VZCZCXRO2452
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0953/01 2791339
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061339Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5246
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000953 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: POLICE LAW IMPASSE:GOM-OPPOSITION TALKS 
INCH FORWARD 
 
REF: SKOPJE 880 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶1. (C) The parliamentary impasse between the VMRO-DPMNE-led 
government and ethnic Albanian opposition party DUI over the 
draft police law continues, with DUI insisting that it will 
not respect the police law unless it is passed with a 
qualified (Badinter) majority.  PM Gruevski and DUI President 
Ahmeti met twice this week -- we brokered their first-ever 
substantive encounter -- to discuss steps they might take to 
advance their agendas.  The first meeting occurred after 
Ahmeti failed in his gambit to win U.S. and government 
support for an initiative to have President Crvenkovski 
convene the 2001 Framework Agreement (FWA) signatories for 
broader political discussions on DUI's concerns regarding FWA 
implementation. 
 
¶2. (C) Although we are pleased the two leaders have finally 
entered into civil discussions on their political agendas, we 
do not expect any sudden breakthroughs on the police law or 
on wider demands by DUI, including a language law.  We will 
continue to press the government to look for ways to be more 
proactive in consulting DUI on important laws, especially 
those (unlike the police law) on which a Badinter vote is 
clearly required, provided DUI is willing to retreat from its 
stated aim of democratically forcing the collapse of the 
Gruevski government in hopes of winning a place in a future 
governing coalition.  End Summary. 
 
IMPASSE OVER POLICE LAW 
 
¶3. (SBU) A legislative impasse with ethnic Albanian 
opposition party DUI continues over the draft police law 
which the VMRO-DPMNE-led government submitted in late 
September for parliamentary debate.  The government rejects 
DUI claims that the law requires a qualified majority 
(so-called "Badinter majority") to pass.  In addition, it has 
tried to stack the parliamentary committee on inter-ethnic 
relations that determines whether legislative initiatives are 
subject to the Badinter requirement.  (NOTE: The Badinter 
principle gives ethnic minorities a stronger hand -- but not 
necessarily a veto -- in passing legislation concerning 
culture, use of language, local government, and education.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) DUI argues that failure to apply the Badinter 
requirement is a violation of the 2001 Framework Agreement, 
and has vowed not to respect the police law if it is passed 
without a qualified majority vote.  As the party with the 
largest share of the ethnic Albanian vote in this year's 
parliamentary elections, DUI believes it enjoys the political 
legitimacy to press such demands.  At the same time, DUI 
leaders have been telling us privately that their sole aim is 
to cripple the current governing coalition to pave the way 
for new elections, possibly in 2007. 
 
¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: Our assessment, shared by our OSCE and EU 
colleagues, is that the Badinter requirement does not 
technically apply in this case.  However, we have argued 
publicly and privately that the government should pursue the 
broadest possible political consensus in support of the 
police law. 
 
PRESSING FOR GREATER GOM FLEXIBILITY VIS-A-VIS DUI 
 
¶6. (C) On September 29, the Ambassador spoke by phone with PM 
Gruevski, urging him to show a greater understanding of DUI's 
concerns.  She noted that two amendments to the law proposed 
by ethnic Albanian governing coalition partner DPA had 
provided a political opening for addressing DUI concerns. 
Gruevski should pursue that line in search of a broader 
consensus for the draft law, she said.  She also noted that 
the attempt to stack the parliamentary inter-ethnic relations 
was damaging to Macedonia's image and flouted the spirit of 
the FWA.  Later that afternoon, DPA withdrew one of those 
amendments under pressure from eMacedonian opposition leader 
SDSM.  (Comment: SDSM reportedly traded its support for the 
law, provided that amendment was dropped.  In the process, 
SDSM's action made it even less likely that DUI would support 
the bill. End Comment.) 
 
SKOPJE 00000953  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
DUI LETTER PROPOSES FWA SIGNATORIES MEETING ON POLICE LAW AND 
BROADER AGENDA 
 
¶7. (C) On October 2, following an urgent request for a 
meeting over the weekend, DUI President Ali Ahmeti met with 
the Ambassador in Skopje to ask for her views on a draft open 
letter from DUI and their coalition partner PDP stressing the 
need for the GOM to respect the Badinter principle and FWA 
regarding the police law.  The letter also called for a 
meeting between DUI and the 2001 FWA signatories (US, EU, 
governing VMRO-DPMNE, DPA, and SDSM), sponsored by President 
Crvenkovski, to discuss FWA implementation and the police 
law.  The Ambassador demurred, noting that a smaller, more 
private format for discussions would be preferable as a 
starting point for discussions.  She suggested a possible 
meeting at her residence or the Embassy between Ahmeti and 
Gruevski, with US and EU representatives present. 
 
GRUEVSKI REJECTS DUI PROPOSAL 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador met later that day with PM Gruevski to 
discuss the letter and her alternate proposal to start 
private meetings at a lower level.  Gruevski ultimately 
rejected the DUI proposal.  He said there was no need for 
international community (IC) mediation on these matters, nor 
did he trust other parties to keep such discussions 
confidential.  In addition, he did not want to meet at the 
 
SIPDIS 
Embassy, at a diplomatic residence, or in the presence of 
foreign ambassadors.  In a meeting the following day (October 
3), the Ambassador asked President Crvenkovski for his views 
on the DUI proposal.  Citing Gruevski's stated refusal to 
participate, Crvenkovski said the idea would be a 
non-starter.  However, he said he was willing to convene a 
meeting of key political leaders and IC representatives if 
that could be useful for restarting dialogue. 
 
GETTING TO KNOW YOU.... 
 
¶9. (C) Despite Gruevski's initial rejection of any IC 
involvement in a meeting, his office asked the Embassy and 
EUSR office to arrange a Gruevski-Ahmeti meeting the evening 
of October 2.  After several attempts to arrange those 
discussions, Gruevski and Ahmeti asked to meet the following 
morning at the US Embassy, with the Ambassador and an EUSR 
representative present (the EUSR himself was out of the 
country). 
 
¶10. (C) The two leaders met at the Embassy the next day in 
their first substantive encounter ever.  They discussed the 
earlier coalition negotiation process, police law, 
composition of the committee on inter-ethnic relations, and 
other broader political issues concerning FWA implementation. 
 Although there were no real breakthroughs or dramatic shifts 
in position over the course of their 2.5 hour conversation, 
the dialogue was civil and respectful. Both leaders agreed it 
had been useful to meet face-to-face, since neither knew the 
other apart from what they had seen or read in the media. 
 
¶11. (C) When the specifics of the police law were raised, 
however, the mood appeared to shift.  Gruevski offered to 
meet with Ahmeti later that evening to discuss details of the 
draft law.  Ahmeti refused, saying he would only discuss the 
police bill in the context of a "package" which would have to 
include the language law and other FWA implementation issues. 
 Gruevski agreed to address those issues in separate 
"political talks."  He also suggested the police law, once 
passed, could later be amended to reflect DUI concerns. 
Clearly retreating, Ahmeti claimed his "mandate" from the 
grassroots required him to address all of the key issues 
cited in a package discussion.  The Ambassador asked both 
sides to avoid allowing the "perfect to become the enemy of 
the good."   She urged further flexibility and readiness to 
compromise.  The two leaders agreed to think more about next 
steps. 
 
CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE BY PROXY 
 
¶12. (C) The dialogue continued on October 5 during 
discussions between DUI VP Teuta Arifi and VMRO-DPMNE VP 
Silvana Boneva, jointly sponsored by the U.S. Embassy and 
EUSR.  Both Arifi and Boneva agreed on the need for further 
 
SKOPJE 00000953  003 OF 003 
 
 
dialogue, but Arifi was adamant that DUI would not vote for 
the draft police law unless it was passed with a Badinter 
majority.  Noting that DUI had retreated from its attempts to 
block discussion of the second reading of the law, which had 
begun October 2, Arifi said DUI would now table instead a 
lengthy series of amendments to prolong parliamentary beyond 
October 6, when the government hoped to pass the draft 
legislation.  Boneva admitted that the government was 
concerned that the SDSM party convention on October 7 could 
result in a change in leadership that would cause that party 
to back away from its support for the draft law.  Hence the 
rush to finish voting on the law by October 6, which DUI 
vehemently opposed. 
 
GRUEVSKI-AHMETI ROUND TWO -- INCHING FORWARD 
 
¶13. (C) Overcoming his earlier hesitation, Ahmeti agreed to 
meet again with Gruevski the evening of October 5, this time 
at the residence of the EUSR.  They requested that EUSR 
provide the venue, but not be present during the discussions. 
 Both were alone at the meeting, which they conducted through 
an interpreter, and there no press leaks, as was the case 
with the October 3 U.S. Embassy get-together.  According to 
the EUSR, who met with the two after they completed their 
discussion, there were positive "body language" indications 
that the talks had been constructive.  Both agreed to 
designate senior advisers to work on a way forward on the 
broader political agenda, although there was no agreement on 
how to proceed with the police law. 
 
COMMENT -- SQUARING THE CIRCLE 
 
¶14. (C) Although we are pleased that Gruevski and Ahmeti 
finally are talking after months of icy refusal to 
communicate directly, except through the media, there are 
limits to how far the dialogue is likely to go.  We do not 
expect any major breakthroughs this early on in the game.  At 
stake for DUI is much more than the final form the police law 
will take.  DUI believes they were cheated out of a place in 
the governing coalition, and is set on using all democratic 
means to cripple the government in order to force new 
elections, perhaps in 2007. 
 
¶15. (C) It appears the only way to get DUI to moderate its 
behavior is if the government agrees to more intensive 
consultations with the party well in advance of action on 
legislation it knows is important to DUI leaders and their 
grassroots supporters.  The logic behind such an approach 
lies in the fact that DUI's supporters reflect the clear 
majority of the eAlbanian electorate, and in the fact that 
DUI controls all but one of the predominantly eAlbanian 
municipalities in Macedonia.  As a result, a more 
consultative approach to the DUI leadership is likely to 
result in more effective implementation of laws requiring a 
Badinter vote and even of the police law, which does not. 
 
¶16. (C) Were the government to take such a consultative 
approach, it might find DUI more willing to reconsider its 
current "scorched earth" tactics.  We will urge the 
government to take that step, and will continue impressing 
upon DUI leaders the importance of avoiding pyrrhic 
victories, and instead focus on influencing legislation that 
will benefit their constituents. 
MILOVANOVIC