VZCZCXRO3758
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #1037/01 3031022
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301022Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5351
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2076
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SKOPJE 001037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: EUR DAS DICARLO'S OCT 23-24 MEETINGS 
WITH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 
 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
--------- 
¶1. (SBU) During meetings with high-level GOM officials in 
Skopje October 23-24, EUR DAS DiCarlo underscored the need 
for the government to build consensus with the opposition to 
gain buy-in for key legislative and reform initiatives, for 
redoubled efforts to implement the reforms required for NATO 
membership, and for a low-key approach on resolving the issue 
of demarcation of the Macedonia-Kosovo border.  She urged 
continued Macedonian flexibility on the name issue, and asked 
opposition parties to be more pragmatic and prepared to 
compromise with the GOM in order to advance Macedonia's 
Euro-Atlantic integration agenda. 
 
¶2. (C) Government officials expressed a willingness to 
continue efforts to engage the opposition, including 
discussing legislative or other initiatives with opposition 
eAlbanian DUI before they are discussed in the parliament. 
DUI's Ahmeti said he was ready to discuss with GOM leaders 
how to move forward on a "package" of issues of concern to 
his party, while DPA's Xhaferi called for a private meeting 
of key government and opposition parties. 
 
¶3. (C) On NATO and EU membership, GOM leaders said they would 
redouble reform efforts, including Framework Agreement (FWA) 
implementation, passing a liberal religious freedom law, and 
combating trafficking in persons and corruption in a 
non-partisan manner.  The government said it would work 
toward resolving the issue of demarcation of the border with 
Kosovo in the context of a final status settlement and would 
continue UN talks on the name dispute.  DAS DiCarlo's 
meetings highlighted the willingness of the major parties to 
engage in consensus-building dialogue as a precondition for 
advancing Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration prospects. 
We are working with our IC partners to facilitate that 
dialogue.  End Summary. 
 
MEETINGS IN SKOPJE WITH GOVERNMENT & OPPOSITION LEADERS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶4. (SBU) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Rosemary DiCarlo met 
with senior GOM officials, major opposition party leaders, 
local mayors, business leaders, political analysts, civil 
society representatives, international community (IC) 
principals and ambassadors, and university students in Skopje 
October 22-24.  Ambassador, DCM and P/E officers accompanied 
DAS DiCarlo.  In her meetings with PM Gruevski, FM Milososki, 
President Crvenkovski and other senior GOM officials, DAS 
DiCarlo made the following key points: 
 
--The GOM must work with the opposition, eAlbanian opposition 
DUI especially, to build the widest possible consensus and 
buy-in for legislative initiatives that will enhance the 
legitimacy of those initiatives and facilitate their 
implementation. 
 
--For Macedonia to be the strongest possible candidate for 
NATO membership at the next enlargement round, the GOM must 
redouble efforts to pass and implement needed reforms, 
including judicial and economic reforms; combat corruption 
and trafficking in persons (TIP); pass a liberal reliQ{[SzNQQ2QLQ-Resolving Kosovo's final status sooner rather than later 
will help bolster stability in the region.  The issue of 
border demarcation with Kosovo is a technical issue that 
should be resolved in a final status settlement; in the 
meantime, keep the matter out of the press headlines. 
 
--Continue talks under UN auspices on the name issue, be 
flexible, and keep the issue out of the press. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In meetings with opposition leaders Sekerinska and 
Mitreva (SDSM) and Ahmeti (DUI), DiCarlo called for each 
party to work pragmatically and to demonstrate willingness to 
compromise on key reforms of broad national interest. 
 
 
SKOPJE 00001037  002 OF 005 
 
 
WORKING WITH THE OPPOSITION -- STRIVE FOR CONSENSUS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶6. (C) PM Gruevski said current political tensions between 
DUI and governing coalition partner DPA were "emotional and 
high," and that he wanted to work with both parties to lower 
them.  He was willing to discuss with DUI all issues, even 
those unrelated to FWA implementation.  He said his goal was 
to strengthen the political stability of the country "at any 
cost." 
 
¶7. (C) Deputy PM for Euro-Integration Konevska agreed with 
DAS DiCarlo on the need for dialogue, consensus, and 
political compromise between the government and opposition. 
Implementation of reforms required political party buy-in. 
Her office would try to consult with the opposition on 
legislation before/before it reached parliament. 
 
¶8. (C) Asked what might make DUI, and DPA, act more 
pragmatically and constructively, opposition SDSM Vice 
President Sekerinska said only pressure from the IC would 
work.  Both parties had crossed a red line that made it hard 
for them to behave pragmatically without external pressure. 
FM Milososki told DAS DiCarlo that DUI could, if it desired, 
enjoy a "privileged partnership" with the GOM through its 
control of the mayorships of all but one eAlbanian-dominated 
municipality. 
 
DUI'S DILEMMA -- FINDING A MODUS OPERANDI 
----------------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) DUI President Ahmeti told DiCarlo that the government 
coalition was putting pressure on his party through a range 
of actions, including refusal to accept DUI amendments to a 
draft police law; firing or transferring civil servants 
connected to DUI; cold-bloodedly "assassinating" the cousin 
of DUI mayor Lika in Tetovo; and trying to shut down Tetovo 
State University, which was closely identified with his 
party.  He said he had tried to contact DPA leader Xhaferi to 
discuss these matters, but there had been no willingness on 
that side to meet.  It was unclear to him who controlled DPA 
(Xhaferi or VP Menduh Thaci). 
 
¶10. (C) Asked if there was a specific approach he would favor 
for dealing with DUI concerns in the future, Ahmeti replied 
that he wanted to reach agreement with the GOM to tackle a 
package of issues, including the law on police, law on 
languages, election of future governments with a qualified 
majority, and a law on compensation for victims of the 2001 
conflict.  A political commitment from the government to 
resolve those issues would help the country begin tackling 
its economic challenges. 
 
¶11. (C) DPA President Xhaferi called the current antagonism 
between DPA and DUI "irrational," and said it could not be 
resolved by the two parties only.  He added that relations 
with coalition partner VMRO-DPMNE were going through a rough 
spell caused by differences over a draft language law.  As a 
result, he said, a private, serious discussion between 
government and opposition party leaders, perhaps hosted by 
the US Embassy, would be useful in "building bridges between 
the parties." 
 
FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION -- STRENGTHENING THE STATE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶12. (C) Deputy PM Selmani said the government wanted the FWA 
to be accepted by all/all citizens as an instrument of 
positive development that would strengthen the state as it 
enhanced inter-ethnic relations.  Selmani said his office was 
working on an action plan to improve ethnic minority 
representation in government, for which he would need 
eAlbanian and eMacedonian support.  He also noted the need 
for continued work on decentralization and said mayors were 
using his office as a channel of communication to the 
government on decentralization needs.  SDSM's Sekerinska said 
the GOM needed to remind the EU that decentralization and the 
parliamentary elections had been Macedonia's recent 
successes.  She warned that any attempt to politicize the 
allocation of state resources to the local governments would 
backfire, and would provoke DUI, which controls nearly all 
eAlbanian mayorships. 
 
SKOPJE 00001037  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM -- CHALLENGING FAITH MONOPOLIES 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶13. (C) Crvenkovski said passing a draft law on religious 
communities and groups that expanded religious freedom in 
Macedonia would erode the monopoly positions of both the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) and the Islamic Community of 
Macedonia.  That would cause a strong political backlash from 
parties enjoying the support of those institutions.  FM 
Milososki said the MOC and Macedonian public would oppose a 
more liberal law, since they do not want the Serb Orthodox 
Church to operate freely here, given its refusal to recognize 
the MOC's ecclesiastic independence.  The Ambassador stressed 
the importance of passing a law that would open the widest 
possible window for others to practice their faiths freely. 
 
COMBATING CORRUPTION -- NEED FOR A SYSTEMIC APPROACH 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶14. (C) Crvenkovski agreed with DAS DiCarlo's message 
regarding the need to demonstrate results in combating 
corruption to demonstrate Macedonia's readiness for NATO 
membership.  He pessimistically noted that past governments 
mistakenly had tried to tackle corruption as a limited 
campaign, with a limited timeframe and a focus on short-term 
efforts.  What was needed was a more systemic, long-term 
effort that built on judicial reforms.  He concurred, as did 
Deputy PM Konevska, with DAS DiCarlo's warning that 
anti-corruption efforts would not be effective if they were 
based on political "revanchisme," since that would undermine 
the credibility of those efforts and the institutions 
undertaking them. 
 
DUI AS "OPPOSITION PLUS" 
------------------------ 
¶15. (C) SDSM's Sekerinska said the lack of consultation 
between the GOM and the major opposition parties on the 
police law was costing the country in terms of time lost and 
the negative external impression the dispute had caused. 
SDSM had told the government they wanted discussion on key 
laws before/before the drafts were sent to the parliament. 
(NOTE: SDSM, as lead party in the previous government, 
offered no such advance consultation to the opposition when 
it was in power. END NOTE.)  SDSM would support key reforms, 
but did not want the GOM to abuse that goodwill or to take 
shortcuts in the legislative process.  President of 
Parliament Georgievski agreed that the government needed 
"carrots and sticks" to use in working with governing 
coalition ally DPA and the DUI opposition.  He agreed with 
the Ambassador's suggestion that the GOM must treat DUI as an 
"opposition plus," given its majority share of the eAlbanian 
vote, but was not confident the current government could 
master that challenge. 
 
NATO MEMBERSHIP - "ADDED VALUE" 
------------------------------ 
¶16. (C) PM Gruevski said the government was beginning to 
implement NATO membership-related reforms.  Macedonia wanted 
the message from the upcoming Riga Summit to offer hope for 
aspirants for membership invitations in 2008.  He pledged 
that the government would work harder in the meantime to 
strengthen the judiciary, fight corruption, boost economic 
growth, and continue defense reforms, among other tasks. 
Gruevski also pledged continuing support for the war on 
terror.  FM Milososki said Macedonia's integration into NATO 
would "add value" to the organization, as would the 
memberships of Croatia and Albania. 
 
EU ACCESSION -- A TWO-WAY PROCESS 
---------------------------------- 
¶17. (SBU) Deputy PM Konevska noted that the EU accession 
process was a "two-way" process reflecting both Macedonia's 
accomplishments and the mood among EU members.  She said the 
GOM was hoping to begin EU accession negotiations in 2007, 
but acknowledged that would require concrete results on 
political EU membership criteria.  Her office was planning to 
complete by March 2007 a list of laws that needed to be 
harmonized with EU laws and implemented by 2010.  DAS DiCarlo 
noted that the USG would continue to remind the EU of its 
commitment to Macedonia and the Western Balkans, but that the 
 
SKOPJE 00001037  004 OF 005 
 
 
government would have to demonstrate progress in fighting 
corruption, trafficking in persons, and in strengthening the 
judiciary to make its case for membership. 
 
KOSOVO FINAL STATUS -- BORDER DEMARCATION 
------------------------------------------ 
¶18. (C) PM Gruevski reiterated GOM support for Special Envoy 
Ahtisaari's efforts.  He said the government wanted the 
Macedonia-Kosovo border demarcation issue to be resolved 
either before or during the status talks.   Gruevski proposed 
final status language calling on Kosovo authorities to work 
with other parties to actually demarcate the border "in some 
defined period of time," but not long after the final status 
decision took effect.  Resolving the demarcation issue as 
part of final status would make it easier for Macedonia to be 
among the first countries to recognize Kosovo. 
 
¶19. (C) FM Milososki was more precise in his formulation -- 
he asked that Pristina be urged to recognize the border not 
later than three months after Kosovo final status, with 
completion of demarcation to occur not later than three 
months after that.  President Crvenkovski agreed that 
resolution of the demarcation issue had to be a part of a 
final status package.  If left unresolved, he warned, the 
issue would create problems later on. 
 
KOSOVO FINAL STATUS -- REGIONAL STABILITY 
------------------------------------------ 
¶20. (C) Deputy PM Selmani told DAS DiCarlo that the GOM would 
tighten cooperation with Kosovo security forces and would 
offer authorities in Pristina lessons learned from 
Macedonia's decentralization experience.  Crvenkovski agreed 
that the only realistic scenario for a Kosovo settlement was 
some form of independence.  He added that, if parliamentary 
elections were held in December, it would be advisable to 
delay a final status decision for a short period.  That would 
reduce the chances of the Radicals entering the government, 
which Macedonia would view as a threatening development.  If 
the elections took place later, however, there should be no 
delay.  FM Milososki agreed that independence was the only 
viable option.  He stressed that delay was in no one's 
interest and that the process should move forward. 
 
¶21. (C) DAS DiCarlo noted that resolving Kosovo's final 
status sooner rather than later would help bring stability to 
the region.  Crvenkovski agreed.  At the same time, he said, 
it would be better for the final status process to be 
completed in an atmosphere in which Macedonia was free of 
intra-ethnic tensions within its eAlbanian community.  Hence 
there was a need to work toward greater inter-party consensus 
in Macedonia on legislative initiatives. 
 
NO GREATER ALBANIA 
------------------ 
¶22. (C) Crvenkovski agreed with DAS DiCarlo's reiteration of 
the Contact Group position that there would be "no greater 
Albania" after Kosovo final status.  He believed the IC and 
other countries in the region would respect those parameters, 
but was concerned that radical ethnic Albanian forces in the 
region would not.  He suggested preventive action would be 
needed -- coordinated between Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania 
-- to keep such forces under control. 
 
NAME ISSUE -- AVOIDING TIT-FOR-TAT 
---------------------------------- 
¶23. (C) On the name issue, PM Gruevski said he had sensed a 
recent growing inflexibility in Athens, as reflected in 
"inappropriate statements" by high-level Greek officials.  He 
was concerned about Greek threats to prevent Macedonia 
entering the EU or NATO, even as FYROM, if it did not change 
its constitutional name.  Seeking to explain Macedonia's 
two-name approach, FM Milososki noted the 1995 Interim 
Agreement between Macedonia and Greece cited a commitment by 
the two sides to work on differences over the name.  Since 
Macedonia is recognized by more than 100 countries by its 
constitutional name, it is clear that the difference referred 
to is only a difference with Greece, hence the Macedonia 
offer of a second name for the Greeks to use in bilateral 
relations.  He expected Athens to try to engage in more 
 
SKOPJE 00001037  005 OF 005 
 
 
aggressive tactics to pressure Skopje, now that the Greek 
local elections were over.  He stressed that the GOM would 
try to limit its response and would continue to take part in 
the UN negotiations on the matter, but would have to respond 
to any provocative statements by Athens. 
 
COMMENT: A CALL FOR DIALOGUE 
---------------------------- 
¶24. (C) The common thread running through nearly all of DAS 
DiCarlo's meetings was the implicit or explicit call for 
dialogue from both government and opposition leaders.  The 
political leadership in Macedonia has recognized that the 
current situation, with legislation bogged down in parliament 
and little action on the reform implementation front, is 
untenable and ultimately will damage Macedonia's EU and NATO 
membership prospects.  We and our EUSR partners will work 
with the leaders of VMRO-DPMNE, DPA, DUI, and SDSM to convene 
a series of private meetings at which a modus operandi can be 
reached for future consultations and consensus-building on 
legislative and policy initiatives of key importance to each 
party. 
 
¶25. This cable was cleared by DAS DiCarlo. 
MILOVANOVIC