VZCZCXRO8463
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4361/01 3301747
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261747Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8199
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SA IQ
SUBJECT: TALABANI, BARZANI, HASHIMI MEET TO DISCUSS 
MODERATE COALITION PARTICIPATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, 
Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi, and Kurdistan Regional 
Government President Masud Barzani gave the Ambassador a 
readout of the November 24 PCNS meeting during a meeting on 
November 25 to develop plans for a broad moderate coalition. 
Hashimi said in today's meeting he was willing to work with 
the U.S. to fight against terrorism provided the U.S. 
protects Sunnis from Shia militias and unitary Iraqi security 
forces that work with them.  Hashimi agreed to draft a paper 
on his expectations for the outcome of the PCNS to be 
presented at a meeting that will include SCIRI leader Abd 
al-Aziz al-Hakim and bring in the Prime Minister after 
getting Hakim's blessing.  The participants agreed that 
Maliki should remain Prime Minister, and Talabani will delay 
his trip to Iran until November 28.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Government (Mis) Organization, Lack of Decision-making 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C) Talabani, Barzani, and Hashimi reported on the PCNS 
meeting the night before.  The meeting had focused on the 
issues of violence and government performance in a direct and 
frank exchange.  They agreed the government has not 
implemented an effective program because of a flawed 
decision-making process and a lack of trust inside 
institutions such as the Ministry of Interior and the 
Ministry of Defense.  Militias and terrorists have undermined 
the government, they said.  They agreed the lack of 
organization in the government hinders the establishment of 
clear objectives on key issues such as terrorism, militias, 
and regional interference.  The GOI needs a plan on security, 
effectiveness of government, and what changes need to be made 
to staffing and the government program.  People in government 
do not share the same goals and some are using government for 
their own goals. 
 
¶3. (C) Vice President Hashimi said if lack of trust is the 
issue, if the Prime Minister does not trust the Sunnis, 
Sunnis would be happy to leave the government.  He said given 
the GOI failure to reach decisions, it would be better to be 
outside the government.  He said, however, if Sunnis are 
included in decision-making then they will share the burden 
as well of confronting terrorists and extremists, but the 
Shia must take responsibility for the militias. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Sunni Cooperation Contingent on U.S. 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) In today's meeting Hashimi said he represents those 
Sunnis willing to work against terrorism.  His Iraqi Islamic 
Party (IIP) thinks that killing U.S. soldiers is against 
Sunni interests, and wants a partnership for building a 
democratic Iraq.  He said the U.S. military also needs a new 
strategy to fight terror.  It works poorly with locals and it 
responds slowly.  The two Kurdish leaders said the government 
and the Coalition should be grateful that the IIP is willing 
to take on AQI in Anbar. 
 
¶5. (C) The Sunnis are willing to work with the U.S. in turn 
and provide intelligence and people to fight the terrorists; 
the U.S. in turn must protect Sunnis and support moderate 
Sunni political leaders.  He claimed he does not know what 
the U.S. wants from the Sunnis.  Hashimi said there must be 
an understanding between the U.S. and the Sunnis on their 
responsibilities.  He said they need clarity on what the U.S. 
wants and what they can do.  The issue is the reform of 
security institutions penetrated by JAM.  Hashimi argued that 
the U.S. needs to bring in more forces to protect Sunnis from 
the Shia militias and the MOI and MOD units penetrated by 
JAM.  Participants agreed that JAM wants to be the Hizballah 
of Iraq, and the GOI needs to deal with it now; otherwise, 
JAM will become entrenched and an institutionalized 
government within a government.  Barzani and Talabani agreed 
that, if asked, they could provide 30,000 peshmerga to 
contribute to securing Baghdad.  Hashimi said he would agree 
to this if he is given specifics on their responsibilities in 
order to prepare the public for their arrival. 
 
¶6. (C) Barzani said he had never heard such a clear and 
positive message and such a willingness to take 
responsibility from Hashimi before.  He urged the Shia to 
cooperate by confronting the militias and penetrated security 
forces. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00004361  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador told Hashimi there had been great 
efforts to bring the Sunnis into the political process, but 
it has not produced fruitful results.  Hashimi replied this 
was because those who fund the insurgents are calling the 
shots.  The Sunni insurgents get their money from two 
sources:  1) Iran and Syria and 2) Arab businessman in the 
Gulf states.  The U.S. and Gulf states need an effective 
strategy to buy off the insurgents.  Using the military alone 
is ineffective. 
 
--------------- 
The Way Forward 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Hashimi agreed to draft a paper encapsulating his 
proposal for the outcome of the PCNS meeting and how to deal 
with Iraq's problems (SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim is 
also meeting to develop concepts and ideas; on November 26 
they will meet to see if their two drafts can be reconciled 
before bringing the consolidated draft to Maliki.) 
 
¶9. (C) During a discussion on cabinet changes, everyone in 
attendance agreed there was not a realistic alternative to 
Maliki as Prime Minister, but Maliki wants Sunni Deputy Prime 
Minister Zubai replaced.  They suggested holding weekly 
meetings between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime 
Ministers to streamline decision-making. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Talabani Agrees to Delay Iran Trip 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) At the Ambassador's urging, Talabani said he had 
decided to postpone today's scheduled trip to Iran; he 
currently plans to leave on November 28.  Hashimi told the 
Ambassador on November 24 that he had been invited by the 
King of Jordan to meet prior to the upcoming November 29-30 
visit to Jordan by President Bush, but he offered to push 
back his November 26 departure date until Talabani leaves for 
Iran.  Talabani said Vice President Adil al-Mahdi will return 
from Tehran tonight. 
KHALILZAD