VZCZCXRO2321
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #1290/01 3111729
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071729Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6427
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC 0008

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 001290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON ML
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ATT'S TRIP TO U.S. TO WITNESS 
SIGNING OF MCC COMPACT 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 01031 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 01112 
     ¶C. BAMAKO 01154 
 
BAMAKO 00001290  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.(C)  Summary:  President Amadou Toumani Toure's (ATT) 
upcoming visit to the U.S. to witness the signing of Mali's 
compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
provides an opportunity to highlight our strong relationship 
with this moderate, stable Muslim democracy, that stands as 
an example for West Africa and beyond.  ATT's visit also 
offers an important opportunity to discuss the continued 
presence of an al-Qaida affiliate, the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC), in Mali, recent fighting between 
the GSPC and the Tuareg rebel group known as the Alliance for 
Democracy and Change (ADC), and what role the U.S. could play 
in improving northern Mali's security situation.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Democracy and International Engagement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.(SBU)  Mali faces many challenges, including its status as 
one of the poorest nations in the world, poor literacy and 
health indicators, food security concerns and the presence of 
terrorist elements in the country's sparsely populated 
northern regions.  The U.S. has a significant stake in 
ensuring that Mali is able to adequately address these 
challenges. 
 
3.(C)  Mali has a strong human rights record, and is one of 
the few members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) rated as free by Freedom House.  Mali is also a 
responsible and engaged international partner.  It is active 
in the United Nations and other international organizations, 
has participated in several international peacekeeping 
operations, and is the current Chair of the Community of 
Democracies.  After a Hugo Chavez visit in July 2007 (in 
which he offered Mali 100 million dollars in oil), Mali made 
public statements supporing Venezuela's Security Council 
candidacy.  Folowing Chavez's remarks to the United Nations 
in Sptember, however, Mali changed its position and 
upported Guatemala.  The Foreign Minister explicity tied 
the change to the realization that Mali's vote must ensure 
the continued possibility of a viable security council (he 
also strenuously denied reports that Mali's permanent 
representative had voted for Venezuela in the 12th round of 
voting as categorically impossible). 
 
4.(SBU)  Mali's status as a moderate Muslim democracy with 15 
years of democratic progress means the U.S. has a 
considerable stake in ensuring the success of the April 2007 
presidential and June 2007 legislative elections.  These 
follow three successful presidential elections since 1992, 
including the 2002 poll that brought ATT to office.  Amidst a 
gaggle of 104 political registered political parties in Mali, 
only 17 are represented in Parliament, and only a handful of 
these are truly national in character.  ATT enjoys the 
support of most of the main political parties, while 
eschewing specific party membership, claiming the mantle of a 
political independent, or "consensus" leader.  Until 
recently, the absence of a declared opposition party enabled 
Muslims to describe their political system as one of 
consensus.  Although no one, including ATT, has officially 
announced their candidacy for 2007, the two main candidates 
are ATT and National Assembly President Ibrahim Boubakar 
Keita (IBK), one of ATT's main challengers for the Presidency 
in 2002.   Although ATT remains the odds-on favorite, 
instability in northern Mali, the increasingly combative 
nature of the 2007 presidential campaign, and the fact that 
IBK may view 2007 as his last political chance means this 
could be one of the most hard-fought elections since Mali's 
democratic transition.  It is vital to U.S. interests in Mali 
and West Africa that the 2007 presidential election 
strengthens rather than weakens Malian democracy.   President 
Toure may request USG resources to support the electoral 
process during his visit; the Embassy will propose possible 
assistance programs septel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Tuaregs, Salafists and Security in Northern Mali 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5.(C)  Mali's sparsely populated northern regions (Timbuktu, 
Gao and Kidal) have long served as a haven for terrorist 
groups and smugglers.  Mali's small security apparatus is 
unable to control the country's long and porous borders.  An 
 
BAMAKO 00001290  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
attack by Tuareg rebels on Malian military bases in the town 
of Kidal (and the desertion of the military commander of the 
base at Menaka) on May 23, 2006, further complicated northern 
Mali's political and security situation.  Mali has weathered 
two earlier Tuareg rebellions (one from 1962-1964 and a 
second from 1990-1996), and for many Malians, the May 23 
events constituted a serious setback for the national 
reintegration process begun at the end of the second 
rebellion in 1996.  The U.S. has maintained that the ADC-GOM 
conflict is an internal one between Malian Muslims that must 
be resolved by Malians. 
 
6.(C)  On July 4 the GOM and Tuareg rebels (now known as the 
Alliance for Democracy and Change, or ADC) signed the Algiers 
Accords.    The Accords, while skirting the ADC's demand of 
political "autonomy" for Mali's northern region of Kidal, 
incorporated the ADC into the restructuring of key local 
government institutions in exchange for the return of weapons 
stolen during the May 23 attacks.  Unfortunately, the GOM and 
ADC have been unable to implement controversial elements of 
the Accords, such as the repositioning of Malian military 
units in Kidal, the disarmament of the ADC, and the 
"reintegration" of Tuareg combatants back into the Malian 
military via the creation of special "all-nomad" military 
units.  Two battles between Algeria-backed ADC fighters and 
the GSPC (most recently on October 23) have dimmed the 
likelihood of ADC disarmament and sparked concern that the 
Accords may have been overtaken by events.  ATT and the GOM 
have not yet articulated a policy on the continued 
implementation of the Accords or the ADC-GSPC conflict in the 
north, complicating our ability to assess the best way our 
already-active military engagement with Mali might support 
positive outcomes. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
MCC: Joining a Robust Bilateral Relationship 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7.(SBU) The signing of a Millennium Challenge Account compact 
with Mali will make the U.S. the largest bilateral donor in 
Mali, cement strong U.S. - Mali relations, and better 
position Mali as a force for stability in a politically 
fragile region.  Other significant USG contributions to 
Mali's socio-economic development and security (figures from 
(FY 2006) via the Department of State, USAID, DOD, Peace 
Corps, NIH and CDC include: 
 
--USD 16.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds 
 
--USD 15.3 million in Development Assistance funds 
 
--USD 1.5 million from the President's Africa Education 
Initiative per year for teacher training 
 
--USD 600,000 for the Ambassador's Girls' Scholarship Program 
 
--Cutting edge health research in areas including Malaria and 
HIV/AIDS, creating a center of excellence drawing scientists 
from across Africa and the U.S. university sphere 
 
Additional key programs include the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, Joint 
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events and DOD-administered 
humanitarian assistance funds to build schools, health 
clinics and wells throughout northern Mali.  Mali is also a 
crucial partner in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism 
Partnership. 
 
-------------------------- 
The North Raises Questions 
-------------------------- 
 
8.(C)  Given the fast-evolving nature of developments in the 
north, key questions for ATT during his U.S. visit include: 
 
   -- How can the USG further assist the GOM to improve peace 
and security in northern Mali?  Is the GOM intent on 
implementing the Algiers Accords and moving forward with 
rebel disarmament, Malian military repositioning and the 
re-integration of Tuareg fighters under the command of the 
Malian armed forces? 
 
   -- What is the GOM's position on the ADC-GSPC conflict? 
What is the GOM's plan for preventing the GSPC from using 
Malian territory as a safe-haven? 
 
   -- What role does the GOM envision for the U.S. regarding 
the implementation of the Accords and the continued training 
of Malian military units? 
 
BAMAKO 00001290  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
McCulley