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P 011526Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY

S E C R E T ANKARA 006230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MPOS PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY STRESSES IRAQ AND PKK TO VISITING 
ARMY COS GEN SCHOOMAKER 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  Iraq and the PKK dominated US Army Chief of 
Staff Schoomaker,s meetings in Ankara October 27 with his 
host Turkish Land Forces Commander Gen. Basbug and with TGS 
CHOD Gen. Buyukanit.  The Turks expressed anxiety about 
developments in Iraq and possible trends in US policy; 
complained again about KRG representation in the 
US-Turkey-Iraq trilateral process on the PKK; and called 
Kirkuk potential &dynamite8 that could undermine efforts to 
form a unified, successful Iraq.  On Afghanistan, Gen. 
Buyukanit said Turkey can provide additional forces for ISAF, 
but any deployment to fight terrorists in the south of the 
country would require parliamentary approval; he did not 
repeat earlier arguments that Turkey,s peacekeeping 
commitments abroad and PKK requirements at home preclude any 
additional forces.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) On Iraq/the PKK, the Turks emphasized the following 
points. 
 
-- Iraq,s political unity and territorial integrity are 
vital to Turkish interests and for the region.  Recent 
developments worry Turkey.  Division along sectarian lines 
will not solve Iraq,s problems and might make them worse. 
Gen. Basbug complained that Turkey,s advice on Iraq going 
back to 2002-2003 had been disregarded, including for example 
on the importance of proportional representation for all the 
key communities in Iraqi political and security institutions. 
 Nevertheless, Gen. Basbug said, Turkey does not want to see 
any change in US policy on Iraq (division of the country, 
premature withdrawal, etc.). 
 
-- The PKK presence in northern Iraq remains a serious 
problem and source of frustration for this country.  Turkey 
supports Gen. Ralston,s initiative and understands he is 
very serious about it.  But the effort must succeed for the 
sake of Turkey,s terrorism problem and for the sake of 
US-Turkish relations; without this, relations will continue 
to deteriorate, and the damage won't be easily repaired.  The 
PKK problem cannot be resolved in one day, but taking real 
steps cannot take too much time, either.  Gen. Buyukanit said 
that he wants to come to the US in mid-February (per his 
invitation from CJCS Gen. Pace) with some results in hand on 
the PKK.  This will enable him to speak more effectively in 
the US and in Turkey on behalf of US-Turkish relations. 
 
-- Recent US emphasis on military force against the PKK as a 
&last resort8 had a very negative impact in Turkey.  The 
military option need not be and understandably will not be a 
large-scale US ground operation against the PKK, but a range 
of other actions could be considered -- e.g., seizing a PKK 
leader, a single air strike, etc.  These would have 
significant and very helpful impact. 
 
-- Gens. Buyukanit and Basbug reiterated their objections to 
Kurdistan Regional Government representation in 
US-Turkey-Iraq trilateral talks on the PKK.  Buyukanit said 
the Turkish government had received a formal note from the 
Baghdad authorities designating a KRG representative to the 
process (presumably Karim Sinjari).  The effect was to turn a 
tripartite process into a quadripartite one.  This was 
unacceptable, and Turkey has rejected it. 
 
-- Gen. Basbug restated Turkish concerns regarding Kirkuk, 
calling it &dynamite8 that could aggravate sectarian and 
other problems within Iraq.  He urged postponement of the 
2007 referendum and an overall approach to Kirkuk that would 
reflect broader consensus among all of Iraq,s various 
communities. 
 
¶3. (S) On Afghanistan, Gen. Buyukanit reviewed SACEUR,s 
requests for additional forces to fight in the south and 
Turkey,s argument that the mandate of ISAF, in which it 
continues to participate, does not include fighting 
terrorists.  He said Turkey can provide additional forces for 
ISAF, but extending Turkish fores to fight terrorists would 
require parliamentary approval here.  He added, however, that 
the situation in Afghanistan is not good and emphasized that 
NATO must be successful there.  Gen. Buyukanit did not repeat 
arguments he has made previously, including publicly, that 
the fight against the PKK and other peacekeeping commitments 
make it impossible to increase Turkey,s Afghanistan 
commitment, and he clearly said that this is not the 
 
military,s position.  In a separate discussion October 28 in 
Istanbul, Turkish Army 3rd Corps Commander and former 
commander of ISAF Lt. Gen. Erdagi argued to Gen. Schoomaker 
that NATO HRF commanders should not be stay-behinds if 
substantial elements of their headquarters are deployed with 
ISAF.  Erdagi did not address the issue of additional Turkish 
forces for ISAF. 
 
¶4. (S) Gen. Schoomaker said that no one in the US has any 
doubt about Turkey,s concerns regarding the PKK.  He had 
spoken with Gen. Ralston and believes he is approaching his 
mission in a practical, serious way.  Gen. Schoomaker 
affirmed the US commitment to a unified Iraq; said there is 
no discussion in official circles about dividing the country; 
and stressed that we see Iraq also in a broader regional 
context that must be looked at strategically.  He cautioned 
against over-interpreting electoral season statements and 
assessments by US political figures on Iraq issues and noted 
how long it took to fashion the US constitution and political 
order.  Gen. Schoomaker tried three times to turn the 
conversation to possibilities for Army-to-Army cooperation. 
Gen. Basbug twice turned the conversation back to the PKK, 
but later indicated some interest in learning lessons from 
the US Army,s experience in Iraq.  Subsequently at dinner on 
October 27, Gen. Basbug approached Gen. Schoomaker one-on-one 
with a much more positive message of serious interest in a 
range of Army-to-Army activities including education, 
training and staff talks. 
 
¶5. (S) In response to the Turkish generals, specific points 
about the PKK, Ambassador stressed the importance of the 
Ralston initiative.  Gen. Ralston,s step-by-step approach is 
producing results, including the closure of PKK offices and a 
GOI statement that the PKK is a terrorist organization -- 
significant, if imperfect policy changes.  We understand that 
more is needed, and it is essential to support the work of 
Gens. Ralston and Baser, which holds the promise of changing 
a negative in our relations into a positive.  Regarding the 
tripartite process, Ambassador said that Gen. Ralston 
believes he has one counterpart designated by the Iraqi 
government, al-Waili.  Whom the Iraqi government includes 
within its delegation/group working to support al-Waili on 
the PKK is its business.  As Gen. Ralston noted on his first 
visit to Ankara, he believes that some connection with 
Barzani and the KRG will be important for producing results, 
but this connection should be through the authorities in 
Baghdad and definitely not one that turns the effort into a 
four-party process that includes the KRG in a formal way.  In 
any case, Gen. Ralston wants to work for the time being on a 
US-Turkey and US-Iraq basis, and no formal trilateral is 
imminent. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment:  The Turkish generals, points to Gen. 
Schoomaker, especially regarding Iraq and the PKK, foreshadow 
the approach that TGS DCHOD Gen. Saygun and Gen. Buyukanit 
himself will take during their respective counterpart visits 
to the US in mid-November and mid-February.  On the overall 
Iraq problem, the Turks are increasingly uneasy about 
developments there and rhetoric in the US that could bear 
negatively our long-term commitent.  Saygun and Buyukanit 
will be seeking a clearer sense of US plans in Iraq and the 
role that we would like for Turkey to play. 
 
¶7. (U) Gen. Schoomaker cleared this message. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON