VZCZCXYZ0037
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAC #1158/01 3201817
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161817Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5038
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ3/SCJ33/SCJ34/SOCSO LNO//
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 001158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2026 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR KICC PTER PINR BR VZ AR PA
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY PERHAPS RETHINKS MILITARY IMMUNITIES 
 
REF: A. ASUNCION 1020 
     ¶B. ASUNCION 1023 
 
Classified By: DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick.  Reasons: 1.4 (C and D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Since officially informing the Embassy in 
early October that that the Paraguayan government does not 
intend to renew immunities for US military exercises, 
domestic criticism of that decision has mounted, spurred by 
proximity to local elections and concerns re Venezuelan and 
Bolivian regional intentions.  With the November 19 municipal 
elections likely to serve as a bellwether for the Duarte 
Frutos administration, the government privately suggests it 
is reconsidering its position -- while anxious to limit the 
political damage of any "flip flop" in its position before 
then.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) The political situation here has changed somewhat 
since FM Ramirez confirmed to the Ambassador October 3 that 
Paraguay had decided not to extend immunities to U.S. 
participants in military exercises beyond December of this 
year.  The government,s earlier public announcement was 
initially lauded by its supporters - only to be surprised by 
the sustained intensity of criticism from many quarters. 
(Indeed, some elements of the government were clearly caught 
off guard by the announcement, as well.) Ongoing concerns 
here re possible Bolivian revanchism towards the Chaco region 
and Venezuela,s role in the region has led to widespread 
calls for increased defense spending - and for a closer 
defense relationship with the United States.  After years of 
studiously ignoring the issue, members of Congress are 
suddenly in a mad scramble to see who among them can be seen 
as the biggest supporter of proposals for major increases in 
defense purchases. 
 
VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE WEIGHS IN 
================================= 
¶3. (C) The government subsequently informed post that the 
government in fact seeks to actually strengthen defense ties. 
 DCM and Pol Chief met November 1 with JuAN Carlos Facetti, 
defense advisor to Vice President Castiglioni.  Facetti 
informed that the President and VP had met privately and 
decided to offer the USG "equal treatment" ("igualdad") with 
the Brazilian and Argentine military. The President remained 
opposed to "total immunity" but was amenable to "functional 
immunity" for U.S. military personnel. In fact, the President 
sought to strengthen and broaden U.S. military cooperation in 
traditional and non-traditional areas. Facetti noted that the 
government intended to submit to Congress soon its proposed 
renewal of Brazil,s 5-year agreement and would like to 
submit an identical agreement with the US to Congress for 
simultaneous approval.  When Emboffs noted that the President 
had recently rejected "A&T status" for the U.S. only now to 
seemingly accept it, Facetti suggested that there had not 
been very clear briefing of the President before he rejected 
the proposed U.S. agreement.  Facetti was crestfallen when 
informed, per informal conversations with DC, that the 
Brazilian proposed text was a clear non-starter for the USG. 
Pol Chief informally provided Facetti with an 
English-language copy of the new draft SOFA text recently 
approved for global use in the Circular 175 process (reftel). 
 
¶4. (C) Facetti called back November 2 to inform that the Vice 
President, Foreign Minister Ramirez, and Vice Foreign 
Minister Gonzalez Franco had already met and agreed that the 
U.S. draft text appeared consistent with the President,s 
wishes.  He proposed DCM raise the issue in a forthcoming 
meeting (already planned) with Gonzalez Franco. 
 
FOREIGN MINISTRY ALSO KEEPS THE DOOR OPEN 
========================================= 
¶5. (C) In their November 6 meeting, DCM shared the draft 
English text directly with Gonzalez Franco.  In the presence 
of his staff, Gonzalez Franco gave no hint of having ever 
seen the text before.  He did, however, reiterate that the 
President sought "igualdad" for the U.S. and systematically 
parroted Facetti,s points that the government was intent on 
expanding U.S. military cooperation, both via humanitarian 
assistance programs as well as traditional military exercises 
and training.  He was appreciative of the recently announced 
IMET waiver and of the offer of GPOI funds (the details of 
which DCM shared with Gonzalez Franco at this meeting). 
Substantively, Gonzalez Franco asked if the U.S. would find 
it objectionable for the USG to have A&T immunities cover all 
those assigned to the Embassy under such a SOFA agreement, 
but privileges (e.g., import rights, tax-free privileges) 
would only be extended to any individuals assigned to post 
for two years or longer.  (NOTE:  This is in keeping with the 
Brazilian and Argentine agreements. END NOTE.) 
 
¶6. (C) Procedurally, Gonzalez Franco asked whether, if/when a 
final text were agreed, an exchange of notes was sufficient 
for the U.S. or whether some other mechanism would be 
required, and whether such an agreement would require U.S. 
congressional approval.  DCM noted the USG sought a 
substantive agreement with the GOP, that we were flexible on 
the exact procedures and that such an agreement does not 
require U.S. legislative approval or ratification.  Gonzalez 
Franco said both the Brazilian and any U.S. agreement would 
have to go to their Congress for approval -- as would any 
subsequent entry of "troops" as opposed to "technicians" (the 
word used in the Brazilian and Argentine texts for all those 
assigned to their milgroups here).  MEDRETE personnel, he 
suggested, should be viewed as "technicians," not troops. 
Asked whether the USG was opposed to a multi-year agreement, 
DCM noted that a longer-term agreement had clear benefits, 
starting with avoiding the need to detail far in advance 
every single proposed exercise; it could also reduce the 
political expense of renegotiating the agreement with us (and 
resubmitting to their Congress) every single year. 
 
¶7. (C) DCM also provided the Vice Minister a copy of the 
signed letter from General Kanazawa confirming GOP approval 
for the December Medical Readiness Training Exercise 
(MEDRETE), as the second-phase of a MEDRETE visit to Paraguay 
last February.  DCM noted the Embassy understood there was 
some GOP interagency confusion as to the status of this 
MEDRETE under the terms of the current bilateral agreement on 
immunities and that we were informing them so as to ensure 
proper interagency coordination.  DCM noted that the MEDRETE 
constituted a dozen or so unarmed doctors, typically 
reservist surgeons, who would be doing follow-up care to 
previous patients as well as extending care to new patients. 
The MEDRETEs, he concluded, were hugely popular within both 
the government and opposition ranks; as such we saw no reason 
for government concern but wanted them to understand that we 
believed we had the authorities necessary for the MEDRETE (as 
Kanazawa reports directly to the President). Gonzalez Franco 
promised to get back to post regarding both the MEDRETE and 
the draft agreement, noting that &these issues are being 
decided at the very highest levels of government.8 
 
COMMENT 
======= 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  All Paraguayan political parties are 
 
consumed by last-minute campaigning for the November 19 
municipal elections, the results of which are already 
expected to serve as a mid-term referendum on the Duarte 
Frutos administration.  The government seems genuinely 
surprised at how vociferous the domestic criticism has been 
at their decision to not renew immunities, but unwilling to 
pursue the issue further until they see the elections in the 
rear view mirror.  The Ambassador is to meet anew with the 
Foreign Minister November 21. The issues of immunities, 
MEDRETEs and military cooperation will no doubt lead off the 
discussion.  END COMMENT. 
CASON