VZCZCXRO5021
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHAN #1307/01 3251226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211226Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3895
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0736
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 001307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EAID KISL CN
SUBJECT: INTER-ISLAND TENSION THREATENS COMOROS' UNITY 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES D. MCGEE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Officials of the Government of the Union of the 
Comoros (GOC) expressed anxiety to the Ambassador, during 
his November 2006 visit, that the tension between the Union and 
Anjouan Island Governments could split the fragile union. Efforts by 
the forward-looking Sambi government to promote Comoros' development 
are being hampered by a pervasive lack of resources, adding fuel to 
the internal criticism of the GOC. High-level GOC officials suggested 
French government involvement in Comoros' internal affairs was targeted 
to destabilize the Sambi government before the next elections. The 
Ambassador stressed to his GOC counterparts the importance of 
maintaining the union and working together for the betterment of the 
Comoran people, a point that will bear repeating in the first meeting 
of the U.S.-Comoros Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
TROUBLE IN PARADISE 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (C) On a visit to the Union of the Comoros November 13 to 15, 
Ambassador McGee, Political Officer, Public Affairs Officer, and 
Defense Attache met with Union President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, 
Union Government Ministers, Island Presidents Fazul (of Moheli) 
and Mohamed Bacar (of Anjouan), and Regional Commanders of the Army. 
Having successfully elected Sambi as Union President in May 2006, the 
next elections will choose the three separate Island Presidents; one 
purpose of the visit was to assess the political environment for these 
March 2007 elections. The tension between the Union and Island 
Governments, particularly that of Anjouan, was a theme underlying most 
of the Ambassador's discussions. Island leaders had a number of 
criticisms for the Union Government, ranging from a general lack of 
communication, to differences in educational standards, to the 
perception that island governments are not getting their share of 
national revenues. Anjouan Island President Bacar alleged (without 
proof) that Sambi has received USD 2 million from Iran and USD 10 
million from Saudi Arabia, none of which is accounted for in the 
national treasury.  This claim sounds exaggerated; however, in their 
effort to pull Comoros out of poverty and to maintain the integrity of 
the union, GOC officials are openly building relationships and seeking 
assistance from a wide range of international partners.  In doing so, 
the Minister of External Relations promised Ambassador McGee that 
Comoros will not accept funds that come with questionable strings 
attached, saying "We prefer to rest in our misery than to create a new 
misery with no end." 
 
¶3. (C) The focal point of the tension lies between Union President 
Sambi (now based in Grand Comores) and Anjouan Island President Bacar, 
although both come from the island of Anjouan. Union Government 
officials in Grand Comores depicted a power-hungry Island President 
Bacar -- widely known for his separatist ideas -- intent on making 
trouble in the coming election. GOC officials claim that bringing the 
historically rebellious Anjouan back into the fold prior to the island 
presidential elections in March 2007 is a major priority, not to 
undermine island autonomy, but to consolidate a sense of national 
unity. It would also guarantee the stability needed to attract 
foreign investment, reassure the Comoran people and build the 
country's credibility. President Sambi requested U.S. assistance in 
establishing a central government presence throughout the country by 
establishing Union offices and residences and assisting in the 
formation and training of national army branches on the islands (read: 
Anjouan) in the months preceding the March elections (septel). 
President Sambi wants this "Army of National Development" to include 
hygiene, infrastructure development, electricity, agriculture and 
medical services as part of its mission, but the more immediate 
objective is clearly to keep Anjouan in line. 
 
¶4. (C) A number of high-level GOC officials, including the Minister of 
External Relations, alluded to the involvement of the French government 
in Comoros' internal affairs -- namely in financially supporting 
President Bacar in Anjouan and an anti-Sambi coalition on Grand Comores 
-- with the ultimate goal of destabilizing the Sambi government in the 
March 2007 elections. Post was not able to extract a convincing 
rationale for such French involvement.  Unlikely explanations ranged 
from France's desire to control (as yet undiscovered) deep-sea oil 
deposits to its need to prevent Comoros' ability to reclaim the fourth, 
French-administered, Comoran island of Mayotte. It was difficult to 
determine whether such warnings were genuine or designed to raise alarm 
in, and elicit funding from, the U.S. 
 
¶5. (C) The meeting with Island President Bacar painted a more nuanced 
picture, suggesting there are elements of truth on both sides. Bacar 
criticized Sambi for dragging his feet in implementing legislative 
measures guaranteeing island autonomy and for failing to deliver on his 
campaign promises, pointing out that teacher salary payments remained 
well past due. President Bacar warned that if Sambi continues to run 
 
ANTANANARI 00001307  002 OF 002 
 
 
the country like this, there will be "some sort of incident after the 
upcoming election."  However, he acknowledged the three islands of 
Comoros need to stay unified to move forward, "we do not want to go 
back in history." Bacar insisted his goal is simply greater autonomy 
for the islands within that union. His criticism of Sambi's efforts to 
date is not uncommonly heard throughout the islands, but Post believes 
it is a lack of resources -- and not a lack of willingness -- that 
hampers the performance of the Union Government. 
 
TOO MANY ELECTIONS? 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (U) While preparations for the March island presidential 
elections have not yet begun, much of the infrastructure from 
the May 2006 presidential elections -- such as ballot boxes 
and voter registration lists -- remains largely in place. 
Ambassador McGee raised the possibility of grouping elections 
in the future to avoid donor fatigue.  GOC officials are aware 
of the problem but are unclear how or when to move forward 
without opening themselves to criticism for cutting the tenure of a 
particular elected group. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶7. (C) After decades of instability, Comoros' newfound 
democracy is in a fragile state. GOC officials are concerned as they 
find it difficult to establish control over the three-island 
union. The paranoia over French intervention in Comoros' internal 
politics seems exaggerated, but there is a historical precedent with 
French involvement in at least five coups in the Comoros in the past. 
Throughout his meetings, the Ambassador emphasized that U.S. 
cooperation with Comoros can only move forward with a peaceful and 
unified government. Post urges that this message be reconfirmed in the 
First Quarter of 2007 when the first meeting of the U.S.-Comoros Joint 
Committee for Bilateral Cooperation is scheduled to take place. 
END COMMENT. 
 
McGEE