEGY 
 
 
Classified By: DCM John Koenig for reasons 1.5(b),(d). 
 
¶1.  (C) (Summary) Germany has made engagement with Central 
Asia a top priority for its upcoming EU presidency.  The 
Germans hope to strengthen regional cooperation in Central 
Asia, expand the region's economic options, increase 
cooperation on energy, promote the rule of law, and expand 
contacts between Central Asia and the West in such fields as 
education.  Above all, the Germans hope to create a 
sustainable basis for deeper relations between the EU and 
Central Asia that will long outlive the German presidency. 
Germany does not aim to bring significant new EU resources to 
bear in Central Asia, but plans to make EU programs more 
coherent and more focused on regional coordination. 
 
¶2.  (C)  We see significant opportunities for fruitful 
U.S.-German cooperation during the presidency to advance our 
priorities in Central Asia.  Germany, although a leader in 
the EU in terms of contacts with Central Asia, needs 
encouragement to think ambitiously and strategically.  Our 
contacts have stressed their desire to consult closely with 
us as their Central Asia strategy emerges.  This openness to 
cooperation is partly motivated by the realization that the 
EU simply does not carry the same weight in the region as 
other major powers do.  Given the Germans' keen interest and 
relative regional strength compared to other EU member states 
(Germany is the only member state with embassies in all five 
capitals) Germany is likely to remain an EU leader on Central 
Asia for the foreseeable future.  For that reason, developing 
a close working relationship with Germany on Central Asia 
during their presidency should help ensure sustained U.S. 
influence on EU policy toward the region well into the 
future.  Among the kinds of cooperation with the EU we should 
consider launching during the German presidency are: 
 
--joint initiatives on regional anti-terrorism and 
anti-narcotics programs in Central Asia 
--joint initiatives linking Central Asian countries with 
Afghanistan through investment, combined police training, and 
involvement in civilian reconstruction 
--support for construction of additional energy pipelines 
--cooperation with donors like Japan and international 
financial institutions to promote regional Central Asian 
transportation infrastructure 
--joint initiatives promoting rule of law 
--joint initiatives on exchange programs in such areas as 
education.  End Summary. 
 
Cooperation on Programs 
 
¶3.  (C)   The October visit of DAS Feigenbaum and Assistance 
Coordinator Klepp created a foundation for closer 
coordination on assistance programs.  Regular contact between 
American assistance coordinators and counterparts from 
Germany and the Commission, both in capitals and in the 
various Central Asian countries, should help us to shape the 
overall EU assistance package and to build close coordination 
with the U.S. into the EU's approach to the region.  We 
should encourage other EU countries to commit to expanding 
their diplomatic presence in the region during the German 
presidency to build a foundation for closer coordination with 
them. 
 
Regional Cooperation 
 
¶4.  (C) While the Germans have promoted their Central Asia 
strategy as a major initiative, they stress that its funding 
is limited.  The 2007-2013 EU budget allots about one billion 
euros for Central Asia, and the Germans do not foresee any 
substantial additional EU or German funding during this 
timeframe.   The main thrust of the German plan will be to 
recast the EU's aid program by creating a regional strategy 
with greater focus than the current country specific action 
plans.  We should, of course, encourage greater EU financial 
commitment to the region, but also support the German 
interest in focusing much of the available resources on 
regional cooperation.  Some areas where Germany hopes to 
increase cooperation include security (terrorism, narcotics 
trafficking, and border security), natural resource 
management (water and energy), and economic development.  All 
of these are areas where we should seek opportunities to find 
synergies in our Central Asian assistance programs. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Germans plan to encourage Central Asian countries 
to strengthen ties with surrounding countries--e.g. to deepen 
relations with countries like Afghanistan.   German contacts 
said that officials from isolated countries like Turkmenistan 
told Foreign Minister Steinmeier during his recent trip to 
Central Asia that they are interested in the Trans-Afghan 
pipeline.  They also note that Tajikistan already cooperates 
with Afghanistan, on some security issues.  We should urge 
the Germans to give special emphasis to encouraging Central 
Asian cooperation with Afghanistan.  Joint U.S.-EU 
initiatives to encourage investment and trade by wealthy 
Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan in Afghanistan are 
one possibility.  Another would be to encourage EU police 
training programs that increase cooperation between 
Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries on 
counternarcotics issues.  Another, more ambitious, 
possibility would be to try to draw Central Asian expertise 
into the civilian reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. 
 
Energy Cooperation 
 
¶6.  (C)  Energy will loom large during the German EU 
presidency with a "Strategic Energy Review" expected in 
January and the adoption of an energy action plan in March. 
In Central Asia, the Germans would like to foster the 
development of a regional energy market by rehabilitating the 
north-south energy grid and providing technical expertise to 
modernize the Central Asian energy infrastructure.  While MFA 
contacts state that the EU has neither the means nor ability 
to finance the construction of pipelines, our contacts 
frequently note the importance of increasing energy options 
both for Europe and for Central Asia   We should seek to 
ensure that discussion of alternative energy pipelines and 
sources from Central Asia remains a key part of the EU energy 
discussion. 
 
Economic Integration 
 
¶7.  (C)  As noted above, the Germans expect the EU to stick 
to its traditional role of providing technical assistance and 
training as opposed to becoming involved in expensive 
infrastructure projects.  However, the Germans can be 
encouraged to work more closely with other large donors such 
as the Japanese, who are involved in larger projects.  The EU 
could provide technical assistance to support those projects. 
 In addition, they could use their influence with 
international financial institutions to draw more 
infrastructure investment into the region.  The Germans 
concede the importance of regional integration and opening up 
Central Asia to broader economic options.  We should 
encourage them to use their influence to ensure that the 
practical basis for integration such as highways and other 
transport links receive due weight in their strategy. 
 
Rule of Law 
 
¶8.  (C) While German officials share our concerns about human 
rights and democracy in the region, they argue that we must 
have realistic expectations about progress in these areas. 
Some officials, such as Political Director Michael Schaefer, 
argue that it will take a generation before significant 
progress can be achieved.  The Germans and the EU have some 
programs, such as judicial training programs, to promote the 
rule of law.  Regarding human rights, they generally argue 
the best way forward is to keep the regional leaders engaged 
in a dialogue.  For example they hailed the recent agreement 
by Uzbekistan to participate in regular dialogue with the EU 
on human rights in general and the Andijon incident in 
particular. 
 
¶9.  (C) We should note that we also have realistic 
expectations for the region.  We should not let semantic 
distinctions between democracy promotion and promoting rule 
of law obscure the fact that most of our work in these areas 
aims at the same goal.  We should encourage Germany and the 
EU to develop a more coherent strategy for improving the rule 
of law in Central Asia and then coordinate our programs with 
theirs.    At the same time, we should stress the importance 
of maintaining human rights standards.  We should, for 
example, support EU efforts to draw Uzbekistan out of its 
shell through dialogue, but when the question of  EU 
sanctions on Uzbekistan comes up for review during the German 
presidency, we should remind the Germans  that dialogue 
cannot be a substitute for progress on the ground in human 
rights practices. 
 
Exchanges 
 
¶10.  (C)  Since the Germans expect progress on human rights 
and rule of law to be slow, they are looking for programs 
that gradually open up the Central Asian societies to new 
influences over the long term.   During Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier's recent trip to the region all five Central Asian 
countries indicated an interest in more assistance in 
education, and the Germans plan to make this an important 
focus of EU work.  This would mainly take the form of 
technical assistance to improve teacher training and the 
administration of national education systems.  MFA contacts 
have also suggested expanding the German-Kazakh University, 
created in 1999 and located in Almaty, into a regional 
center. 
 
¶11.  (C) Germany hopes the interaction with EU officials and 
increased familiarization with EU standards will allow these 
programs to become models of good governance and provide 
models of best practices.   Exchange programs that enabled 
educators from Central Asia to visit and work in Europe would 
be another element of this strategy.  We should stress that 
we, too, see the importance of exchange as a way of opening 
up the region to new influences, and consider what kind of 
parallel programs we can develop with the EU. 
 
TIMKEN JR