VZCZCXRO3063
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0983/01 2911430
ZNY EEEEE ZZH
O 181430Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5287
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0195
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2068

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 04 SKOPJE 000983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER AND DAS DICARLO) 
SARAJEVO PLS PASS TO DAS DICARLO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016 BY STEPHEN A. HUBLER REASON 1.4 (b,d) 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS DICARLO'S VISITTO SKOPJE, 
OCTOBER 22-25REF: SKOPJE 953CORE MESSAGES 
 
 
¶1. (U) Your visit comes at the right time, two months into 
the new VMRO-DPMNE-led government of PM Gruevski, to deliver 
the following core messages to the government and opposition: 
 
Government: 
 
--Need broad consultations and consensus-building with DUI 
and opposition parties on key legislation and implementation 
of reforms.  Need genuine will on both sides to reach 
compromise, not just meeting and talking without results. 
 
--Demonstrate through results your commitment to Framework 
Agreement (FWA) implementation, in close consultation with 
opposition parties and parties not in government (DUI). 
 
--Need broad political consensus now to implement your 
ambitious economic growth and reform agenda and to fulfill 
key criteria for NATO and EU membership, including combating 
corruption and strengthening rule of law in a balanced, 
non-partisan manner. 
 
--The PM is responsible for ensuring coalition partners play 
as members of one team -- individual efforts not coordinated 
within the government can derail talks with opposition and 
delay reforms. 
 
Opposition/Party Not in Government (DUI): 
 
--Need to play constructive, positive role as opposition. 
The country needs a loyal opposition, not efforts to 
undermine the government and delay reform efforts. 
 
--Genuine dialogue and willingness to compromise are 
essential if opposition expects government to include it in 
consultation and consensus-building process. 
 
--Strong opposition is healthy for democracy, but any 
suggestion that failure to reach compromises on important 
legislation will jeopardize political stability or lead to 
violence is unacceptable. 
 
POLITICAL CONTEXT -- DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD, BUT WHAT IS THE 
END GAME? 
 
¶2. (SBU/NF) You arrive in Skopje nearly 60 days after the new 
government was sworn-in on August 26.  In those two months, 
the government has implemented little of its ambitious 
legislative and economic growth agenda.  Part of the reason 
for that is the government's inability so far to work 
effectively with the ethnic Albanian DUI party, led by Ali 
Ahmeti, which won the majority of eAlbanian votes in the July 
parliamentary elections but was not included in the governing 
coalition.  (Having won the majority of eAlbanian votes, DUI 
considers itself "out of government" but not in the 
opposition.)  In addition, the government has failed to rein 
in its eAlbanian DPA coalition partner, whose ministers have 
engaged in haphazard, poorly-coordinated actions, some of 
which targeted DUI supporters and further alienated DUI 
leaders.  Ahmeti and other DUI leaders believe DPA's intent 
is to destroy DUI as a political force.  Also hampering 
progress is the fact that the government has dismissed or 
downgraded many civil servants, and has not yet replaced 
them, or has replaced them with neophytes. 
 
¶3. (SBU/NF) There have been recent efforts by the 
VMRO-DPMNE-led government and DUI to discuss their 
differences, in a variety of settings (reftel), but the 
dialogue has not produced any practical positive results. 
The GOM needs to acknowledge that it must work differently 
with DUI, which, given its eAlbanian majority support, cannot 
be considered just a "typical" opposition party. 
Consultation and compromise with DUI on key legislative 
initiatives, especially those related to the FWA, must begin 
early on, and the government should demonstrate flexibility 
and generosity in reaching consensus on those initiatives; 
that has not been the case so far.  At the same time, DUI 
needs to show it can engage in genuine dialogue and is 
prepared to reach compromises before negotiations conclude; 
it cannot assume it has veto power over legislative proposals. 
 
 
SKOPJE 00000983  002 OF 004 
 
 
DRAFT POLICE LAW -- LITMUS TEST 
 
¶4. (SBU/NF) The government has been debating for the past 
several weeks a draft police law intended to enhance the 
professionalism of the police and implement FWA provisions 
for the selection of municipal police chiefs.  The draft law 
was originally compiled by the former SDSM-led government, 
and SDSM (now in opposition) initially indicated it would 
support the law.  I was not put to a vote under the previous 
government because there was no agreement with DUI on key 
elements of the bill.  When the new government took up the 
bill, DUI complained that Gruevski did not intend to pass the 
law with a qualified (Badinter) majority.  Ahmeti said the 
party either would boycott the vote or would vote against the 
legislation (reftel). 
 
¶5. (SBU/NF) Eventually, DPA suggested two DUI-backed 
amendments -- one that would reduce the number of years 
required to qualify for nomination as a police chief (opening 
more opportunities to eAlbanian police), and another 
amendment proposing the addition of a ninth regional police 
district headquartered in the eAlbanian-dominated city of 
Struga.  DUI had pressed for both amendments when it was in 
earlier in government.  SDSM immediately objected to the 
latter amendment.  Fearing the loss of SDSM support, the 
government immediately allowed DPA to withdraw the Struga 
amendment, irritating DUI in the process. 
 
¶6. (SBU/NF) Since then, there have been confidential 
discussions between DUI and government representatives on the 
police law, but without concrete results.  DUI claims the 
government is not negotiating in good faith, while the 
government accuses DUI of submitting frivolous amendments to 
the law that would not improve policing.  DUI would like to 
see an amended law that, inter alia, would enhance external 
oversight of police action and eliminate regional police 
districts as unnecessary layers of authority between the 
central government and municipalities.  The government has 
responded that those changes could be incorporated into the 
implementing by-laws of the final legislation, but does not 
want to make any changes to the existing draft law.  DUI 
fears this is a GOM tactic and that once the law passes the 
GOM will not necessarily implement its pledge to include the 
DUI recommendations in the by-laws. 
 
¶7. (SBU/NF) Whether the government and DUI can reach some 
sort of modus vivendi on the draft law before it goes to a 
vote is likely to determine, to a large extent, whether they 
can move on to dealing with other issues in a positive, 
constructive manner.  If DUI feels its concerns are 
completely overlooked in passing the legislation, it may feel 
pressured to take action that could be politically 
destabilizing.  We should firmly and clearly let Ahmeti know 
that such an approach is both unconstructive and 
unacceptable.  At  the same time, we should tell the GOM that 
it must publicly commit to including DUI's requested changes 
to the police law in the implementing by-laws, and should 
implement those changes in short order. 
 
FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION -- MISSION NOT YET ACCOMPLISHED 
 
¶8. (SBU) The new government has on more than one occasion 
tried to claim that FWA implementation is complete.  In fact, 
all FWA-related legislative requirements have been met. 
Implementation of decentralization and equitable 
representation are proceeding well but are in the initial 
stages only.  Moreover, FWA-related requirements -- including 
the police law and a law on languages -- remain to be 
completed.  Both DUI and DPA believe there is still much to 
do before the FWA chapter can be closed; DPA leader Arben 
Xhaferi has even stated that the government needs to go 
beyond the FWA in meeting eAlbanian demands.  The government 
needs to be reminded that FWA implementation is not a closed 
chapter; it must demonstrate results in implementing 
FWA-related reforms, including decentralization and equitable 
representation. 
 
NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP -- REFORMS MUTUALLY REINFORCING 
 
¶9. (SBU) The government has stated its commitment to NATO and 
 
SKOPJE 00000983  003 OF 004 
 
 
EU membership as top foreign policy priorities, and is 
supported by opinion polls showing 90 percent or higher 
public support for membership in both organizations. 
Nevertheless, the impasse with DUI over the police law, and 
the government's general inability to manage effectively 
intra-coalition and government-opposition relations, have 
hampered progress on the rule of law, judicial reform, and 
other political and economic criteria Macedonia needs to 
fulfill to be considered a strong candidate for membership in 
either organization. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Macedonia could be a strong candidate for a NATO 
invitation at the next enlargement summit.  The government is 
hoping for positive language at Riga recognizing its 
achievements and indicating that enlargement will be a topic 
at any 2008 summit.  Government interlocutors need to hear 
that, in order to achieve those goals, they must work with 
DUI to overcome the current impasse, and must find a 
mechanism for building broad consensus with other opposition 
members for economic and other reforms.  In addition, the 
government must avoid using its declared commitment to fight 
corruption as cover for launching witch hunts against members 
of the former government. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Although Macedonia received EU candidate status 
last December, it is unlikely to receive the invitation it 
hopes for from the EU to begin accession negotiations in 
¶2007.  The government will receive an assessment from the EU 
in November on its progress in meeting the EU acquis; that 
assessment is likely to point to the current standoff with 
DUI, lackluster results in combating corruption, and slow 
progress in implementing judicial reforms as some of the main 
reasons for not beginning accession negotiations next year. 
 
KOSOVO FINAL STATUS -- KEEPING BORDER DEMARCATION OFF THE 
FRONT PAGE 
 
¶12. (U) The government's official position on Kosovo final 
status has been closely aligned with ours -- support for 
Ahtisaari and the Contact Group, for a settlement by the end 
of the year, and resolution of the demarcation issue in the 
context of a final status settlement.  PM Ceku visited Skopje 
shortly after the Gruevski government took office, Deputy 
Prime Minister Selmani (DPA) recently led a small delegation 
to Pristina, and PM Gruevski plans to visit Kosovo in early 
¶2007. 
 
¶13. (SBU/NF) Despite these positive indications, however, 
some GOM officials have been off-message on the border 
demarcation issue, and on a final status outcome (Selmani 
reportedly said in Pristina that the US and EU should resolve 
the final status issue).  The government needs to hear yet 
again that it should avoid discussing these issues in the 
media, but that, if its officials do so, they need to ensure 
they speak in one voice and deliver only messages consistent 
with the GOM's official policy. 
 
¶14. (SBU/NF) MFA contacts recently told us that they are 
developing language they think should be included in a Kosovo 
final status settlement that would specify in greater detail 
how the border demarcation issue should be resolved.  FM 
Milososki likely will run that language by you for reaction. 
They have not shared a draft of the proposed language with 
us, but we suspect it will reference, perhaps indirectly, the 
2001 Skopje-Belgrade border accord and the need for 
demarcation to proceed in accordance with that agreement. 
 
NAME DISPUTE -- CONTINUED UN PROCESS, BUT NO RESOLUTION ON 
THE HORIZON 
 
¶15. (SBU/NF) The government has reiterated its "dual name" 
formula as the basis for further discussions with the Greek 
government on the name dispute, and has indicated willingness 
to proceed on that basis with negotiations under UN auspices 
mediated by Ambassador Nimetz.  Nimetz is expected to visit 
Skopje in November, but MFA interlocutors do not expect any 
major developments in the discussions this year. 
 
ECONOMIC GROWTH -- NEED STABLE POLITICAL BASE 
 
 
SKOPJE 00000983  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶16. (SBU) When he first came to office, PM Gruevski called 
for a moratorium on inter-ethnic issues so as to allow the 
government to focus on its top-priority economic growth goal. 
 That position disregarded the fact that political stability 
has helped to undergird Macedonia's recent economic growth 
and will be necessary for the economy to reach the 6-8 
percent annual GDP growth targets the government has set for 
itself. 
 
¶17. (SBU/NF) The macro-economic climate remains positive, 
with low inflation and a stable exchange rate, and a US firm 
(Johnson Controls) recently broke ground for the first major 
greenfield investment in Macedonia's free trade zone near 
Skopje.  Nevertheless, Gruevski needs to accept and fully 
internalize that there can be no economic growth without the 
political stability that will accompany improved inter-ethnic 
relations. 
 
UNGA PRESIDENCY CANDIDATE SRDJAN KERIM 
 
¶18. (SBU) Macedonia has proposed former foreign minister 
Srdjan Kerim as a candidate for the UNGA Presidency in 
2007-2008.  Kerim had a distinguished diplomatic career in 
the former Yugoslavia and in the early days of Macedonia's 
independence.  He currently works as general director of a 
local media consortium that is a member of the German WAZ 
group.  MFA officials have told us that only two other 
countries, Georgia and Armenia, may propose candidates, and 
FM Milososki might ask you for USG support for Kerim.  We 
sent Kerim's bio data to USUN for information, but have 
reminded MFA contacts that we do not commit in advance to 
support such candidates. 
 
MILOVANOVIC