VZCZCXRO5492
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #3478/01 2841009
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111009Z OCT 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2524
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003478 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2026 
TAGS: ETTC UNSCR TW NKWG
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN GAMEPLAN REVIEW 
 
REF: BREMNER-NEELY EMAIL 10/06/2006 
 
Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, REASONS 1.4 B/C 
 
¶1.  (S) Taiwan has made significant export control gameplan 
progress in recent weeks.  This cable summarizes recent 
gameplan developments and responds to Ref A questions. 
 
Definitions of Taiwan's SCL and SHTC 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) Taiwan defines Sensitive High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) 
as including 1) items on the controlled lists provided by 
export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime; 2) items not included on the 
controlled lists, but whose end use is linked to the 
development of  nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and 
delivery systems; and 3) re-export of items imported with 
written assurances issued by Taiwan authorities.  Taiwan 
requires all SHTC items to have a license to be exported to 
any destination.  At the August 2005 negotiations, Taiwan 
agreed to also require export licenses for additional 
"sensitive commodities" bound for North Korea and Iran, and 
that U.S. agencies would be allowed to review all 
applications for export licenses for items bound for North 
Korea or Iran.  Taiwan considers items on this Sensitive 
Commodities List (SCL) to be an additional category of SHTC 
items only for direct or indirect exports to North Korea and 
Iran. 
 
Progress Made this Year 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) In January 2006, Taiwan implemented the requirement 
that all SHTC items exported to North Korea and Iran must 
have export licenses reviewed by U.S. agencies.  On June 1, 
Taiwan added 87 SCL items to its SHTC needing export licenses 
for export to Iran or North Korea.  On September 15, in 
support of UNSCR 1695, Taiwan further expanded its SCL to 
include all the 433 items recommended by U.S. agencies, and 
clarified that all SHTC/SCL items bound for North Korea or 
Iran must be listed on the ship's manifest and obtain 
official permission to transit Taiwan ports.  At the same 
time, Taiwan added new restrictions on travel and financial 
dealings with Iran and North Korea.  On September 28, Taiwan 
agreed to AIT procedures for sharing information on North 
Korean and Iranian visa applicants. 
 
Export License Review System Working 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Since January 2006, Taiwan has sent to U.S. agencies 
via AIT about 60 export licenses applications related to 
exports of SHTC/SCL items to Iran and North Korea.  Taiwan 
denied licenses in four cases, companies withdrew the 
application on learning of the proliferation risks in six 
cases, and two cases were withdrawn because of the lengthy 
application process. 
 
Transit/Transshipment Reviews Face Technical Issues 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (S) On September 15, Taiwan authorities issued a public 
notice informing shippers of the new transit/transshipment 
license requirement; however, full implementation of this 
gameplan requirement has been delayed pending resolution of 
technical details related to the time needed to review the 
license applications and the methods used by shipping agents. 
 
Investigations Stemming from Gameplan 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S) Since January 2006, the Taiwan Bureau of Foreign 
Trade (BOFT) has provided the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) with 
information on about 20 cases of suspected export control 
violations for investigation.  These cases involve at least 
five different companies, including multiple cases involving 
 
TAIPEI 00003478  002 OF 002 
 
 
Ching Hwee and She Hong.  Three of the 20 cases have been 
found to involve clear violations of export control 
regulations and have been turned over to local prosecutors 
for prosecution.  Several of these 20 cases were detected as 
a result of tighter Customs inspections of goods bound for 
North Korea and Iran.  Customs noticed that the items lacked 
export licenses, stopped the shipments, and notified BOFT. 
BOFT has described this as a significant step forward in 
interagency cooperation, but has also noted that MOJ needs 
instruction on how to carry out its export control 
investigations. 
 
Next Steps 
--------- 
 
¶7.  (S) The planned November 13-17 consultations are 
important to demonstrate our continued concern about full 
implementation of the gameplan.  There have been no 
AIT-Taiwan interagency talks on export control since August 
¶2005.  At these upcoming consultations, Taiwan plans to 
present a report on progress and problems on the 
transshipment/transit issue.  Taiwan is waiting for a 
response to its proposals on hosting EXBS regional training 
sessions.  AIT is hoping for clarification of issues related 
to assigning an EXBS advisor here on a permanent services 
contract.  AIT and Taiwan are hoping for clarification on how 
U.S. agencies can assist Taiwan in identifying high-risk 
shippers/exporters/importers whose cargoes transit Taiwan, 
and in training Taiwan MOJ investigators. 
 
¶8.  (S) From Taiwan's point of view, one major issue still 
handicapping Taiwan efforts to punish violators is the lack 
of cooperation from foreign and international agencies.  For 
instance, Taiwan authorities have collected substantial 
evidence in a case where a Taiwan company illegally 
re-exported a Japan-made bio-drying cabinet to North Korea. 
However, this type of cabinet is not made in Taiwan, and 
Japan law enforcement agencies have so far refused to provide 
technical specifications on the cabinet that are needed in 
developing the prosecutor's case. 
 
¶9.  (S) Although not gameplan related, Taiwan authorities 
have repeatedly raised the issue of the rapid growth in the 
number of lost/stolen Taiwan passports.  There are 
indications that ROC passports are becoming the travel 
document of choice among globe-trotting criminals.  Yet, 
Taiwan is excluded from the ongoing APEC project to share 
information on lost/stolen passports.  This information could 
be provided to Taiwan on CD in return for the information 
Taiwan provides on North Korea/Iran visas.  On October 5, 
more than 500 Taiwan passports were stolen from a local 
travel agency. 
YOUNG