VZCZCXRO5625
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHC #1050/01 3042218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 312213Z OCT 06
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0789
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4545
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 181050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2031 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ JA KS IT
SUBJECT: IRAQ: GUIDANCE FOR BILATERALS WITH ROK AND JAPAN 
 
Classified By: NEA DAS L. VICTOR HURTADO, 
ACTING FOR REASONS 1.4 (A), (B), AND (D) 
 
  ¶1. (C) Department instructs a delegation led by Deputy S/I 
Barabara Stephenson to participate in bilateral talks with 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) on Friday Nov 3 and with Japan on 
Nov 6-7 to discuss ongoing and future cooperation in Iraq. 
The focus of the ROK talks is to define a concept of 
operations for the ROK-U.S. Regional Reconstruction Team 
(RRT) planned for Erbil.  The focus of the Japan talks is to 
request Japanese logistic airlift support for the Italian-led 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in DhiQar and to explore 
how to create the conditions necessary for Japan to disburse 
the significant loans it pledged to Iraq in 2004. 
 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: BACKGROUND 
----------------------------- 
¶2. (C) The ROK contributes significantly to Iraq's security 
and stability, and the USG would like to see a robust ROK 
engagement to continue.  ROK commands one of three 
internationally led multinational divisions (MND-NE), but by 
mid-2007 ROK's Iraq troop strength will be half its original 
deployment.  The ROK also plays an important role in 
providing middle ring security for the UN Protection Force 
(UNPF).  Lastly, as we continue to work with the ROK in 
planning for an RRT based in Erbil, we need to define a 
concept of operations that both military and political 
elements clearly understand and support, both in capitals and 
the field. 
 
JAPAN: BACKGROUND 
----------------- 
¶3. (C) This summer Japan drew to a close a very successful 
chapter of its contributions to Iraq by withdrawing its 
ground forces from Iraq after Muthanna province transitioned 
to Provincial Iraqi Control in July 2006.  At present Japan 
is reluctant to contribute to PRTs; its expanded C-130 air 
routes in support of MNF-I and UNAMI have a very small 
footprint; and it has few staff dedicated to administer 
Japan's massive financial aid to Iraq.  The USG would like to 
encourage Japan to expand its present engagement in Iraq. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
------------ 
¶4. (C) Drawing on points below, delegation should pursue the 
following: 
 
ROK 
 
Regional Reconstrution Team (RRT) 
- (C/REL ROK) Ascertain ROK vision & objectives: What are 
RRT's goals and how long is ROK's commitment?  How will it be 
different from existing ROK Civil Military Operations in 
Erbil?  What are ROK views on building local governance 
capacity, on improving rule of law, on engaging minorities 
inside Kurdistan? What has ROK budgeted for and how long? 
Does ROK intend to focus on Erbil, or also to do work in 
Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah?  What expertise will ROK deploy? 
Will staff be all civilian or civ-mil mix?  Does ROK have 
adequate liaison with the NCT? 
- (C/REL ROK) Define concept of RRT operations including: 
command and control structure--co-lead with U.S., or ROK 
lead?  If co-lead, how will projects work vis-a-vis 
decision-making, funding, etc?  If ROK lead, are they willing 
to engage in issues beyond reconstruction such as rule of 
law, transparency and governmental institution building? What 
decisions is Korean RRT leader authorized to make in the 
field and what decisions get referred back to Seoul? 
- (C/REL ROK) Verify logistical arrangements: e.g. security 
for ROK personnel (static, movement in Erbil and to other 
cities, and QRF) and perimeter security for full RRT; life 
support including medical and medevac; RRT's access to MNF-I 
threat info.  Will ROK offer life support at Camp Zaytun to 
all U.S. RRT members?  What other assets will be available to 
U.S. RRT members?  How will we negotiate a formal 
support/reimbursement mechanism and through what channels? 
Would like Korean RRT leader to deploy as soon as possible. 
An effective civil-military interface is always a 
challenge-how does ROK intend to structure civ-mil 
communications in the RRT? 
 
MND Command 
 
- (C/REL ROK) Iraq is entering a critical phase where the 
Coalition is transferring security lead to Iraqi Security 
 
STATE 00181050  002 OF 002 
 
 
Forces.  It is essential that the Coalition transforms to a 
supporting function with Iraqi security forces in the lead. 
The Coalition will concentrate on training, humanitarian and 
economic assistance. 
- (C/REL ROK) We believe your forces in Iraq are ideally 
positioned to be the vanguard of this transformation.  Korean 
forces are invaluable in northern Iraq.  They are leading the 
transformation in Irbil, and demonstrate to the entire nation 
what the Coalition can bring to other provinces. 
- (C/REL ROK) ROK forces also serve the strategic goals of 
economic development, diminishing cross border and internal 
tensions, and demonstrate to the Iraqi people that they are 
not alone. 
- (C/REL ROK) We need ROK to continue in its leadership role 
in MND-NE by maintaining these troop levels through the end 
of 2007, and particularly maintaining the command 
structure/headquarters of MND-NE. 
- (C/REL ROK) Can you share your 2007 plans for supporting 
OIF? 
- (C/REL ROK) How does ROK envisage its posture changing 
after Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)? 
- (C/REL ROK) Post-PIC security arrangments will be with 
whom: ISF or Peshmerga?  What is confidence level in police 
for post-PIC? 
 
UN Protection Force (UNPF) 
 
- (C/REL ROK) Given USG role in recruiting ROK to the UNPF, 
obtain ROK assessment of the mission.  Is ROK satisfied with 
what the UN asks it to do?  Are UN requests for ROK 
resources, including convoy escort, reasonable?  Does ROK 
believe the UN is effectively utilizing its presence?  How 
could UN operations be improved?  Is there any role that ROK 
recommends the U.S. play in affecting the UN mission in Erbil? 
 
JAPAN 
 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) 
 
- (C/REL JAPAN) Request extension of flight hours of Japan's 
C-130s; reason for this request is to allow a stop at Tallil 
Airbase to ferry U.S. PRT members and cargo; same need exists 
for Italians at Dhi Qar.  We are seeking nonreimbursable 
flights for civilian members of PRT with assignment of a high 
enough priority to ensure regular flight availability. 
Ideally the JASDF C-130 would stop in Tallil en route to 
Baghdad and on the return flight as well. 
 
- (C/REL JAPAN) Thank you for your generous pledge of $3.5 
billion in soft loans Japan at the Madrid donor's conference 
in 2004.  What needs to happen to put those loans into 
action?  Have you received sufficient information from GOI, 
project proposals etc., to proceed on disbursement?  If not, 
how does that impact disbursement?  How will monies be 
disbursed if Japanese companies are not operating in Iraq? 
Might part of the solution be to second a finance/accounting 
expert to Baghdad who can ensure efficient and rapid 
disbursement of Japan's loans, and provide GOJ accountability 
and transparency?  This would be a function separate from the 
diplomat in the NCT disbursing small quick-impact grants. 
 
- (C/REL JAPAN) Seek clarity on reported $30 million 
contribution from Japan to IOM?  What is purpose of funds? 
When do they expire? 
RICE