VZCZCXRO0465
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #1359/01 3321705
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281705Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6524
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0297
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0230
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0118
RHMFISS/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC 0011

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUCOM FOR POLAD 
SOCEUR FOR RADM MCRAVEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML
SUBJECT: MALI'S UNSETTLED NORTH:  RESTIVE TUAREGS, RESTIVE 
PRESIDENT 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 1244 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 1243 
 
BAMAKO 00001359  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, Embassy Bamako, 
Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(S)  Summary:  The Tuareg rebel group known as the Alliance 
for Democracy and Change (ADC) has reportedly recalled its 
three representatives from the Algiers Accords nine-person 
steering committee.  The action followed a five day, November 
6 - 11, meeting in Algeria between the ADC, the GOM, the 
Algerian Ambassador to Mali and other Algerian officials.  In 
the Ambassador's subsequent meeting with President Amadou 
Toumani Toure (ATT), the President expressed frustration with 
contradictory Algerian actions which on the one hand 
purported to support the Accords and on the other could 
effectively turn northern Mali into a battlefield.  ATT told 
the Ambassador he would soon make a State visit to Algeria, 
during which he would propose that President Bouteflika 
convene a meeting at the Chief of State level including Niger 
and Mauritania on how to best address the issue of the GSPC 
presence in the trans-Sahara region.  ATT would welcome 
expanded U.S. training for Malian military forces in Tessalit 
and the new "motorized camel corps" foreseen in the Algiers 
accords, but highly prizes a distinctly regional flavor to 
any eventual plan.  The Algerian Ambassador to Mali claims 
that the ADC has not abandoned the Algiers Accords, and a 
combined Algerian civilian-military delegation arrived in 
Bamako on November 25 to hold talks with key Government of 
Mali interlocutors.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
ADC Pull-out from Algiers? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  According to various press sources, in withdrawing 
from Algiers the ADC accused Malian authorities of failing to 
respect the spirit or fulfill the provisions of the Accords. 
The ADC specifically noted failures to: 
 
--create a new regional council in Kidal; 
 
--reposition Malian military bases to the outskirts of Kidal; 
and, 
 
--pull back Malian military reinforcements sent to Kidal 
following the May 23 attacks. 
 
 
3.(C)  The ADC indicated that other steps, including the 
redeployment of Malian soldiers, the return of weapons stolen 
on May 23 and the creation of all-nomad military units, would 
not proceed until these benchmarks were met.  Some local 
media reports have gone so far as to proclaim the Accords as 
dead, attributing their failure to the ADC's refusal to 
comply with provisions concerning rebel disarmament.  The ADC 
said it was recalling its three representatives to the 
steering committee because they were "neither respected, nor 
listened to nor implicated in decisions."  As a result, the 
ADC preferred to "provisionally" recall its representatives 
pending further clarification of their official role as 
steering committee members.  The Algerian Ambassador to Mali 
told Ambassador that a combined Algerian civilian-military 
delegation had arrived in Bamako on November 25 for talks 
with ATT and Minister of Territorial Administration 
Kafougouna Kone, in an effort to put the implementation of 
the Algiers Accords back on track. 
 
------------------ 
Conflicting Goals 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C)  The ADC's challenges to GOM good faith 
notwithstanding, it is increasingly unlikely that the ADC 
would agree to any form of disarmament in the near-term given 
its on-going feud with the GSPC.  Algeria's decision to 
provide material support to the ADC has seriously complicated 
Algeria's role as an independent mediator and undercut the 
Accords' provision regarding rebel disarmament. 
 
¶5. (S) In a November 10 meeting with the President, the 
Ambassador asked for his interpretation of the seeming 
 
BAMAKO 00001359  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
duality within the Government of Algeria, with its Foreign 
Ministry overseeing Accords that military support to the the 
ADC against the GSPC patently undermined.  In reply, ATT 
announced his intention to make a long-scheduled State visit 
to Algeria in which he would propose a heads of state meeting 
among Mali, Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania.  The goal of the 
meeting would be to devise a cohesive plan for these four 
actors to manage/remove the GSPC presence from the Sahel. 
ATT expressed frustration with the Algerians in particular, 
noting it was their fault the GSPC was in northern Mali in 
the first place.  "If they had done their job, the GSPC would 
never have left Algeria."  He found it absurd that the 
Algerians would suppose "ragtag Tuareg rebels" could 
successfully complete the task at which the altogether 
credible force that is the Algerian  military had failed, 
namely dispatching the GSPC.  Not only, therefore, was their 
support to the ADC unlikely to achieve that end, but it has 
the unfortunate side effect of emboldening the Tuaregs 
against key disarmament provisions of the Algiers accords. 
Worst, concluded ATT, "the Algerians could turn my country 
into a battlefield." 
 
¶6.  (C)  As for next steps, ATT acknowledged that the GSPC is 
a real threat, but one that must be addressed in concert with 
Mali's partners in the region, thus his planned proposal to 
President Bouteflika for renewed strategizing among the 
affected neighbors.  ATT was cautious about any direct Malian 
military action in a short term, because the current 
volatility of the situation in the north meant such action 
could itself create a northern battlefield.  Moreover, as the 
GSPC had as yet not attacked any Malian installations, he was 
loathe to risk GSPC retaliation that could injure or kill 
Malian civilians.  He also noted that the Malian military had 
attempted an action against the GSPC in 2003, and sustained 
serious casualties. 
 
¶7.  (C)  As for eventual U.S. assistance towards the northern 
Mali problem,  ATT reiterated his intention to welcome Tuareg 
militants who accepted the accords to transit camps, from 
which they would be dispersed into regular military units, as 
well as to create one specialized unit to operate in the 
north.   He expressed keen interest in continued regular 
training events with U.S. forces such as the ongoing JCET, 
and requested that this training be expanded at the 
appropriate time to include units in Tessalit, and even, 
eventually, the new special unit for the north. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶8. (S) As he prepares to launch his campaign for re-election 
in 2007, ATT remains restive about the possibility that 
intemperate actions from any number of the concerned parties 
could destabilize Mali's delicate north.  While his plan to 
seek high-level concertation on next steps is a genuine 
reflection of that concern, it has the probable ancillary 
benefit of prolonging the lack of a definitive resolution. 
Presidential candidate ATT has good reason to hope to limp 
along without northern fireworks until after the Presidential 
elections, now less than six months away.  As for the U.S. 
role, we need to balance our goal of denying space to or 
eliminating the GSPC from northern Mali with our larger 
long-term objectives of supporting a stable and democratic 
Mali and enhancing the country's capacity to address multiple 
security threats in the north.  While we should explore how 
to expand our training calendar with Malian security forces, 
we must tread carefully to keep the U.S. footprint as light 
as possible.  Mali's civilian and military leadership is 
unanimous in seeking expanded engagement with U.S. forces, 
but President Toure is manifestly reluctant to consider a 
sustained U.S. presence in northern Mali, particularly if 
this could throw his military into a conflict with the GSPC. 
McCulley