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DE RUEHIN #3388/01 2750840
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FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2405
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2026 
TAGS: ETTC UNSCR TW NKWG
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN AGREES TO SEND IRAN/NORTH KOREA DATA 
 
REF: A. STATE 156220 
 
     ¶B. STATE 161145 
 
Classified By: AIT Acting Deputy Director Daniel K. Moore, REASONS 1.4 
B/C 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: On September 28, AIT delivered to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Consular Affairs (CA) 
Bureau Ref A talking points on outstanding export control 
"gameplan" issues.  CA and AIT agreed to implement before 
mid-October a system to allow Washington agencies to 
regularly review Taiwan visa data on North Korean and Iranian 
nationals.  Separately, AIT delivered Ref B export license 
comments to the Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) and BOFT 
described recent progress in interagency cooperation.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) On September 28, AIT/ECON officers met with MOFA to 
deliver Ref A demarche on reviewing Taiwan information on 
visa applicants from North Korea and Iran.  Representatives 
from the Taiwan side included MOFA CA Section Chief Chou 
Chung-hsing, Second Division Director Jerry S. K. Yang, and 
Department of North America Affairs First Section Chief 
Vincent C. H. Yao.  Section Chief Chou, who was introduced as 
the person in charge of North Korea visa issues, was the 
principal speaker for the Taiwan side. 
 
MOFA Visa Procedures 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Section Chief Chou presented an overview of the visa 
application process for MOFA's overseas consular offices. 
Every visa applicant from "Category Five" "sensitive" 
countries like Iran and North Korea must be vetted by Taipei 
and is required to have a local Taiwan sponsor who vouches 
for the legitimacy of the applicant's intentions.  Visa 
application information, including information on the Taiwan 
sponsor, is collected at the foreign post and then faxed or 
otherwise electronically sent back to Taiwan MOFA. 
 
¶4.  (S) After the information is received in Taipei, MOFA 
compares it against various "black lists" and briefly 
investigates the sponsor/local company (for business visas 
the sponsor is a local company).  Typically, MOFA will only 
check the business license of a listed company sponsor.  MOFA 
can then approve or deny the visa application, and relays its 
decision to the overseas consular office. 
 
AIT Overcomes MOFA Sovereignty Concerns 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) MOFA CA Second Division Director Yang and Section 
Chief Chou discussed at great length with AIT Ref A talking 
points on providing information on visa applicants from North 
Korea and Iran.  In response to the sovereignty concerns that 
they raised, AIT assured CA that the data exchange program 
would in no way infringe on Taiwan's authority to issue or 
deny visas to any individual, and that the final decisions on 
whether to issue or deny a visa would remain with Taiwan 
authorities.  AIT explained that U.S. agencies would merely 
provide an additional background check to see if the 
applicants had any association with weapons programs or 
criminal activities.  Taiwan could then use this information 
along with information from its own sources in determining 
whether or not a foreign national should be allowed to travel 
to Taiwan. 
 
Balance Ying and Yang to Achieve Harmony 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) MOFA CA representatives also expressed concern about 
the one-sided nature of the information flow and asked if AIT 
could provide any lists of entities involved in weapons 
proliferation in return for the data on visa applicants.  AIT 
said that Washington agencies would regularly reply with 
information on whether the Iranian or North Korean nationals 
applying for Taiwan visas had suspicious backgrounds.  If 
further information exchange was needed for the sake of 
 
TAIPEI 00003388  002 OF 003 
 
 
balance, AIT suggested that it could regularly provide lists 
of entities involved in terrorist finance activities based on 
public information from the U.S. Treasury Department.  MOFA 
CA indicated such an exchange arrangement would be more 
palatable, and agreed the U.S. Treasury data could serve that 
purpose. 
 
MOFA Raises Logistical/Timing Concerns 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Section Chief Chou pointed out to AIT some of the 
logistical and timing issues that needed attention before 
data exchanges could take place.  He said that Taiwan 
consular offices in some countries do not have access to 
reliable internet connections and transmit application 
information to Taipei via fax.  Further, the Taiwan visa 
application form lacked data fields for date of birth and 
name of employer, as requested in Ref A.  Chou also expressed 
concern about the length of time that would be required for 
U.S. agencies to review the visa applications.  He pointed 
out that AIT and CA would need to agree on how the data would 
be formatted, encrypted, transmitted, stored, and shared with 
AIT. 
 
AIT Focuses on a Practical Approach 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) AIT agreed that there were a number of unresolved 
logistical issues, but noted that Ref A talking points 
suggested that progress towards the gameplan goals could be 
achieved in stages.  AIT suggested that AIT and CA 
immediately begin a series of tests of the proposed data 
exchange system to get a better idea of the numbers, timing, 
and difficulties involved. 
 
MOFA Agrees to Immediate Testing 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Chou agreed to immediately begin an initial testing 
phase of the data exchange system.  During this phase, MOFA 
will supply AIT with data for visa applicants from North 
Korea and Iran that have most recently received Taiwan visas. 
 CA and AIT briefly discussed whether to exchange data at 
weekly or monthly intervals, but decided feasibility testing 
was necessary to determine the appropriate interval.  CA 
agreed that the Taiwan information will be formatted 
according to international standards for digital visa 
information.  The data will include the name, passport 
number, date of birth, sex, visa type, number of entries, 
issue place, issue date, enter-before date, duration of stay, 
visa number, remarks (including name of employer for business 
travelers), and a digital photograph. 
 
Details of Testing Arrangement 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (S) During the testing phase CA will inscribe its most 
recent visa data for North Korean and Iranian nationals onto 
a compact disk.  In order to balance the flow of information, 
AIT will prepare a disk with any U.S. responses on previous 
visa applicants and the latest U.S. Treasury public 
information on entities involved in terrorist finance 
activities, and swap disks with CA.  AIT will then transmit 
the visa data to ISN/MTR via the State Department Intranet 
system.  Both CA and AIT will keep records of the number of 
applicants, how long it takes Washington agencies to provide 
comments on the applicants, the number of applicants scoring 
"hits" indicating suspicious intentions, and follow-up 
actions taken by Taiwan authorities. 
 
Bad Guys Can Be Stopped at the Border 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Section Chief Chou explained that in most cases visa 
applicants do not enter Taiwan immediately after the visa is 
issued.  He said that even several days after issuance there 
would be a good chance that the person could be stopped at 
the border prior to entry if Washington agencies can provide 
 
TAIPEI 00003388  003 OF 003 
 
 
prompt responses.  He noted that even if the person could not 
be stopped prior to entry, it might be possible to stop them 
prior to exiting Taiwan, and it would certainly be possible 
to add their names to Taiwan's own "blacklist" to prevent 
future travel to Taiwan. 
 
System Test and CWC Info Coming in Near Future 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12.  (S) AIT noted that the testing phase would provide 
information essential for planning how to move closer to the 
Ref A goal of allowing Washington agencies a chance to review 
visa applications prior to adjudication.  Section Chief Chou 
agreed that after implementation of the testing phase there 
could be more realistic discussions on how to move forward. 
AIT and CA agreed that the first test of the new data 
exchange system will take place before mid-October.  Chou 
also said that within the next few days MOFA will provide AIT 
with updated materials on Taiwan's desire for some form of 
participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
 
BOFT Praises Effectiveness of Gameplan 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) In a separate meeting with BOFT Export Control Task 
Force Head Wally Su, AIT delivered Ref B comments on specific 
export license applications.  Su took the opportunity to 
relate that Taiwan Customs has recently forwarded a number of 
cases of possible export control violations to BOFT, which, 
in turn, has forwarded them to the Ministry of Justice 
Investigation Bureau (MJIB).  Su said he was impressed with 
recent improvements in interagency cooperation, but was 
concerned that the MJIB still had few agents who understood 
export control issues.  He added that Taiwan's National 
Security Bureau has asked him to develop a training program 
in export control for its agents. 
WANG