VZCZCXRO8325
OO RUEHAST
DE RUEHVJ #2361/01 2761657
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031657Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4556
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIAN ELECTIONS: PRESIDENCY COUNT FINAL BUT 
PARLIAMENT RESULTS UNCLEAR 
 
REF: A. SARAJEVO 2329 
     ¶B. SARAJEVO 2279 
 
SARAJEVO 00002361  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Vote counting for the October 1 national elections 
is continuing.  In the evening of October 2, the Central 
Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed 
Haris Silajdzic, Nebojsa Radmanovic and Zeljko Komsic as the 
winners of Bosniak, Serb and Croat seats on the 
Tri-Presidency and delivered preliminary, and incomplete, 
results of legislative elections.  In a departure from past 
elections, vote tabulation is proceeding slowly, with 
counting complete in only 45 percent of Federation and 65 of 
Republika Srpska (RS) municipalities, according to the CEC. 
Although legislative returns are incomplete, they suggest 
SNSD will have a plurality among the RS delegation to the 
State Parliament and an absolute majority in the RS National 
Assembly (RSNA).  Although the SDA may remain the largest 
Bosniak party in Parliament, SBiH has greatly undermined its 
influence.  Dodik and Silajdzic are already signaling that 
they are prepared to cooperate in State-level issues, 
however, the nationalist invective of the campaign season 
will probably complicate both leaders' ability to cooperate 
in the near term. The Croat reaction to the election of 
Zeljko Komsic has been emotional and disorganized with Ivo 
Miro Jovic, despite his own party's concession, still 
claiming the Croat Presidency.  The SDP, despite the Komsic 
win, remains the weakest of the three Bosniak parties and is 
growing increasingly concerned that it will be denied a 
meaningful coalition role.  Although Parliamentary results 
remain unclear, the SBiH and SNSD victories may portend 
near-term difficulties for USG priorities such as 
constitutional and police reform.  The coalition-building 
process is likely to be a lengthy one, and it may be several 
months until a new government is seated.  End Summary. 
 
Preliminary Elections Results: 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) In the evening of October 2 at 2100, the Central 
Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed 
the three winning candidates for the Tri-Presidency.  Nebojsa 
Radmanovic of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats 
(SNSD) was elected to the Serb presidency.  Haris Silajdzic 
of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) was elected to 
the Bosniak seat.  Zeljko Komsic of the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) was elected to the Croat Presidency.  Milan Jelic 
was also confirmed as the new RS President.  The electoral 
opponents of all three Presidents elect have conceded defeat. 
 Under Bosnian electoral law, the CEC has until October 31 to 
certify the election results, at which point they become 
final. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In the same briefing the CEC released preliminary 
results (based on 40-45 percent of the vote) on the overall 
vote received by each party competing for seats in the State 
Parliament.  Projection of seats in each electoral district 
is not possible until all votes are counted.  However, as a 
result of the landslide victory of SNSD in the Republika 
Srpska (RS), it is almost certain that the SNSD will win a 
plurality in the State Parliament and an absolute majority in 
the RS National Assembly (RSNA).  Preliminary vote counts 
suggest that the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) will 
probably remain the largest Bosniak party in Parliament but 
the strong showing by SBiH will erode SDA influence.  After 
initial euphoria over the election of Zeljko Komsic to the 
Croat Presidency, SDP is moderating its high expectations for 
seats in State Parliament.  Other parties that are likely to 
win between two and four seats in the State Parliament 
include the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), the Serb Democratic 
Party (SDS) and  HDZ-1990.  One or two of the minor national 
parties, including the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) and 
the may also cross the three percent threshold to win a 
single seat in Parliament. 
 
Vote Count Complications 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) In contrast with past elections, vote counting by 
the CEC is proceeding slowly.  According to Bosnian election 
law, vote counts must be completed in each municipality with 
ballots subsequently forwarded to Sarajevo for CEC 
confirmation.  As of 2100 on October 2, only 45 percent of 
Federation and 65 percent of RS municipalities had completed 
vote tabulation.  According to mission contacts at the CEC, 
the most significant delays have occurred in Tuzla, Prijedor 
 
SARAJEVO 00002361  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
and certain districts in Sarajevo and are primarily due to 
unspecified technical and transportation problems.  Although 
allegations of irregularities abound, primarily disseminated 
by losing parties, post has no concrete information 
indicating that delays in vote counting are the result of 
fraud or vote tampering. 
 
The National Political Landscape 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) For the first time in the history of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the three establishment national parties (SDA, 
SDS and HDZ) have been shut out of the Presidency.  SBiH and 
SNSD succeeded at the polls largely due to the same 
nationalistic campaigning for which they had been criticizing 
SDA and SDS for more than a decade, however.  Silajdzic 
highlighted his nationalist credentials by emphasizing his 
actions undermining constitutional reform, while Dodik made 
liberal use of Pan-Serb secessionism.  Although Dodik and 
Silajdzic are already signaling that they are prepared to 
cooperate in State-level issues, the nationalist invective of 
the campaign season will probably complicate both leaders' 
ability to cooperate in the near term.  The SDP, despite the 
Komsic win, is politically isolated and growing increasingly 
concerned that it will be denied a coalition role.  In the 
current atmosphere, further complicated by the slow pace of 
vote counting, the coalition-building process is likely to be 
a lengthy one.  It may be several months until a new 
government is seated. 
 
 
Bosniak Realignment 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU)  The landslide victory of Bosniak President-elect 
Haris Silajdzic has provided him a compelling mandate among 
the Bosniak electorate.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
Silajdzic is already taking advantage of his bully pulpit in 
the initial stages of the coalition-building process. 
Incumbent Bosniak President Sulejman Tihic, and his SDA, have 
been severely weakened and Tihic's continued leadership of 
the party is in serious doubt.  The SDA is already under 
pressure to modify its policies in order to enter into 
coalition with the newly dominant SBiH.  SDA members have 
begun discussing the possibility of an extraordinary party 
congress this year during which party policies and leadership 
would be reconsidered.  SDA members from the more 
conservative wing of the party appear to be on the ascendant. 
 
 
Croat Reaction 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Though they fretted about it before the election, 
establishment Croat parties were unprepared for the election 
of Zeljko Komsic to the Croat Presidency and are struggling 
to find their post-election footing.  Per ref B, the division 
of the Croat vote between HDZ and HDZ-1990 was a significant 
factor in the election of Komsic and Croat political leaders. 
 Notably, both Croatian President Stjepan Mesic and Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanander have stated that Bosnian elections were 
free and fair and results are legitimate.  HDZ Presidential 
candidate Ivo Miro Jovic has appeared particularly 
off-balance since election day.  In an October 2 television 
interview he stated that either "Ivo Miro Jovic is the Croat 
member of the Presidency or there will not be any Bonsian 
Presidency at all."  In a separate statement Jovic insisted 
that he had been elected to the Presidency and that if 
attempts are made to challenge him "something shocking is 
going to happen in this country, something tragic," Jovic 
added that Komsic will not take this seat because he did not 
receive "a single vote of a true Croat."  Jovic also said 
that Croats can express their dissatisfaction by leaving the 
country."  Yesterday HDZ spokesman Miso Relota asserted that 
that the Komsic victory portends a serious political crisis 
and a Komsic presidency will turn Bosnian Croats into a 
national minority. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Shock within the Croat community over having 
unwillingly played into the hands of SDP may result in a 
gradual rapprochement of the estranged parties HDZ-BiH and 
HDZ 1990 and of the other Croat-dominated parties, such as 
HSP-DJ/NHI and NSRB, both of which have benefited from the 
HDZ decline. It cannot be ruled out, however, that in the 
short run the newly emerged Croat pluralism will result in 
paralysis, thus strengthening radical Croat circles and 
self-rule tendencies outside Parliament. 
 
 
SARAJEVO 00002361  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Dodik Consolidates Power in the RS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U)  SDS President Dragan Cavic issued a statement early 
on October 2 conceding defeat to the SDS at all levels of the 
RS and State government and congratulated SNSD candidates on 
their victories.  For his part, statements by RS PM Milorad 
Dodik were generally temperate in contrast to his campaign 
rhetoric.  Dodik said that the scale of the SNSD win bodes 
well for an absolute majority in the RSNA and that the 
elections illustrated that the SNSD and the continued 
existence of the RS were now permanent realities in Bosnia. 
Dodik stated he would remain as RS PM and that SNSD was in 
the process of deciding its nominee for the State Prime 
Minister (Chairman of the Council of Ministers). 
 
¶10. (SBU) At an October 2 SNSD press conference, the party 
released unofficial results based on incomplete tallies. 
With ninety per cent of the votes counted in individual 
races, SNSD claimed that Milan Jelic led Dragan Cavic for the 
RS Presidency by 62 to 37 per cent, while Nebojsa Radmanovic 
led Mladen Bosic 68 to 31 per cent.  In the race for thestate parliament, with 
40 per cent of votes counte, SNSD 
claimed to be leading with 59 per cent, folowed by SDS with 
20 per cent and PDP with 5 percent.  SNSD claimed a lead of 
52 percent in the SNA, compared to the SDS 20 percent. 
Dodik's draatic success could make state-level reform more 
difficult.  Dodik's victory will legitimize his intention to 
be treated, both by Sarajevo and the IC, as a an autonomous 
negotiating partner.  The SNSD victory could also cause the 
SDS to move towards a more hard-line opposition stance and 
refuse to participate in SNSD  reform negotiations. 
 
Implications for U.S. Interests 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Although Parliamentary results remain unclear, 
current trends portend near-term challenges for USG 
priorities such as constitutional and police reform. 
Silajdzic's resounding victory is the single most important 
complicating factor in the prospect for the reform process. 
Current electoral returns suggest that HDZ-1990, the other 
outspoken party opposing Constitutional Reform, will receive 
a solid mandate in Croat cantonal-level races.  If these 
trends continue, the result could be a new 
anti-Constitutional reform Croat caucus in the State level 
House of Peoples.  Milorad Dodik's overwhelming mandate has 
given him the ability, if he chooses, to indefinitely block 
police reform and therefore Bosnia's Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU.  Preliminary soundings 
give us reason for guarded optimism that, flush with its 
strong show of support, SNSD will stake out a more 
statesmanlike position.  But if goaded by Silajdzic or others 
the spirit of cooperation could quickly unravel. 
 
CEFKIN