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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 TEGUCIGALPA 001881 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESC, WHA/EPSC, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN 
STATE FOR D, E, P, AND WHA 
TREASURY FOR JHOEK 
NSC FOR DAN FISK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2036 
TAGS: ETRD EPET ENRG PGOV VZ HO
SUBJECT: (S) HONDURAS UNDER CAFTA:  AFTER SIX MONTHS, 
LITTLE TO SHOW 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Six months have passed since CAFTA entered 
into force for Honduras. President Zelaya's support was key 
to getting Honduras on board, and he continues to profess his 
support for capitalism and free markets.  Yet when faced with 
making the reforms necessary to let a free market develop, 
the GOH has too often resorted instead to policies that favor 
state intervention, protection, and the entrenched elites. 
This cable considers recent examples from a wide-range of 
economic sectors, and asks whether Honduras is really taking 
advantage of the opportunity (and challenge) presented by 
CAFTA.  The record is mixed, but in the matters of most 
consequence tends towards the negative. On paper Honduras is 
in an excellent position for strong future growth.  In 
reality, the GOH is coasting on the previous administration's 
economic successes, and unless the Zelaya administration can 
generate its own momentum for reform, it risks squandering 
one of its best-ever opportunities to pull itself up out of 
poverty.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
entered into force for Honduras on April 1, 2006, following 
several months of break-neck legislative and regulatory 
reform by the GOH.  Starting in meetings during the 
transition period after winning the Presidency on November 
26, 2005, Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya Rosales made it clear that 
CAFTA's entry into force was one of his top priorities.  New 
to the realm of international trade agreements, Zelaya 
questioned grace periods included in CAFTA for sensitive 
products, and instead expressed his preference for moving 
Honduras immediately to fully competitive markets.  At the 
time, Post did not doubt the genuineness or depth of Zelaya's 
dedication to the overarching principle of free trade.  To 
Post's consternation, however, in each significant individual 
decision since entry into force, the GOH has chosen the more 
protectionist, less market-oriented solution to economic 
challenges.  Those GOH agencies and leaders eager to move 
forward with positive, market-oriented reforms are hindered 
by budgetary inertia and intra-governmental disorganization. 
Post does not doubt Zelaya's personal dedication to the ideal 
of competition, but we question whether he fully understands 
what steps are needed to move towards such an outcome and 
whether he has the political will to make such steps a 
reality. 
 
¶3. (U) The following is an illustrative list of significant 
economic developments over the first six months of CAFTA. 
Most have been reported extensively septels, and will only be 
summarized here. 
 
------------------------------------- 
The Good News: Some Pro-CAFTA Reforms 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR):  GOH efforts on 
IPR have tended to run hot and cold, but under CAFTA the GOH 
has nevertheless made significant advances that, if 
continued, should help spur investment.  CAFTA restored 
ex-oficio powers to Honduran law enforcement, freeing them to 
crack down on pirates even without specific complaints being 
filed by the aggrieved party (often a major multinational 
with little time for filing the paperwork to justify each 
individual raid).  The IPR prosecutor's office has 
enthusiastically participated in several U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) training sessions, and has launched 
a few high-profile raids on pirated DVD and CD vendors.  The 
GOH has adopted a proactive IPR strategy (with significant 
behind-the-scenes input from Post) and the Vice President 
himself has adopted it as one of his issues.  Effective 
enforcement is still well in the future, and is significantly 
undermined by a dysfunctional judiciary, but the GOH deserves 
praise for its energetic first steps to come to grips with 
the IPR challenge. 
 
¶5.  (S) Puerto Cortes:  As the only significant deep water 
port in the region and the anchor for a regional export 
strategy, Puerto Cortes is a major competitive advantage for 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001881  002 OF 006 
 
 
Honduras.  Its 2004 self-certification to the International 
Maritime Organization, followed by kudos from the U.S. Coast 
Guard and selection for the Container Security and Megaports 
Initiatives, all mark the port as a major success.  On the 
downside, the port has had three non-technical directors in 
nine months and suffers from endemic corruption and relative 
inefficiency.  The newly named director of ports, Edwin 
Araque (former Deputy President of the Central Bank) told 
Post privately that his job is to confront the entrenched 
corruption.  In particular, he has been tasked with reducing 
the corrosive influence wielded by Marco Avila, a major 
Zelaya campaign contributor with a dark past.  Avila brags 
that he controls the port, and through his monopoly on cranes 
there he reportedly extorts funds from port users.  Araque 
claims Zelaya knows Avila must be confronted but since Avila 
was a significant campaign contributor Zelaya does not want 
to be in the forefront of such an effort.  Araque recognizes 
that he risks his life with this task, and Post will seek 
ways to support him in his efforts. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Road Infrastructure:  Closely related to the 
developmental impact of the Port is improving the road system 
to link the port to internal markets and to markets in 
neighboring Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador.  The 
previous GOH administration explicitly recognized this by 
making roads improvement the centerpiece of its Millennium 
Challenge compact.  The new administration, while recognizing 
the importance of roads, has suffered from very slow project 
execution.  The GOH has reluctantly accepted the necessity of 
funding road operations and maintenance (having been forced 
to do so as a conditionality under the MCC compact).  The 
comprehensive nature of the roads project under the MCC 
includes elements to improve transparency, accountability, 
evaluation, and sustainability over the long-term. It is 
hoped that success of this project will lead the GOH to adopt 
similar rigor in future infrastructure projects.  The highway 
project will be critical to the success of exploiting new 
market opportunities under CAFTA, and adopting these best 
practices for future project will be the key to sustainable 
growth for Honduras in the future. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Banking: The Honduran banking sector is another 
bright spot, as local banks slowly gear themselves up for the 
faster and more competitive regional and global markets that 
CAFTA will bring.  As Honduran trade and investment prepares 
to expand under CAFTA, regional banks have taken notice and 
aggressively entered the market.  Under threat, the Honduran 
banking sector is looking for ways to compete.  While still 
conservative to a fault, the banking sector has begun to 
reorient its attitudes towards more creative products and 
services.  Lack of access to credit has always been one of 
the biggest barriers to entry and expansion for would-be 
Honduran small and medium enterprises.  As the banking sector 
is weaned from dependence on government bonds, Post hopes to 
see credit to the private sector expand accordingly. 
Mortgage credit has already seen impressive growth, led by 
the regional banks.  The Honduran banks have a long way to 
go, but have at last apparently faced the reality of the 
emerging competition.  The GOH for its part embarked last 
year on a comprehensive set of banking sector regulatory 
reforms designed to bring the sector (eventually) up to Basel 
II standards.  GOH cooperation on anti-money-laundering has 
been outstanding, and ongoing efforts to reform the 
seized-assets office will only further strengthen these 
results. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Other Policies Are Major Steps Backwards 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Energy: By far the most worrisome development has 
been the post-CAFTA decision by the GOH to nationalize the 
importation of all fuels into the country.  This 
non-transparent process threatens to strip existing U.S. 
investors of their rights to participate in the sector, and 
could effectively strand millions of dollars in investments 
and force breach of contracts with suppliers and 
distributors.  The GOH explains the creation of a state-run 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001881  003 OF 006 
 
 
monopoly by claiming that it is a justifiable response to an 
alleged oligopoly, and that it is (bizarrely) a step on the 
road to liberalization of the sector.  Post assesses that our 
aggressive public and private interventions have 
significantly reduced the chances that this process will 
result in a political and economic alliance of the GOH with 
Venezuela under a PetroCaribe arrangement.  We also assess 
that we have largely stymied early attempts by politically 
influential powers (including former President Rafael 
Leonardo Callejas) to corruptly manipulate and personally 
profit from this scheme.  Despite these victories, Post still 
views the nationalization plan as profoundly misguided and 
likely non-compliant with CAFTA.  Depending how it is 
implemented, the damage from this scheme, and from the 
predicted follow-on lawsuits, could dramatically chill the 
investment climate here and set back by years Honduran 
efforts to spur investment-led growth and job creation.  With 
this one stroke, Honduras could lose the good will attained 
by joining CAFTA, while also calling into question the depth 
of its dedication to basic free-market principles. 
 
¶9.  (S) Presidential Meetings:  In private meetings with 
Ambassador, President Zelaya reiterates to his commitment to 
market reforms, but in public he contradicts himself.  On two 
occasions (June and September 2006) President Zelaya has met 
with POTUS.  Despite POTUS's counsel that POTUS did not 
understand how the fuel import scheme could work and that, 
were it his choice, he would not pursue it, Zelaya remains 
unswayed.  In a move that demonstrated lack of finesse and 
his reported bull-headed streak, President Zelaya exited each 
of the POTUS meetings publicly declaring that POTUS supported 
his plans, including the fuel scheme.  On both occasions Post 
was forced to issue statements correcting the record.  Post 
is concerned that despite receiving a strong message from the 
most senior level of the USG, Zelaya has failed to moderate 
his rhetoric or alter his plan.  Indeed, Zelaya went even 
further in a September 19 speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly, in which he used phrases evocative of the 
1970s to blast free markets. Post is at something of a loss 
as to how to explain Zelaya's apparent cognitive dissonance 
between supporting free trade as a concept and yet calling 
for a government nationalization and monopolization of the 
fuel imports sector. 
 
¶10.  (C) Mining: In the mining sector, the GOH has moved to 
ban open-pit mining for precious metals, alleging 
environmental damages.  A 'temporary' ban on new mining 
permits has been in effect since July 2004, but with no 
attendant movement towards a serious review of GOH processes 
and procedures to protect the environment.  Most precious 
metals mining in Honduras is conducted by foreign firms 
(including at least two U.S. firms), while most open pit 
mining for sand, gravel, and other resources -- excluded from 
the proposed ban -- is conducted by Honduran firms.  It is 
unclear whether the intent of the ban is to target foreign 
firms, to open space for Honduran investors to perhaps 
take-over lucrative precious metals mines, or whether the GOH 
is, as it claims, primarily motivated by concerns over the 
use of cyanide and other chemicals in gold and silver mining 
operations.  If the latter, a far more appropriate and 
targeted response would be improved environmental regulation, 
not a ban.  Nevertheless, the ban will likely go into effect, 
as there is no political will on either side of the aisle to 
stop it.  When it does, existing mines will be grandfathered, 
but expansions or new investments will almost certainly 
cease, effectively closing off this sector to foreign 
investment. 
 
¶11.  (C) Food Security: The GOH has altered for the worse its 
agricultural policies, moving away from proven successful 
methods of diversification into higher value added crops and 
toward subsidies for uneconomic basic grains.  This is not an 
obvious breach of CAFTA, but it is a significant step 
backwards from sustainable economic development policies for 
a country where 50 percent of the workforce is still on small 
and subsistence farms.  CAFTA is a tool to spur development, 
but it cannot do so without appropriate GOH policies to 
support it.  The GOH's return to discredited statist policies 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001881  004 OF 006 
 
 
of the past, subsidizing non-competitive crops, calls into 
question its will to challenge the traditional (but failed) 
agricultural model.  Worse, to fund these crop subsidies, the 
GOH plundered the agricultural sector budget, robbing funds 
from technical assistance programs, crop diversification 
programs, and even proposing to zero-out animal health 
programs, likely with expectations that donors would fill in 
the funding gaps.  This last cut would have left Honduras 
woefully unprotected against avian flu, and also unable to 
meet the sanitary standards needed to increase food exports 
to the U.S., again undermining one of the key benefits of 
CAFTA.  Post succeeded in getting the GOH to restore funding 
for the animal health inspection program, but we remain 
deeply concerned by the instinct that allowed the GOH to 
think such proposed cuts were ever a good idea. 
 
¶12.  (C) Telecommunications:  The long-awaited 
telecommunications reform bills remain stalled, as 
protectionist elements seek to preserve inefficient and 
bloated parastatal telephone company Hondutel.  A draft 2005 
bill was watered down and loaded up with pro-Hondutel and 
anti-free market provisions by the new Congress, and debate 
since then has largely centered on removing these 
objectionable articles.  The bill has been split into two, 
one to liberalize the sector and the other to strengthen 
Hondutel.  It is generally accepted that politically the two 
must pass at the same time if they are to pass at all. 
Honduran telecomms are reportedly CAFTA compliant now, thanks 
to a series of administrative decrees issued by the previous 
administration in late 2005.  However, the pending bill would 
formalize and lock-in those changes, and would set the stage 
for greater market opening.  For the time being, a number of 
investors (including U.S. investors) remain in limbo, 
promised a chance to compete on an equal footing but not yet 
given that chance.  Post is cautiously optimistic a bill will 
pass this year, though GOH Chief CAFTA Negotiator Melvin 
Redondo recently told Post that he fears the current version 
of the bill does not go far enough and might not be fully 
CAFTA compliant.  Post continues to watch this closely. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Fiscal Policy:  While not a formal part of CAFTA, 
a responsible fiscal policy is a necessary enabling element 
to the investment and growth CAFTA seeks to generate in 
Honduras.  There are signs the GOH fiscal discipline has 
eroded during the Zelaya Administration, culminating with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) failing to close its latest 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) review of 
Honduras, implying significant fiscal problems were 
discovered.  Deteriorating fiscal conditions or weaker Fund 
confidence in the GOH could cool investors on Honduras by 
increasing the perception (or reality) of investor risk. 
Another fiscal factor that more directly impacts investment 
is the GOH's under-execution of capital investment programs. 
Many of these programs relate to infrastructure, which 
directly supports economic activity and increased trade. 
Until the GOH can organize itself to begin disbursing 
effectively on these programs, the slowed construction will 
likely result in slower investment and trade than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Disorganization, Lack of Resources Magnify Challenges 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶14.  (C) The Competition Commission:  One of the successes of 
the early Zelaya Administration was passage of Honduras' 
first bill outlawing monopolistic market practices and unfair 
competition and establishing a Honduran Competition 
Commission (an anti-trust body, much like the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission.)  The legislation, under consideration 
since 1992, was finally passed in February 2006. 
Unfortunately, since then the GOH has demonstrated 
indications of lack of will to make this body effective by 
delaying any further action for months, and then proposing as 
one of three Commissioners the Chief Operating Officer of the 
cement monopoly.  (Note:  Minister of the Presidency Yani 
Rosenthal is President of that cement company.  End Note.) 
Outcry from several quarters, including a strong intervention 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001881  005 OF 006 
 
 
by Post with the President himself, forced withdrawal of the 
list.  Following another two months of dithering, the 
Honduran Congress named three acceptable commissioners, but 
the decree formalizing their nomination remains unsigned on 
the President's desk two months later.  In the meantime, the 
GOH has proposed to fund the Commission at only 60 percent of 
its minimum estimated start-up costs, dramatically decreasing 
the likelihood the Commission can be made effective by the 
December 2006 target date.  Until a budget is approved, the 
Commission has no access to any funds, meaning it cannot hire 
staff or ramp up activities to meet its legal mandates. 
While the Ministry of Finance focuses on other fiscal crises, 
funding other important initiatives lags.  In the meantime, 
monopolistic and crony-capitalist business practices continue 
to hamper economic development. 
 
¶15.  (C) Foreign Trade Institute: The Ministry of Commerce 
has yet to produce a comprehensive CAFTA implementation plan 
for Honduras, as illustrated by its failure to launch the 
legislatively-mandated Foreign Trade Institute.  This organ, 
designed to have been the central authority for the GOH to 
administer CAFTA, has yet to be formed or funded.  The 
institute was intended in part to retain the expertise of 
trade experts and negotiators, and to ensure the GOH had a 
critical mass of experts to implement CAFTA effectively. 
Lacking budget support and regulatory authority, the GOH 
announced in April that it would delay formation of the 
Institute until October.  As October begins, there is little 
sign the GOH is prepared yet to launch the body.  Early in 
the administration, Vice Minister of Trade and Industry Jorge 
"Coki" Rosa made public remarks opposing the Institute, 
remarks he was subsequently forced to retract.  In private 
conversations with Post, however, he blamed the failure to 
establish the Institute on the Minister.  Meanwhile, Minister 
Azcona claims that there are problems with the hiring 
procedures laid out by the legislation, a claim refuted by 
the private sector, which views her claims as stall tactics 
meant to limit private sector oversight of the Institute, as 
written its founding legislation. 
 
¶16.  (S) More recently, Rosa has intimated that his price for 
support of the project would be setting up the Institute as 
an independent organ, outside the Ministry of Trade, with 
himself as its head and carrying the rank of Minister. 
(Comment:  This would be a disaster, as Rosa appears 
concerned about his own advancement and that of his Liberal 
Party above all else.  Following a two hour presentation on 
the need for effective consumer protection, for example, 
Rosa's sole question to the presenters was how many Liberal 
Party members the new organ would hire.  In another example, 
Rosa backed India's very unhelpful proposal on renewable 
energy technology at the recent World Trade Organization 
talks, dismissing the U.S. proposal as containing "nothing" 
of interest to Honduras.  End Comment.)  The Minister and 
Vice Minister are reportedly not on speaking terms, further 
exacerbating the GOH's weak follow-through in developing 
CAFTA implementation strategies. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Corruption and Lack of Juridical Security 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Corruption/juridical security:  Casting a pall 
over every other aspect of doing business in Honduras is a 
clear and disturbing lack of juridical security.  Cited 
almost universally as the greatest impediment to investment 
here (even more than physical security), this pervasive 
corruption and lack of rule of law undermines every contract. 
 Land titles cannot be trusted, which not only increases 
costs and slows the process of building a plant, but also 
complicates access to credit as banks are wary of using such 
titles as collateral.  Rights and guarantees, such as patents 
and trademarks, are ephemeral, and Post is aware of cases in 
which registrations have vanished from the registries, 
permitting other firms to register infringing marks. 
Official decisions can be arbitrary, and public officials 
including judges are susceptible to both bribery and other 
forms of influence or pressure.  Even when caught, there is 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001881  006 OF 006 
 
 
rarely any sanction imposed on corrupt public officials. 
While official immunity was eliminated last year, official 
impunity remains the acknowledged standard. 
 
¶18.  (C) Juridical security continued:  Finally, there is a 
perception if not a reality that Honduran parties to lawsuits 
receive unfair advantage versus foreign parties.  For 
example, a U.S. mining company is being assessed a three 
million dollar judgment as the result of a case to which they 
are not even party, and in which the culpable party was 
determined to be the GOH itself.  In another case, a worker 
fired for cause was nevertheless awarded punitive damages 
from the U.S. employer.  He is now suing the firm's affiliate 
company -- for which he never worked -- for back wages and 
additional damages.  In a third recent case, when workers for 
a small Honduran apparel plant failed to win punitive damages 
from the firm, they sued the big U.S. firm to which the 
Honduran firm sold its products as a subcontractor.  Despite 
having nothing to do with the case (other than buying its 
products), the U.S. firm is potentially facing 2.5 million 
dollars in damages to another company's workers.  As a result 
of its treatment in this case, the U.S. firm -- which employs 
3000 Hondurans -- is contemplating pulling out of Honduras. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Comment:  President Zelaya repeatedly professes his 
support for capitalism and free markets.  Yet when faced with 
making the reforms necessary to let a free market develop, 
the GOH has too often resorted instead to discredited 
policies that favor state intervention, protection, and the 
entrenched elites.  As can be seen from the above list, the 
record is mixed, but in the matters of most consequence tends 
towards the negative.  Under the previous administration, 
Honduras spent four years building a solid macro economic 
foundation, securing debt relief, and winning approval of 
CAFTA.  Its economy is growing, its currency is stable, and 
inflation is under control.  Yet the policies of the new 
administration, while benefiting from this historical 
momentum, do not seem to build on and expand these trends. 
Zelaya's populist tendencies have left him unwilling to 
confront interest groups  (such as teachers) in promoting 
needed reforms, and all too willing to buy his way out of 
social confrontation though unsustainable state subsidies. 
This focus on the short-term, and on popular but largely 
unproductive subsidies of consumption, limits Honduras, 
ability to invest in true market reforming initiatives.  Such 
reforms could position Honduras to better take advantage of 
CAFTA by laying solid foundations for economic expansion.  On 
paper Honduras is in an excellent position for strong future 
growth.  In reality, the GOH is coasting on the previous 
administration's successes, and unless it can generate its 
own momentum for reform, it risks squandering one of its 
best-ever opportunities to pull itself up out of poverty. End 
Comment. 
 
Ford 
FORD